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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis makes an intervention in the recent proliferation of work on encyclopaedism in 
fiction. By taking James Joyce’s Ulysses, Leslie Marmon Silko’s Almanac of the Dead, and 
Roberto Bolaño’s 2666 as its case studies, the project proposes that fictional encyclopaedism 
can be read through the responses authors make to the diverse forms that encyclopaedic 
thought and practice has taken throughout history. In this, I contend, ‘encyclopaedism’ can 
be dissociated from its commonplace conflation with ‘great white male’ theories of literature, 
and refigured as a literary category with the potential to restructure, or decolonise, both our 
sense of ‘greatness’ and ‘mastery’ in fiction and our idea of the world as a complete and 
coherent totality. 
 
The project is divided into five sections. The introduction establishes the relationship 
between encyclopaedism and totality through a reading of the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s ‘Great 
American Indian Leaders’ exhibition in the 1980s, drawing particularly on the theoretical 
work of Gerald Vizenor and Walter D. Mignolo and on historians of encyclopaedism. The 
first and second chapters look to the ways Joyce and Silko, respectively, critique and re-tool 
specific forms of encyclopaedism, with Ulysses focusing on the Britannica and Almanac of the 
Dead reaching back to the encyclopaedic practices that gave epistemic shape to the European 
‘conquest,’ or invasion, of the Americas (particularly those of Bartolomé de Las Casas). Both 
authors, I propose, imagine new, radical, decolonial encyclopaedisms that work by opening 
themselves up to their own productive failures. The third chapter explores how Bolaño uses 
2666 to identify potential encyclopaedisms immanent to the contemporary, particularly 
through his dialogue with Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch. The conclusion synthesises the three 
authors’ forms of fictional encyclopaedism into the beginnings of a theory of literary totality 
as ‘totality-without-totality,’ along the lines of Jacques Derrida’s ‘messianism-without-
messianicity.’ 
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Contact with Tlön and the ways of Tlön have disintegrated this world. Captivated by 
its discipline, humanity has forgotten, and continues to forget, that it is the discipline 
of chess players, not of angels. 
 
Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ (1941)
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1. Introduction: Fictional Encyclopaedism 
 
Americans are the western pilgrims, who are carrying along with them that great mass 
of arts, sciences, vigour, and industry which began long since in the east; they will 
finish the great circle. 
J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur 
‘Letter III: What is an American?’ (1782)1 
 
The whole world of knowledge is a single universe of discourse. 
Mortimer J. Adler 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th edn.; 1974)2 
 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s, in the 
suburbs of LaCrosse, Wisconsin, the 
Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust 
acquired a plot of land that contained the 
remains of a Native American village. The 
Trust excavated the remains and 
constructed Valley View Mall in its place.3 
To celebrate the mall’s completion in 1980, 
the management decided to incorporate 
the site’s Indigenous history into its grand 
opening, and approached the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, based in Chicago since the 
beginning of the century, for ‘authentic 
information’ in putting it together.4 The 
result was an exhibition curated by the 
Britannica, entitled ‘Great American Indian 
																																																						
1 J. Hector St John de Crèvecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer, ed. by Susan Manning (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 44. 
2 Mortimer J. Adler, ‘Propædia: Circle of Knowledge,’ ed. by P.W. Goertz, New Encyclopædia Britannica 
(Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1974), 5–8 (p. 5). 
3 Patricia van Horn, ‘Exhibit of Indian Leaders Devoted to Unraveling Myths,’ The Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, 
PA, 11 May 1983), p. N – 3; Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust, ‘Valley View Mall: Property 
Overview’ <http://www.preit.com/leasing/detail/property_overview/18> [accessed 1 August 2014]. 
4 Ibid. Production of the Britannica moved from Edinburgh, where it was originally founded, to Chicago in the 
early 1900s, after it was sold to Horace Everett Hooper, an American businessman. Richard R. Yeo, 
Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 170; Gillian Thomas, A Position to Command Respect: Women and the Eleventh Britannica (Metuchen, NJ: 
The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1992), p. 11. 
 
Fig. 1. Valley View Mall, LaCrosse, WI. 
billburmaster.com (Bill Burmaster, June 2005. Web. 17 
March 2017). 
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Leaders,’ designed, according to a 
spokesperson, ‘[to educate] people on the fact 
that the Indian is very much alive.’5 The 
exhibition comprised twelve mannequins of 
historic tribal leaders in traditional costume, 
performances of traditional dances, fried 
dough and t-shirt concession stands, and lots 
of publicity for the recent Fifteenth edition of 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The exhibition 
proved successful enough to be taken on tour 
to malls across the U.S.A.6 The catalogue for 
the exhibition assures the reader that 
‘Britannica staff members spent long hours 
consulting scholars in the fields of Indian 
history, anthropology, and ethnology.’7 Yet, 
as Gerald Vizenor has pointed out, ‘Such considerations seem ironic, because most of the 
tribal names were not entered in the encyclopaedia the sponsors promoted at the 
exhibitions.’8 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. used Indigenous cultures to fund an 
encyclopaedic project that did not deem those very same Indigenous cultures sufficiently 
notable to warrant inclusion. 
This project addresses the intervention fiction can make in the modern history of 
encyclopaedic thought and practice, and takes as its case-studies James Joyce’s Ulysses, Leslie 
Marmon Silko’s Almanac of the Dead, and Roberto Bolaño’s 2666—three especially significant 
novels from the last 100 years that, when taken together, can be used to outline a theory 
about fiction and the totalising imagination. The almost tragically suburban example of the 
Britannica’s ‘Great American Indian Leaders’ exhibition might seem like a niche place to start, 
but it provides a helpful example through which to unpick what is at stake in encyclopaedic 
thought and practice, and to ascertain the relationship between encyclopaedism and fiction. 
Moreover, in the critical eye Vizenor brings to the exhibit, this project finds some of the 
theoretical terms of its de-totalising framework. In what follows, I will review the theoretical 
																																																						
5 Kevin Stanton, qtd. in van Horn. 
6 Ibid. The mannequins represented Black Hawk, Pontiac, Cochise, Massasoit, Joseph, Cornplanter, 
Powhatan, Red Cloud, Sequoyah, Tecumseh, Wovoka, and Sacagawea.  
7 Great American Indian Leaders: A Special Exhibit Catalogue (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1980), p. 3. 
8 Gerald Vizenor, Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance, First Bison Books (Lincoln, NE: Bison, 
1994), p. 40. By the time of the 1991 reprint of the Macropaedia, Massasoit, Red Cloud, and Sacagawea were 
still omitted. Since at least 2011, all selected leaders have discrete entries on the Britannica’s website. 
 
Fig. 2. Great American Indian Leaders: A Special 
Exhibit Catalogue (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 
1980). 
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and literary contexts in which this study intervenes, and go on to trace the shape of its 
argument—but before I get to that, I will begin by introducing my key terms, by way of the 
Britannica’s ‘Great American Indian Leaders’ exhibition. 
 
1.1 Imagined Encyclopaedisms 
 
If an encyclopaedia summarises and organises all knowledge within a totalising 
epistemological framework, the edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica promoted by the ‘Great 
American Indian Leaders’ exhibition denied space within its totality to Indigeneity. In this, 
the Britannica positioned Indigeneity outside or beyond the remit of its ‘order of things,’ as if 
to suggest that Indigeneity is somehow incompatible with or insignificant to the framework 
with which the encyclopaedia summarises and organises all knowledge. What happens to 
knowledge that is excluded from order, or deemed insufficiently significant to be notable as 
part of order? Michel Foucault uses Jorge Luis Borges’ Heavenly Emporium of Benevolent 
Knowledge, the infamous imaginary ‘Chinese encyclopedia’ from his essay on John Wilkins’ 
analytical language, to posit that one of the key effects of the encyclopaedic framework is to 
‘define a common locus beneath’ all that is included, regardless of its incongruity.9 For Foucault, 
what is so unsettlingly hilarious about Borges’ Heavenly Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge is the 
suggestion that a ‘common locus’ might work through categories like ‘(k) drawn with a very 
fine camelhair brush’ or ‘(n) that from a long way off look like flies.’10 We could build on 
Foucault’s terms, then, to speak of the Britannica denying Indigeneity a part of that ‘common 
locus’ through which it assigns an order to things—and we could go on to infer from that 
that the Britannica’s exclusion of Indigeneity robs it of a certain factuality. 
This is an important idea; but the inference that exclusion from encyclopaedic order 
implicitly renders facts untrue does not really get to how encyclopaedic thought and practice 
mediates reality according to that which is ‘notable’; after all, the inclusion of fictional 
constructs, like geopolitical categories, or, the taxonomy of animals in Heavenly Emporium of 
Benevolent Knowledge, pose no categorical problem for encyclopaedic thought.11 Rather, 
inclusion seems to endow those included with a particular kind of ‘common’ recognisability 
or commensurability—to make that which is included, fictional or factual, real in its eyes. It 
																																																						
9 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘John Wilkins’ Analytical Language,’ The Total Library: Non-Fiction 1922-1986, trans. by 
Esther Allen, Suzanne Levine, and Eliot Weinberger (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 231; Michel Foucault, The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. xvii–xviii; emphasis in 
original. 
10 Borges, The Total Library, p. 231. 
11 Ibid, p. 231. 
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is not the boundary between fact and fiction that the encyclopaedia mediates: it is the 
category of legitimate and normative reality that it reifies. The Britannica’s self-congratulatory 
appropriation of ‘Great American Indian Leaders’ for its marketing makes clear that the 
relationship between exclusion-from and inclusion-in an encyclopaedic framework is not so 
easily reducible to a fiction-fact binary; indeed, while the Britannica may deny Indigeneity 
space within its framework, it still finds a way to co-opt the factuality of Indigeneity 
paratextually. It is not so much that exclusion from an encyclopaedia negates existence as 
that inclusion conflates legitimate and normative reality with ‘notability,’ to invoke 
Wikipedia’s key criterion. Indeed, we could take Wikipedia’s hint, since it has become almost 
certainly the most widely and heavily used contemporary encyclopaedia,12 and consider how 
its definition of ‘notability’ not only articulates a key principle of encyclopaedic thought, but 
clarifies one of its key effects. 
Wikipedia’s ‘General Notability Guideline’ is as follows: ‘If a topic has received significant 
coverage in reliable sources that are independent of the subject, it is presumed to be suitable for a 
standalone article or list.’13 For Wikipedia, inclusion repeats and indexes that which is already 
important to reality. We could describe its effect upon its content, then, as synthesising 
‘notable’ fictions and facts into a single space to make them more easily and widely accessible. 
But, more importantly, we should also assert that that synthesis reifies the very ‘notability’ of 
those fictions and facts—it increases their ‘notability,’ making those fictions and facts and 
the ‘common locus’ into which they are subsumed more verifiably real. This is important: for 
encyclopaedic thought has no more special access to impartiality and objectivity than any 
other form of thought. What if there were systemic biases across the ‘reliable sources’ on 
which Wikipedia, and indeed all encyclopaedias, depend? What if, for example, those sources 
tended to be written by men, or funded by colonial governments, or used outdated 
methodologies, or normalised certain familial and societal structures, or disguised corporate 
conflicts of interest? Would that mean that the criterion of ‘notability’ cannot be detached 
from the power structures immanent to the status quo? If Wikipedia’s ‘General Notability 
Guidelines’ assert that ‘Notability is based on the existence of suitable sources,’ then it follows that 
notability presupposes a reality in line with the structures of power that determine what 
																																																						
12 Wikipedia consistently ranks, across both Alexa Internet and SimilarWeb, as the fifth most viewed website 
on the internet, behind Google, YouTube, Facebook, and Baidu. ‘List of Most Popular Websites,’ Wikipedia, 
2017 <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_most_popular_websites&oldid=765683495> 
[accessed 18 February 2017]. 
13 This ‘General Notability Guideline’ is described by Wikipedia’s editors as ‘a test used…to decide whether a 
given topic warrants its own article.’ ‘Wikipedia:Notability,’ Wikipedia, 2017 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Notability&oldid=760576683> [accessed 1 
February 2017]; emphasis in original. 
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constitutes those ‘suitable sources.’14 We could begin to speak of a ‘dialectic of notability’ 
inherent to encyclopaedic thought, whereby inclusion within the encyclopaedia’s ‘common 
locus’ synthesises the fictions and facts that constitute the status quo into that which in the 
world is ultimately the most real. 
The consequence of this is that encyclopaedic thought and practice is always already 
legitimating and normalising that which it deems ‘notable’—and it is from this standpoint 
that we can begin to unpick what is at stake in encyclopaedic thought. How does 
encyclopaedic thought construct a relationship between ‘notability’ and ‘reality’? What kind 
of worlds does it imagine by assuming the authority to articulate that relationship? And most 
importantly, how can that which is excluded work within or against such encyclopaedisms?  
In the context of the ‘Great American Indian Leaders’ exhibition, the answers to the first 
two questions at least are clear: the Britannica’s simultaneous appropriation of Indigeneity for 
marketing purposes and decision to not deem Indigeneity sufficiently notable for inclusion 
within its ‘common locus’ is an act that subordinates Indigenous reality to Euro-American 
reality—that uses the former to assert the supremacy of the latter. As such, Vizenor describes 
Indigenous exclusion from the encyclopaedic framework as motivated fundamentally by 
Euro-American ‘aversion to the presence of tribes’: it is the desire to sidestep the fact of ‘the 
tribal real’ that enables the exclusion of Indigeneity from the Britannica’s ‘encyclopaedia of 
dominance.’15 Indeed, it is as if the ‘common locus’ from which the Britannica’s brand of 
encyclopaedism imagines its community is one that is struggling to repair itself with its 
history—as if the Britannica’s encyclopaedism is trying to make real a world wherein that 
history is less real. Building on Benedict Anderson’s theory of literature, national identity, 
and print capitalism, we can remind ourselves that the encyclopaedia’s idea of the world will 
always reflect, to some degree, the prevailing values held by the community it imagines.16 As 
Vizenor notes, the Britannica’s sense of the ‘tribal real’ in its traveling exhibition is a simulation 
of ‘reality’ defined from the standpoint of compulsory tribal absence; or to use Vizenor’s 
words, ‘In the absence of the tribal real, the unreal simulations crossed the border of “fact 
and fiction” and became the real in the promotion of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.’17 In the 
reality of the Britannica, Indigenous reality is defined as affirmation of the supremacy of the 
Euro-American real—the Britannica imagines a world that excludes the ‘tribal real,’ as if its 
very existence depends on that assertion of dominance. 
																																																						
14 Ibid; emphasis in original. 
15 Vizenor, pp. 3, 41, 39. 
16 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. edn (London: 
Verso, 2006). 
17 Vizenor, pp. 40–1. 
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In all of this, one thing that the dialectic of notability makes crystal clear is that 
encyclopaedic thought is always selective thought—capacious thought, certainly, but by no 
means all-inclusive or universal or absolute. This is not unique to the Britannica or Wikipedia: 
while encyclopaedism may operate, as Foucault suggests, ‘to define a common locus beneath’ 
everything, it always, as Walter D. Mignolo asserts, emerges from a ‘locus of enunciation.’18 
Encyclopaedias may present themselves as universal, or be renowned for extensiveness and 
completion, but their compilation has always depended, to at least some degree, upon 
notability. This selective principle is built into the term’s very etymology: the term 
‘encyclopaedia’ is derived from Quintilian’s Greek ‘enkyklios paideia’ (ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία), 
which translates literally as ‘circle of learning’ or ‘cycle of education.’19 While the term entered 
into popular usage in the sixteenth century—the result, Robert L. Fowler describes, of the 
new Renaissance stress ‘on the notion of the unity of all knowledge’—it had emerged as the 
principle term for the Western omne scibili by at least the eighteenth century.20 The explicit 
didacticism of the metaphor of a ‘circle of learning’ in itself tells us a lot about the standpoint 
of any encyclopaedic project. After all, a ‘circle of learning’ is not necessarily a totalising 
image: it does not define the entirety of reality so much as a set of predetermined pedagogical 
principles—principles that synecdochally make visible the order beneath reality. But, of 
course, since it is those pedagogical principles that define the ‘circle of learning,’ and not the 
other way around, its image of the entirety of reality is always already encoded with a 
particular set of values. In this, any ‘circle of learning’ necessarily repeats and makes accessible 
a world that is already known—not so much all that is the case, which we do not necessarily 
																																																						
18 Mignolo has explained that he derives this term from Foucault’s ‘modalities of enunciation’ [‘modalités 
d’enonciation’] in The Archaeology of Knowledge. That said, since much of Mignolo’s work functions to re-place 
Foucauldian thought on a more solid geo-historical footing, I also interpret it in implicit dialogue with the 
‘common locus’ of encyclopaedic thought that Foucault discusses in The Order of Things. Walter D. Mignolo, 
The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 2nd edn (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 2003), p. 5; Michel Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1969), p. 72; 
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 2nd edn (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 59; Foucault, 
The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, p. xviii. 
19 Teresa Morgan, ‘Rhetoric and Education,’ in A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. by Ian Worthington 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2010), p. 309.  
20 Fowler dates the term’s ‘invention’ among ‘humanistic circles’ in Europe back to the late fifteenth century. 
Yeo elaborates on this, suggesting that the metaphorical ‘circle of learning’ provided by the term reflected the 
increasing importance of pedagogical considerations as the remit of encyclopaedic projects grew 
unmanageably larger, since knowledge came to be ‘conceived as an open-ended search that could displace 
accepted truths’ and ‘the prospect of holding all important knowledge in memory’ began to seem ‘impossible.’ 
As such, projects like Gregor Reisch’s Margarita Philosophica (1496) and Johann Heinrich Alsted’s Encyclopaedia, 
Septem Tomis Distincta (1630) imitated the university curriculum or prescribed an order of study. Only after 
Francis Bacon’s interventions, in The Advancement of Learning (1605) and Novum Organum (1620) did 
encyclopaedic projects’ pedagogical considerations begin to incorporate the indexing that characterises the 
structure of most contemporary encyclopaedias. Robert L. Fowler, ‘Encyclopaedias: Definitions and 
Theoretical Problems,’ in Pre-Modern Encyclopaedic Texts: Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-
4 July 1996, ed. by Peter Binkley (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 6–7, 27–9; Yeo, pp. 78–83. 
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know, as all that has always been the case, which is all we do.21 In this, the ‘dialectic of notability’ 
that populates the ‘circle of learning’ comes to look much like the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’ 
theorised by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer: both have the potential to reproduce 
the status quo by shutting themselves off from the unknown. Indeed, as Adorno and 
Horkheimer write, in full cognisance of the consequences of this, ‘Humans believe 
themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown.’22 
The encyclopaedia’s content, then, can be described as a totalised version of reality. Its 
contents, which aim to paint a complete and coherent picture of our world and universe, 
have already been interpreted and arranged for its audience; that is to say, it articulates an 
idea of the world as a total object built from parts or fragments determined by the priorities 
of the agents constructing it. Moreover, its idea of the real is conflated with the known: that 
which is unknown is unable to structure or shape the encyclopaedia’s complete and coherent 
idea of the world. On what basis, then, could any ‘circle of learning’ assume objectivity?23 Is 
an encyclopaedia not always on some level the ‘codification of a metaphorical intellectual 
dominion,’ to use Richard R. Yeo’s memorable description of the Eleventh Edition of the 
Britannica?24 
J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur provides a neat image for visualising how encyclopaedic 
thought asserts the dominance of its idea of the world: in his letter to Europe on American 
identity and possibility, he explained that America’s ‘western pilgrims’ stand to ‘finish the 
great circle’ of ‘arts, sciences, vigour, and industry.’25 Invoking the ‘circle of learning,’ 
Crèvecoeur casts America as the missing piece of a European tradition; and indeed, if 
America is an appendage to European knowledge, the European locus from which it is 
enunciated automatically marginalises, or negates, or overwrites, those loci indigenous to 
America. Moreover, Crèvecoeur suggests that the possibility of ‘completion’ is contingent on 
the assembly and enforcement of boundaries that exclude that which does not fit the pre-
																																																						
21 Indeed, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s own shift, in Philosophical Investigations, away from the logical positivism of the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ propositions serves as a helpful reminder that any representation of the ‘world’ is 
always a signified—an idea of the ‘world’—rather than the world itself. As Philosophical Investigations makes 
clear, the ‘totality of facts’ does not necessarily mediate between what is and is not the case. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 1*, 1.1. 
22 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. by Gunzelin Noeri, trans. by Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002; repr. 2007), p. 11. 
23 And indeed, in this light, it is curious to note that the idea of ‘objectivity’ in itself is a surprisingly new 
concept: Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison note that ‘It first emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and in a 
matter of decades became established not only as a scientific norm but also as a set of practices.’ Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), p. 27. 
24 Yeo, p. 241. 
25 Crèvecoeur, p. 44. 
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determined worldview.26 The encyclopaedic imagination becomes one that re-states 
dominance over that which is deemed ‘other’: the completed circle that Crèvecoeur envisions 
will be one which overwrites that which has been the case in America with that which has 
always been the case in Europe—an imagination in service of colonial dominance. In the 
case of the Britannica’s ‘Great American Indian Leaders’ exhibit, it is clear how this works: 
Indigenous culture is excluded from the ‘great circle,’ made visible only insofar as it resources 
Eurocentric dominance. As Mortimer J. Adler, director of editorial planning for the Fifteenth 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, wrote in its Propaedia: ‘the whole world of knowledge is a single 
universe of discourse.’27 For Adler, it is as if all knowledge were not only singularly coherent 
and mutually supportive but the same across languages—at best a universalist fantasy and at 
worst a supremacist calculation. ‘The truth,’ Mignolo reminds us, ‘is always relative to the 
locus of enunciation.’28 
That said, it is far too easy to write a critique of encyclopaedic thought that ends on 
accusations of Eurocentrism—a charge Hamid Dabashi has rightly described as ‘punishingly 
boring’ in the twenty-first century.29 Yes, the encyclopaedia, and the Britannica in particular, 
can be defined as total knowledge complete with built-in Eurocentric ignorance, but, as 
Mignolo insists, that is just the starting point: ‘The question is: who, when, why is 
constructing knowledges?’30 Moreover, what does it mean for the ‘completeness’ of 
constructed knowledges to be contingent on the act of exclusion? Does it suggest that the 
‘completeness’ of constructed knowledge depend on that constructed knowledge’s reception 
as ‘exceptional’? Indeed, to extrapolate from Giorgio Agamben’s political analysis of juridico-
constitutional states of exception, if exceptional measures ‘find themselves in the paradoxical 
position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms,’ and the state 
of exception ‘appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form,’ then we could ask 
to what extent the prerogatives of encyclopaedic thought depend on its consideration by its 
																																																						
26 As Seth Rudy has noted, this attitude to ‘completion’ flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries: ‘The frequent appearance and casual use of “complete” and its variants in the titles and prefaces of 
seventeenth-century guidebooks for example…helped to establish “complete” less as a determinate of quality 
than as a way of thinking about the order, organization, transmission, and progress of human learning—
particularly as mediated by literature. The completeness of knowledge in general and the completeness of a 
“literary” work in terms of formal structure and generic propriety, moreover, were not always already divided, 
particularly in the cases of epic and encyclopedic endeavors.’ While Rudy focuses on texts associated with the 
Enlightenment in Britain, our approaches overlap in our mutual insistence on the political stakes of 
‘completion.’ Seth Rudy, Literature and Encyclopedism in Enlightenment Britain: The Pursuit of Complete Knowledge 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 6. 
27 Adler, p. 5. 
28 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance, p. 186. 
29 Hamid Dabashi, ‘Fuck You Žižek!,’ ZED Books, 2016 <https://www.zedbooks.net/blog/posts/fuck-you-
zizek/> [accessed 25 January 2017]. 
30 Walter D. Mignolo, ‘Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,’ Theory, 
Culture & Society, 26.7-8 (2009), 1–23 (p. 2). 
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imagined community as ‘exceptional.’31 If we accept the latent biases conferred on 
encyclopaedic thought and its idea of the world by its ‘dialectic of notability,’ we are 
compelled to push further than exceptionalism. Is it inevitable for encyclopaedic thought to 
repeat the status quo’s supremacy? Is encyclopaedism without dominance possible? 
Moreover, how can the willed gaps and exclusions on which certain encyclopaedic ideas of 
the world depend—what Charles W. Mills describes as an ignorance ‘militant, 
aggressive…active, dynamic…presenting itself unblushingly as knowledge’—be unravelled?32 
Can encyclopaedic thought be made to productively address itself to or engage with that 
which is not known—the unknown? How can that which is excluded by the encyclopaedia’s 
framework make itself visible and active within the status quo? Indeed, to recall Gilles 
Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s terms, how ‘to challenge the language and [make] it follow a 
sober revolutionary path? How to become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy in relation 
to one’s own language?’33 How can we read the disjuncture that exclusion enforces without 
buying in to that ‘taste for exclusive disjunctions’—that is, in a way that ‘would no longer be 
exclusive or restrictive, but fully affirmative, nonrestrictive, inclusive,’ allowing for a 
‘disjunction that remains disjunctive, and that still affirms the disjoined terms…without 
restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the one’?34  
With an eye, then, on James Baldwin’s dictum that the creative process ‘must drive to the 
heart of every answer and expose the question the answer hides,’35 I propose that these 
questions emerge when Joyce’s Ulysses, Silko’s Almanac of the Dead, and Bolaño’s 2666 are 
taken, individually and collectively, as answers to the issues posed by encyclopaedism in 
fiction—and in Joyce’s, Silko’s, and Bolaño’s interpretations of and interventions in the 
history and practice of encyclopaedic thought, we can begin to get a sense of the worlds both 
through and beyond encyclopaedism that literary thinking makes possible. To explore the 
ways in which Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño raise these questions and work to think through and 
beyond them is to theorise the peculiar forms of imaginative possibility that fiction can 
																																																						
31 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. by Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
p. 1. 
32 Charles W. Mills, ‘White Ignorance,’ in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. by Shannon Sullivan and 
Nancy Tuana (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007). 
33 Gilles Deleuze and Fe ́lix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. by Dana Polan (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 19. 
34 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark 
Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 76; emphasis in 
original. 
35 James Baldwin, James Baldwin: Collected Essays, ed. by Toni Morrison (New York, NY: Library of America, 
1998), p. 670. 
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activate in encyclopaedic thought.36 That is to say, if encyclopaedic thought requires a totality 
that is complete, consistent, coherent, singular, and certain, then perhaps what a literary 
totality enables is a form of encyclopaedism that can involve its own failure—its own 
incompletion, inconsistency, incoherence, multiplicity, and uncertainty. 
By suggesting that the possibility which fiction affords encyclopaedic thought may be the 
possibility of its own failure—that the difference between an encyclopaedic totality and a 
literary totality may be the ability of the latter to allow for its own negation—my approach 
to theorising fictional encyclopaedism follows a similar critical trajectory as that which brings 
Jacques Derrida, in Specters of Marx, to his theory of the ‘messianic without messianism.’37 
Indeed, his is a helpful course to track, not just because the potential for radicalism he finds 
in a messianism that consciously withholds its messianic promise bears a family resemblance 
to that of an encyclopaedism that consciously undermines any attempt to totalise reality, but 
because Derridean thought, since Of Grammatology, takes a similar starting point to this 
project: that the idea of the world can never be coterminous with or reflective of the actual 
world. Just as the signified cannot be completely grasped by the signifier, the encyclopaedia 
cannot provide unmediated access to the world’s universal system. Indeed, if the conditions 
that make language possible cannot be accessed by language, then it follows that the system 
that makes the world possible cannot be accessed by encyclopaedism. In this, the way that 
Derrida’s grammatological thesis revises and re-tools Martin Heidegger’s critique of 
metaphysics proves a useful point of departure—for, while Of Grammatology specifically 
assimilates ‘presence’ and ‘Being’ as they are theorised in Being and Time, its ideas can also be 
productively applied to Heidegger’s statement, in ‘Age of the World Picture,’ about the 
possibility of imagining the world.38 
In Heidegger’s understanding, the ‘world picture’ is the key category for ascertaining 
modernity: the modern ‘world picture’ is ascertained by ‘science as research,’ or the scientific 
																																																						
36 That fiction and encyclopaedic thought are conventionally seen to exclude each other is, as Renaissance 
historian Neil Kenny has observed, a sign of the extent to which modern encyclopaedic ideals diverge from 
those of the Renaissance: ‘We tend to assume…that science, philosophy, and learning are very distinct from 
fiction […] It therefore comes as no little culture shock for us to find sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
writers commonly mixing fictional modes of discourse with the broad domain which they call philosophy, 
including all investigations into human and natural phenomena, from metaphysics to alchemy.’ Kenny goes 
on to argue that, since ‘Renaissance modes of organizing and conceiving knowledge, is deeply and overtly 
dependent on strategies which we would now label “literary,”’ the history of encyclopaedic thought can be 
seen to take a dramatic new path with ‘the rise of “literature” as a mode distinct from philosophy, science, 
and erudition occurred primarily in the eighteenth century.’ Neil Kenny, The Palace of Secrets: Béroalde de Verville 
and Renaissance Conceptions of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 2, 3–4. 
37 Derrida theorises this notion most thoroughly in the chapter entitled ‘Conjuring—Marx.’ Jacques Derrida, 
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, ed. by Peggy Kamuf (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 74–92. 
38 Martin Heidegger, ‘Age of the World Picture,’ in Off the Beaten Track, ed. by Julian Young and Kenneth 
Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 57–85. 
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method. Importantly for Heidegger, it is in the secular nature of ‘science as research’ that the 
modern ‘world picture’ differs from that of the Middle Ages, as it makes human ‘Being,’ 
rather than God, the central, transcendent element of the modern ‘world picture’; as he notes, 
‘The essence of modernity can be seen in humanity’s freeing itself from the bonds of the 
Middle Ages in that it frees itself to itself’—a liberation that transforms ‘the essence of 
humanity’ so that ‘man becomes the subject.’39 In Heidegger’s eyes, then, the modern ‘world 
picture’ is the one that encodes human ‘Being’ as the centre of the order of things: 
When…man becomes the primary and genuine subiectum, this means that he becomes 
that being upon which every being, in its way of being and its truth, is founded. Man 
becomes the referential center of beings as such.40 
 
If the scientific method is the means by which modernity is established, and the 
presupposition of that method (according to Heidegger) is that human ‘Being’ is central to 
reality, then modernity becomes the point at which human imagination reflects that centrality 
in the world and allows us to picture it accordingly: 
Where the world becomes picture, beings as a whole are set in place as that for which 
man is prepared; that which, therefore, he correspondingly intends to bring before 
him, have before him, and, thereby, in a decisive sense, place before him.41 
 
In Heidegger’s idea of the world, the world picture of modernity ‘stands before us together 
with what belongs to and stands together with it as a system.’42 
It is clear how the Heideggerian imagination of the world is open to Derrida’s critique of 
the metaphysics of presence: Heidegger’s ‘world picture’ is coterminous with that which 
‘presence’ makes comprehensible to ‘Being.’43 That is to say, the ‘world picture’ is directly 
associated with that which is present to the observer, and as such implies that knowledge of 
the world is allied with presence—indeed, everything in the world is the ‘totality of 
beings…“in the picture.”’44 The problem with this is that by characterising the ‘world picture’ 
as observable to ‘Being,’ Heidegger extends the thought in Being and Time that allows him to 
construct ‘Being’ as prior to language. For Derrida, this casts ‘Being’ as a ‘transcendental 
signified’—a situation that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes as one ‘where the signified 
[i.e., ‘Being’] commands, yet is free of, all signifiers.’45 In so doing, the ‘world picture’ 
																																																						
39 Ibid, p. 66. 
40 Ibid, pp. 66–7. 
41 Ibid, p. 67. 
42 Ibid, p. 67. 
43 Ibid, p. 66. 
44 Ibid, p. 67. 
45 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976; repr. 2016), pp. 21, xxxiv. 
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becomes, for Heidegger, a way of understanding the essence of the world beyond 
signification—assumes, that is, that the ‘world picture’ observable to ‘Being’ coincides with 
the world in and of itself. For Derrida, of course, this is simply not possible: 
‘Being’ as it is fixed in its general syntactic and lexicological forms within the area of 
linguistics and of Western philosophy, is not a primary and absolutely irreducible 
signified…it is still rooted in a system of languages and an historically determined 
‘signifiability [signifiance].’46 
 
As Mar Rosàs Tosas has outlined, the inescapable disjuncture between signifier and 
signified creates both the structural and causal grounds for Derrida’s later work on law, 
justice, and radical politics.47 The apparently paradoxical ‘messianic without messianism’ 
affords, for Derrida, a modality for action once one has become conscious that the signified 
can never be reached, and that the messiah will never arrive—it provides a means for justice 
without reducing justice to ‘juridical-moral rules, norms, or representations, within an 
inevitable totalizing horizon.’48 For this project, it provides a theoretical precedent that makes 
clear the implicit stakes of the similarly paradoxical fictional encyclopaedism: if any ‘world 
picture,’ or encyclopaedic totality, is necessarily unable to coincide with reality, and if any 
attempt to suggest that it could falls into the trap of depending on a ‘transcendental signifier,’ 
then a fictional encyclopaedism, or an encyclopaedism-without-facts, can provide a modality 
that allows encyclopaedic thought to move beyond the limits placed by the impossible 
completion it by definition seeks. 
If Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño use fictional encyclopaedism to imagine the world beyond the 
encyclopaedic totality produced by the status quo, it is because fictional encyclopaedism 
provides a way of making encyclopaedic thought face the unknown, and the repressed, and 
recalibrate itself accordingly—in a way that an encyclopaedism invested in its success cannot. 
To write a totality without totality is not just to place value in failure, but to understand 
intuitively what is at stake in the creation of the ideas of the world that underpin our lives—
what Jean-Luc Nancy describes, to admittedly rather different ends than my own, as ‘the 
sense of the world’: ‘world is not merely the correlative of sense, it is structured as sense, and 
reciprocally, sense is structured as world.’49 Thought, or sense, in itself depends for its existence 
on how it values its absolute context, the world—so precisely how we enable ourselves to 
imagine the world matters. The narrative that Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño present when read 
																																																						
46 Ibid, p. 24. 
47 Mar Rosàs Tosas, ‘Derrida’s Way out of the Dead End of Contemporary Messianism,’ Journal for Cultural 
Research, 18.4 (2014), 350–69 (p. 351). 
48 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 34. 
49 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. by Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 8; emphasis added. 
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comparatively suggests that we can decolonise our ideas of the world by thinking without the 
totalising moves on which dominance depends—and in this, I contend, the radical potential 
of imagined (fictional) encyclopaedisms in the contemporary world presents itself.  
 
1.2 From Swigger and Mendelson to Saint-Amour and Barrenechea 
 
The field of critical scholarship on fictional encyclopaedism is typically dated from 
Edward Mendelson’s 1976 article ‘Encyclopedic Narrative: From Dante to Pynchon’—an 
eccentric, quasi-comparative essay concerned with constructing a distinguished genealogy of 
‘encyclopedic narratives’ from The Divine Comedy to Gravity’s Rainbow.50 Mendelson’s essay has 
indeed had tremendous impact: as Luc Herman and Petrus van Ewjik note, it was responsible 
for popularising the term in U.S. literary scholarship.51 Yet, as Paul K. Saint-Amour has 
noted, the primary motivation of Mendelson, who is otherwise a scholar of W.H. Auden, in 
writing the essay was the Pulitzer board’s intervention to overrule its judges’ unanimous 
decision to award Gravity’s Rainbow the 1974 Pulitzer Prize for fiction: Mendelson chose to 
rise to Pynchon’s defence by installing the novel ‘in a rarefied lineage.’52 In this, the role of 
‘the encyclopaedic’ in relation to fiction is, for Mendelson, inherently linked to the type of 
nationalist cultural curation associated with national book awards. As such, Mendelson 
characterises ‘encyclopedic narratives’ as needing to fulfil a ‘unique set of formal and thematic 
conditions’ in order to be included in the genre: the terms of their success as ‘encyclopedic 
narratives’ lie in both their achievement of a formal and cultural mastery that simultaneously 
encapsulates and articulates their nation’s nascent consciousness or identity.53 Indeed, from 
Mendelson’s perspective: 
Each major national culture in the west, as it becomes aware of itself as a separate 
entity, produces an encyclopedic author, one whose work attends to the whole social and 
linguistic range of his nation, who makes use of all the literary styles and conventions 
																																																						
50 The essay is comparative in the sense that it attempts a comparison between different world cultures—and 
in Mendelson’s invocation of Northrop Frye’s short passages on ‘encyclopedic forms’ in Anatomy of Criticism, 
he specifically builds from that ur-text of comparative literary studies. Edward Mendelson, ‘Encyclopedic 
Narrative: From Dante to Pynchon,’ MLN, 91.6 (1976), 1267–75 (p. 1268n1); Northrop Frye, Anatomy of 
Criticism: Four Essays, 2nd edn (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 315–26. 
51 Indeed, Herman goes so far as to describe Mendelson’s contribution as ‘groundbreaking’ in his entry on the 
‘Encyclopedic Novel’ in Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory. Luc Herman and Petrus van Ewijk, ‘Gravity’s 
Encyclopedia Revisited: The Illusion of a Totalizing System in Gravity’s Rainbow,’ English Studies, 90.2 (2009), 
167–79 (p. 168); Petrus van Ewijk, ‘Encyclopedia, Network, Hypertext, Database: The Continuing Relevance 
of Encyclopedic Narrative and Encyclopedic Novel as Generic Designations,’ Genre, 44.2 (2011), 205–22 (p. 
205); Luc Herman, ‘Encyclopedic Novel,’ Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory (Routledge, 2005), pp. 137–
38 (p. 137). 
52 Paul K. Saint-Amour, Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p. 204. 
53 Mendelson, ‘Encyclopedic Narrative,’ p. 1267. 
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known to his countrymen, whose dialect often becomes established as the national 
language, who takes his place as national poet or national classic, and who becomes 
the focus of a large and persistent exegetic and textual industry comparable to the 
industry founded upon the Bible.54 
 
Of course, ‘national culture[s],’ major or otherwise, and their boundaries are always subject 
to policing, or curation. By Mendelson’s logic, there may be narratives written that achieve 
the requisite formal mastery to be considered ‘encyclopedic,’ but their inclusion in the genre 
of ‘encyclopedic narrative’ depends on a national agreement to treat them as such—a point 
that Mendelson’s argument obscures in its suggestion that a national culture might produce 
‘an encyclopedic author’ as organically as it might a messiah. In this way, Mendelson is able to 
claim that there has been, to date, only seven ‘encyclopedic narratives’: besides The Divine 
Comedy and Gravity’s Rainbow, Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel, Cervantes’ Don Quixote, 
Goethe’s Faust, Melville’s Moby-Dick, and Joyce’s Ulysses.55 
As an essay in response to the goals of the Pulitzer, Mendelson’s argument makes some 
sense—as an argument about the connection between encyclopaedism and fiction, however, 
it does not.56 By arguing that encyclopaedic narratives need to be curated as such in order to 
achieve their potential, since it is ‘Only after an encyclopedic narrative has taken its place as 
a literary monument’ that it can be ‘recognized as a member of its small and exclusive genre,’ 
Mendelson conflates encyclopaedism with a national becoming that co-opts his authors into 
his specific idea of nationhood and national identity, and refuses those encyclopaedic 
narratives he does not identify to be recognised as having engaged with the history and 
practice of encyclopaedic thought.57 Accordingly, Mendelson’s argument goes through 
awkward contortions when trying to clarify the supremacy of certain ‘encyclopedic’ authors 
over others. When, for example, discussing the ‘absence of a single monumental work that 
can serve as a cultural focus’ in England and Russia, Mendelson insists that Shakespeare and 
Pushkin respectively take on the ‘encyclopedic role’; and when considering those 
‘encyclopedic authors who are not “national authors”’ in France and the U.S.A., the work of 
authors like Balzac and Dos Passos becomes subordinated to ‘the problematical positions of 
																																																						
54 Ibid, p. 1268; emphasis in original. 
55 Ibid, p. 1267. 
56 Mendelson refined his ideas in a later essay devoted specifically to Gravity’s Rainbow, but, as Herman and 
van Ewjik argue, he overvalues the role of ‘totality’ in the novel in a way that enables him to overlook that 
‘Gravity’s Rainbow is predicated on an insight into its own limitations as an encyclopedic novel,’ and that 
Pynchon explicitly makes clear the futility of ‘any attempt at encircling the totality of knowledge on even one 
specific topic.’ This emphasis on success and completion is, as already suggested, anathema to the critical 
value of the term ‘encyclopaedic.’ Edward Mendelson, ‘Gravity’s Encyclopedia,’ in Mindful Pleasures: Essays on 
Thomas Pynchon, ed. by George Levine and David Leverenz (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1976); Herman and 
van Ewijk, pp. 168–9. 
57 Mendelson, ‘Encyclopedic Narrative,’ p. 1268.  
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Rabelais and Melville.’58 For Mendelson, ‘encyclopedic narrative’ is a genre characterisable 
only through a nationalist ‘greatness’ that charges the term ‘encyclopedic’ with a 
transcendence which normalises his particular sense of the world and its geopolitical order. 
In this, the term loses its specificity—becomes, as Franco Moretti suggests in his aversion to 
the term some years later, indicative more of an inscrutable super-canonicity, for texts that 
are ‘virtually unread,’ ‘Obligatory for any educated person,’ and dependent upon ‘scholastic 
institutions’ for survival.59 
It is little surprise, then, that when work on fictional encyclopaedism pays its dues to 
Mendelson, it tends to do so fleetingly—generally treating his argument as at best an eccentric 
staging post and at worst a strawman.60 This tendency leaves this project with two questions: 
firstly, what to make of Mendelson’s centrality in the field, given his argument’s problems; 
and secondly, whether it has any productive potential as part of a project that aims to unsettle 
the familiar boundaries of encyclopaedic thought. 
In answering the first question, it is curious and instructive to note that, Northrop Frye 
notwithstanding, Mendelson was not the first to try to explore the critical value of the term 
‘encyclopaedic’ in literature studies: Ronald T. Swigger’s ‘Fictional Encyclopedism and the 
																																																						
58 Ibid, p. 1268.  
59 Franco Moretti, Modern Epic: The World-System from Goethe to García Márquez, trans. by Quintin Hoare 
(London and New York: Verso, 1996), pp. 4–5. 
60 Besides Moretti, and Herman and van Ewijk, other significant contributions include: Gustavo Sainz, ‘Carlos 
Fuentes: A Permanent Bedazzlement,’ trans. by Tom J. Lewis, World Literature Today, 57.4 (1983), 568–72; 
Hilary Anne Clark, The Fictional Encyclopaedia: Joyce, Pound, Sollers (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), pp. v–vi; 
Hilary Anne Clark, ‘Encyclopedic Discourse,’ SubStance, 21.1 (1992), 95–110 (p. 95); Trey Strecker, ‘Ecologies 
of Knowledge: The Encyclopedic Narratives of Richard Powers and His Contemporaries,’ Review of 
Contemporary Fiction, 18.3 (1998), 67–71 (p. 67); Adam Sol, ‘The Story as It’s Told: Prodigious Revisions in 
Leslie Marmon Silko’s Almanac of the Dead,’ American Indian Quarterly, 23.3/4 (1999), 24–48; Mark D. 
Anderson, ‘A Reappraisal of the “Total” Novel: Totality and Communicative Systems in Carlos Fuentes’s 
Terra Nostra,’ Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures, 57.2 (2003); Stephen Burn, ‘The Collapse of 
Everything: William Gaddis and the Encyclopedic Novel,’ in Paper Empire: William Gaddis and the World System, 
ed. by Joseph Tabbi and Rone Shavers, 2nd edn (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2007), 
pp. 49–50; Len Platt, ‘“Unfallable Encyclicing”: Finnegans Wake and the Encyclopedia Britannica,’ James Joyce 
Quarterly, 47.1 (2009), 107–18; Søren Frank, ‘The Aesthetic of Elephantiasis: Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children as an 
Encyclopaedic Novel,’ Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 46.2 (2010), pp. 189–90; van Ewijk, pp. 205–6; David 
Letzler, ‘Encyclopedic Novels and the Cruft of Fiction: Infinite Jest’s Endnotes,’ Studies in the Novel, 44.3 (2012), 
304–24 (p. 127); Patricia Novillo-Corvalán, ‘Transnational Modernist Encounters: Joyce, Borges, Bolaño, and 
the Dialectics of Expansion and Compression,’ The Modern Language Review, 108.2 (2013), 341–67 (pp. 354–5); 
Stefano Ercolino, The Maximalist Novel From Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow to Roberto Bolano’s 2666 
(Bloomsbury USA Academic, 2014), pp. 37–9; Mark D. Anderson, ‘Modernism, Crisis, and the Ethics of 
Democratic Representation in Fernando Del Paso’s Total Novels,’ Latin American Research Review, 50.2 (2015), 
42–62; Saint-Amour, pp. 203–9; Antonio Barrenechea, America Unbound: Encyclopedic Literature and Hemispheric 
Studies (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2016), pp. 13–4. Jed Rasula may be alone in 
treating Mendelson’s essay without suspicion, and as having established ‘a cogent vocabulary and a rationale 
for viewing Gravity’s Rainbow as the latest in a line of singular narratives exceeding the bounds of the novel.’ 
Jed Rasula, ‘Textual Indigence in the Archive,’ Postmodern Culture, 9.3 (1999), p. 1. 
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Cognitive Value of Literature’ predates his by a year.61 Swigger’s argument takes a different 
stance on the term to Mendelson, associating it primarily with ‘use of and aspiration toward 
knowledge,’ rather than national identity, and uses Hermann Broch, Gustave Flaubert, 
Borges, and Raymond Queneau to sketch the beginnings of a theory of how ‘literature 
provides us with a central perspective on the fateful relations between mind and reality.’62 In 
this, Swigger’s argument is much more rigorously theorised than Mendelson’s, building on 
what he identifies as a fecund and hitherto under-examined overlap between Frye’s ideas on 
‘Specific Encyclopedic Forms’ and Menippean satire and Mikhail Bakhtin’s theories of 
polyphony, carnival, dialogism, and menippea.63 For Swigger, this area should receive more 
attention: 
not because the matter of generic classification is in itself so urgent, but because in 
these ultimate genres we may see how literature has served and may continue to serve 
to extend the boundaries of ‘culture’ so that all the various means of cognition which 
are employed in the pursuit and maintenance of ‘civilization’ may be comprised 
within one field, a field which speaks for and sums up the possibilities of knowledge 
open to humans.64 
 
While Swigger’s use of the term ‘cognition’ feels very much of its time, in his insistence on 
the ways that fiction enables readers to envision the inherently contingent, partial, and 
possible constructions of knowledge, he provides a much clearer sense of what studies of 
fictional encyclopaedism without nationalism can look like. Indeed, in his, admittedly brief, 
readings of Broch, Flaubert, Borges, and Queneau, he begins to trace a sophisticated 
argument about how fiction can make clear the ‘vain, hopeless, or even dangerous’ elements 
of encyclopaedic thought while simultaneously asserting the heuristic potential in fiction’s 
‘intellectual capacities and imaginative versatility,’ which maintain its place ‘at the center of 
man’s symbolic efforts.’65 
All this is to say that Swigger presents a far less restrictive picture of the critical potential 
of ‘encyclopaedism’ in understanding fiction—and, in this, the important example that 
Swigger sets attests to the productivity of comparative study of fictional encyclopaedism 
beyond the geopolitical status quo. If for Mendelson encyclopaedism must be determined by 
																																																						
61 Ronald T. Swigger, ‘Fictional Encyclopedism and the Cognitive Value of Literature,’ Comparative Literature 
Studies, 12.4 (1975), 351–66. Although his contribution is overlooked by the majority of work in the field, 
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national curation, for Swigger all that a text requires to be productively considered through 
the lens of encyclopaedism is that it demonstrate consideration of encyclopaedic thought and 
practice; while Mendelson contorts his theory to omit certain encyclopaedists and include 
those whose work patently has no interest in encyclopaedism, Swigger’s insistence on a 
porous generic classification allows him to open fruitful avenues for further research—
avenues that critics like Sainz, Clark, Moretti, Strecker, and van  Ewijk, for example, are at 
pains to construct. 66 
Why, then, is Mendelson, and not Swigger, constantly assimilated by studies of fictional 
encyclopaedism? There are, of course, plenty of hypotheses that can be made—from the 
essay’s function as a rebuttal to the Pulitzer committee, to its centrality in Pynchon studies, 
to Mendelson’s own modest celebrity in academic circles—but in the context of comparative 
studies of fictional encyclopaedism, it is tempting to conclude that critics can be rather too 
ready to allow ‘encyclopaedism’ to become a euphemism for a nation’s ‘great novel,’ or for a 
re-packaged ‘great man’ theory of literature. This project aims to reach back past Mendelson 
to retrieve Swigger’s sense of the term’s categorical productivity beyond the tedious, 
Eurocentric, phallocentric ideas of mastery that reify the prestige of that which the status 
quo deems unquestionably ‘great.’ 
This returns us to the second question: for a project concerned with unsettling the 
familiar boundaries and use of encyclopaedism, is there any productive potential to be found 
in Mendelson’s argument? In its weaknesses, I contend, the unconscious of Mendelson’s 
essay makes for a helpful, if negative, example against which to position this thesis’ argument: 
for if Mendelson’s use of the term ‘encyclopedic’ makes it into something like a 
transcendental signifier that obscures his standpoint, it is, ironically, because he has fallen 
into a trap laid for him by the permutation of encyclopaedic thought that evolved in the 
nineteenth century. As Yeo and others have noted, the long nineteenth century saw the end 
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of the Enlightenment’s ‘republic of letters,’ and a shift from cosmopolitan encyclopaedic 
visions to those with a ‘national focus’—a balkanisation that was sealed by the ‘dramatic 
period of the revolutionary wars.’67 That is to say, Mendelson’s conflation of the 
encyclopaedia with national identity and becoming is an inheritance of the imperial-
nationalism ascendant in the previous century. Indeed, as Fowler notes: 
The notion of the omne scibile is not static; nor are the ways adopted to capture 
it. Peleus used genealogy, Eusebius used chronography to reduce chaos to 
order. […] Every age has its peculiar encyclopaedia.68 
 
By misunderstanding the malleability of ‘encyclopaedism’—by allowing it to become a 
transcendental signifier that authorises his own prejudicial idea of western culture—
Mendelson sets a vital, negative example in the study of fictional encyclopaedism: to 
understand whether, how, and why authors are engaging with encyclopaedic thought and 
practice, the idea of encyclopaedism must always be situated historically. 
This is a stake that some of the most recent work in the field has embraced: the two most 
significant and provocative studies, Saint-Amour’s Tense Future and Antonio Barrenechea’s 
America Unbound, take radically different fields of writing—the former examining numerous 
canonical texts of western modernism and the latter four conspicuously encyclopaedic North 
American novels—and make their respective arguments using a historically situated idea of 
encyclopaedism. For Saint-Amour, this leads to a provocative argument about how 
encyclopaedism, as it emerged from the Enlightenment, became, for interwar novelists, ‘a 
properly scaled alternative’ to ‘total war’ discourse and the traditional epic, while for 
Barrenechea, it allows him to explore how the form of encyclopaedism that developed out 
of American and European contact, which he labels ‘New World Encyclopedism,’ is 
negotiated by authors seeking to understand America beyond its contemporaneous 
geopolitical boundaries.69 If this study seeks to reach back past Mendelson to Swigger’s sense 
of the critical productivity of encyclopaedism, it is also to insist that the core of Mendelson’s 
error is a refusal to understand encyclopaedism historically—and to position the beginnings 
of a theory of literary totality between the deftly historicising work of Saint-Amour and 
Barrenechea. 
If we take Mendelson’s centrality in the field as even an unwitting or unconscious 
endorsement of the ahistorical use of encyclopaedism in literary studies, we can begin to 
perceive how easily the way ‘encyclopaedic’ can end up as a go-to category for safeguarding 
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the ‘rarefied lineage’ of western culture. In this light, the commonplace conflation of 
encyclopaedism with national ‘greatness’ and ‘mastery,’ begins to look a little less innocent 
and a lot more like the rear-guard of a culture’s structure of feeling—as if cultural dominance 
can be maintained through claims of cultural mastery. Indeed, we could take Frederick R. 
Karl’s description of the American ‘mega-novel’ as instructive: 
While reviewers and critics have hooked on to categories of Jewish novelists, 
gays, black writers, female authors, another kind of novel has emerged: 
written mainly (not solely) by white Protestant males.70 
 
A category with obvious investment in the encyclopaedic—Karl focuses on writers like 
Joseph McElroy and William Gaddis in his analysis—it is legible for him only as a reciprocal 
statement against an apparent, and implicitly suspect, institutional interest with identity 
politics. Just as for Mendelson ‘encyclopedic narratives’ are definable only as a type of 
singular and national greatness that negates the encyclopaedism of other writers, for Karl the 
ambition of such texts becomes an occasion for the celebration of the putative mastery of 
‘mainly (not solely)’ white Protestant Americans—that is, for blindness to the diversity of 
American writing.71 Chief among the gambits this project makes is that the history of 
encyclopaedic thought and practice can help us to decolonise, re-think, and re-cast our 
inherited sense of literary ‘greatness’ or ‘mastery.’ Answers to the questions that fictional 
encyclopaedism presents to literary studies too often affirm lone genius, or the supremacy of 
similar sets of social identities—and it is with this in mind that I have taken as my guiding 
principle the conviction that new and different answers will come only through a comparative 
lens that seeks out difference amidst the manifestly apparent diversity of modern and 
contemporary authors of encyclopaedic fictions. 
 
1.3 Joyce, Silko, Bolaño 
 
In order to meet these goals, I have selected three texts diverse in their provenances but 
united by an implicit disregard for or disinterest in the rigidity of national boundaries: just as 
Joyce’s Irish Odysseus is a twice-baptised Hungarian Jew married to a Gibraltarian Penelope, 
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Silko’s Almanac of the Dead begins with a map that redraws the U.S.-Mexico border, and the 
events of Bolaño’s 2666 take place across numerous national borders. Moreover, by 
considering alongside one of the most widely-read and -studied modernist writers two of the 
most important recent Native American and Latin American writers, I aim not only to 
suggest their equivalent significance, but to allow Indigenous and Latinx literary criticism and 
theory to interact with and re-shape the tools with which the field approaches fictional 
encyclopaedism. What this means is that while this project reads closely Ulysses, Almanac of 
the Dead, and 2666 for their ideas on the history and practice of encyclopaedic thought, and 
the strategies they adopt to develop their own forms of fictional encyclopaedism, it endeavours 
at the same time to situate each text, at least initially, within the history of criticism that has 
developed around it—and to go on to put the tools of those discrete fields into dialogue with 
one another. 
‘James Joyce and the “Obscure Soul of the World”’ begins by exploring the shifts in the 
critical use of the term ‘encyclopaedic’ in relation to Joyce’s work, and posits that it can be 
productively considered in relation to ‘totality’ as it emerges across his oeuvre. Looking 
closely at Ulysses, I explore how ‘Telemachy’ sets up competing metaphors for totality, and 
establishes, through Stephen Dedalus, a critique of encyclopaedism that aims to totalise 
reality. In this, Leopold Bloom’s fantasy of owning the Encyclopaedia Britannica is cast as a 
cruelly optimistic commitment to the received totality of the Imperial status quo. For Joyce, 
the only way to perceive the world’s ‘obscure soul’—to move from the known to the 
unknown—is by thinking without totality—a method he gestures towards in the ‘Nostos,’ as 
the totalising androcentrism of Bloom and the totalising gynocentrism of Molly are made to 
complement each other. In this, the radical potential of fictional encyclopaedism, for Joyce, 
can be seen to inhere in its ability to imagine the world not according to a single totality, but 
through the interaction of multiple totalities. 
This conception of the potentiality of fictional encyclopaedism finds, I contend, new life 
in Silko’s Almanac of the Dead and Bolaño’s 2666. In ‘Leslie Marmon Silko in “the World of 
the Different,”’ I begin by arguing that the controversy surrounding that Silko’s under-
appreciated second novel stems from its vision of the world from the multiple perspectives 
of ‘the different.’ In this, Silko characterises ‘the different’ as those subject to the dominant 
settler colonial gaze—which she figures, by way of reference to the early Spanish proto-
encyclopaedist Bartolomé de Las Casas, as part of the inheritance of the Eurocentric 
encyclopaedic imagination that developed in the Americas alongside European settlement. 
As such, I provide a short excursus on the development of settler colonial encyclopaedism 
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in the New World, which I describe—pace Barrenechea—as ‘conquest encyclopaedism,’ 
before exploring how Silko presents its inheritance as proscribing ‘the different’ in order to 
preserve settler colonial dominance. For Almanac of the Dead, fictional encyclopaedism 
provides a means of envisioning detotalised, pan-American solidarity, and accordingly 
becomes a radical tool for imagining the decolonisation of the ‘world of the different.’ 
While Joyce and Silko both explicitly engage with and critique specific historical 
formations of encyclopaedic thought and practice, Bolaño uses 2666 to identify potential 
encyclopaedisms immanent to the contemporary. In this, Bolaño’s fictional encyclopaedism 
focuses on the possibility that such as-yet-unrealised encyclopaedisms may achieve synthesis 
and dominance over reality. Beginning with an interpretation of Bolaño’s theory of 
‘semblance’ and the totalising imagination as it emerges in 2666, I look back to his first 
exploration of such immanence in Nazi Literature in the Americas, in which, as with 2666, the 
role of the reader in enabling potential encyclopaedism to achieve synthesis is emphasised—
akin to how the viewer of a gestalt image pieces together its dots into a complete image. In 
this, Bolaño critiques and repurposes ‘reader-response’ theory, particularly as it is defined by 
Julio Cortázar in Hopscotch, to re-focus it on that to which we are customarily blind—and as 
such, argues for more ethically-guided ways of conceiving the world. Indeed, just as with 
Joyce and Silko, such radical steps are only conceivable for Bolaño by way of an 
encyclopaedism that makes itself aware of its own weaknesses. 
In their study of ‘worldmaking’ among Wikipedia’s editors, Lindsay Fullerton and James 
Ettema observed that the collaborative editing of Wikipedia is an activity that is both 
‘cognitive and normative.’72 This is as much as to say that in the world according to the 
‘General Notability Guideline’ the ability to think a given thing and the normativity of that 
given thing are conflated. Wikipedia’s world, fractious and incomplete as it is and always will 
be, aims to become a complete, consistent, coherent, singular, and certain totality. Between 
Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño, it is clear that a fictional encyclopaedism explicitly disrupts how we 
think and what we consider normal, implicitly insisting that the former does not necessarily 
lead to the latter. In Ulysses, Almanac of the Dead, and 2666, encyclopaedic thought is made to 
work without the totalising turns that can transform it into an expression of dominance. 
Fiction allows the totalising imagination to imagine the totality of reality without at the same 
time trying to totalise reality—enables, that is, ‘totality-without-totality.’ It is as if a literary 
totality depends on its capacity to make strange the assumptions that give us confidence in 
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our sense of the world. By invoking the history and practice of encyclopaedic thought in their 
diagnoses of the world, Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño create literary totalities that recalibrate our 
senses and our worlds.  
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2. James Joyce and ‘the Obscure Soul of the World’ 
 
Since the publications of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, encyclopaedism has been one of the 
least controversial aspects of James Joyce’s work and its legacy; indeed, considering that he 
described Ulysses to Carlo Linati as ‘una specie di enciclopedia’ and Finnegans Wake to Harriet 
Shaw Weaver as his ‘universal history’ or ‘history of the world,’ scholars can reasonably claim 
to be following Joyce’s lead when offhandedly referring to his ‘encyclopaedism’ or his 
‘encyclopaedic style.’73 Moreover, Richard Ellmann’s and Stuart Gilbert’s accounts of Joyce’s 
use of the Encyclopaedia Britannica while writing the Wake have provided suggestive evidence 
of Joyce’s referential relationship with encyclopaedic practice.74 Yet the relative absence of 
controversy around the term has allowed its critical capacity to become glib: as a phrase that 
illuminates Joyce’s work, ‘encyclopaedism’ cannot currently be said to hold the same cache 
as, for example, terms like ‘myth,’ ‘everyday,’ ‘epiphany,’ or ‘Uncle Charles’; rather, it has 
afforded a neutral vehicle for interpretations that can, as I will outline, be essentially at odds 
with one another. I maintain, however, that a robust understanding of Joyce’s engagement 
with encyclopaedic thought and practice affords an important, and specific, means for 
appreciating his novels’ achievements and influence—especially as comparators for those 
contemporary fictions, like Almanac of the Dead and 2666, that have taken up similar ambitions. 
By looking at how it is that the term’s use in Joyce studies has come to lack the relative 
specificity required to become one of its key critical terms, we can start to reclaim it, and 
begin to reconsider Joyce’s texts, and those of his descendants, in its light. 
Early readings of encyclopaedism in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake tended to conflate 
interpretations of the texts’ ostensibly totalising aesthetics with critiques of encyclopaedic 
method, often in a way that reified the novels’ qualities as universal. In this, the novels’ 
stylistic expansiveness was often portrayed as feeding into a broader mythological, 
universalised epistemology. In Gilbert’s critical work, for example, he explicated Ulysses’ 
encyclopaedism as the ideal Aquinasian realism of ‘wholeness, harmony, and radiance,’ while 
Harry Blamires’ theologically-inclined guide to Ulysses describes the ‘Ithaca’ episode as 
‘encyclopaedic in its fullness, cosmic in its range.’75 Similarly, Frank Budgen declared that ‘the 
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persons in Work in Progress are as universal as the words through which they live.’76 Gilbert, 
Blamires, and Budgen saw Joyce’s encyclopaedism as not only universalising, but also 
essentially apolitical, ahistorical, and unreflective in its own manifest significance.77 
This type of reading has been highly unfashionable since at least the 1970s, when shifts 
in critical practice began to incorporate more structuralist approaches: critics such as Marilyn 
French and Margot Norris attacked the idea that Joyce’s fictions allowed for the possibility 
of universalism, let alone valorised it as desirable, and as such separated the texts’ expansive 
aesthetics from their critiques of encyclopaedism.78 The subsequent work of deconstructive 
practice, in particular that of French theorists,79 has institutionalised readings of Ulysses and 
Finnegans Wake as assaults on the very notion of ‘universality,’ while reasserting the 
importance of the texts’ performativity. So, for Jacques Derrida they represent ‘the most 
powerful project for programming over the centuries the totality of research in the onto-
logico-encyclopedic field,’80 which is to say that Joyce’s fiction recapitulates the 
Enlightenment’s epistemological project while simultaneously performing its own 
deconstruction. This school of thought has led to a recent surge in historically-led approaches 
to the novels, which examine what constituted Joyce’s conception of the Enlightenment, and 
tend to emphasise the context in which any critique of encyclopaedism should be considered. 
It is worth pointing out that this recent re-contextualising turn in readings of Joyce’s 
encyclopaedism is in keeping with the broad critical trajectory of the past near century of 
Joyce scholarship. Since at least the 1990s, scholars have worked to remove Joyce from the 
de-contextualising silo in which his contemporaries and earliest critics revered him, in order 
to re-place and re-read him in the fabric of his historical moment. Vincent Cheng provides a 
succinct articulation of this move, in Joyce, Race, and Empire, when he criticises the tendency 
for Joyce’s early critics’ to detract from ‘the manifestly political content and ideological 
discourse of Joyce’s work.’81 More recent work, by critics like Andrew Gibson, Katherine 
Mullin, and Laura Barberán Reinares, for example, seems to heed directly Cheng’s call to 
rediscover the discourse surrounding Joyce’s work directly, placing it among the highest 
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priorities: while Gibson’s study of Joyce’s relationship with history and politics begins from 
the premise that ‘Joyce was Irish, and so was his subject matter,’ Mullin and Barberán 
Reinares have shone new, and complementary, light on how Joyce’s writing plays on 
contemporaneous popular anxieties about censorship and sexuality.82 
The re-contextualising turn in Joyce scholarship provides a useful backdrop for 
understanding why and how recent readings of Joyce’s encyclopaedism have tended to 
emphasise the historical specificity of the term. Cheryl Herr, for example, casts Joyce’s 
encyclopaedism as exactly the opposite of the enactment of universal values alluded to by 
Gilbert and Blamires when she notes that the ‘diverse body of information alluded to in 
Ulysses defines an encyclopedism that is at best hollow; it serves to emphasize…not 
wholeness but discrete sets that defy and thwart holism.’83 Not dissimilarly, Maria Tymoczko, 
negating any reading of Ulysses’ style as universal, historicises its affected encyclopaedism by 
locating its roots in early Irish cultural practices: for her, the text works as an elaborate 
hybridisation of very specific aspects of Irish antiquity with the modern.84 In Finnegans Wake 
criticism, it is easy to see how Budgen’s reading of ‘universal historical experience,’ is voided 
by a critic like Emer Nolan, who reads its interest in transnationalism as pertaining specifically 
to the creation of ‘Irishness’ and Irish identity.85 What is important about this is that as 
scholars have worked to re-contextualise Joyce, the critical use of the term ‘encyclopaedism’ 
can be seen, over the past near-century of work, to have performed a volte-face: while it once 
signified a mythologising universalism, it has come to be the object of a historicising 
particularisation.86 Implicit in this turn is the honing of a critical paradigm increasingly 
suspicious of any moves to claim that Joyce’s magna opera aspired to, rather than critiqued, 
universality, and increasingly reparative with Joyce’s historical context. 
Once our understanding of Joyce’s encyclopaedism is removed from any supposed 
valorisation of universality, and historicised accordingly, the peculiar way in which Joyce 
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presents the act of encyclopaedically imagining the totality of reality—of conceiving in 
written language a ‘totalised’ image of the world—starts to demonstrate a remarkable 
consistency across his oeuvre. Indeed, what emerges in Finnegans Wake as ‘the sum told of 
all’ is equally identifiable in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man as a critique of encyclopaedic 
articulations of reality for depending on a ‘totalised’ interpretation of reality as entirely 
knowable, articulable, unified, and homogenous; as Herr argues, ‘more than representing 
unity and completeness, Joyce’s fictional encyclopedism reproduces and critiques the 
dominating divisions at the heart of the Irish life that he shows us.’87 Stephen Dedalus’ 
schooling in the first episode of Portrait demonstrates this clearly, and is worth outlining 
before moving on to explore what exactly a fictional encyclopaedism might mean beyond the 
reproduction of Irish life identified by Herr. 
Revising from his geography book, the young Stephen reflects on its description of the 
world, and considers how humanity can be identified according to its nesting categories: 
‘They were all in different countries and the countries were in continents and the continents 
were in the world and the world was in the universe.’88 In keeping with this, Stephen has 
written in his geography book’s flyleaf ‘himself, his name and where he was’: 
Stephen Dedalus 
Class of Elements 
Clongowes Wood College 
Sallins 
Country Kildare 
Ireland 
Europe 
The World 
The Universe89 
 
In this moment, Stephen imagines the whole of the universe knowable and unified in a 
totalising schema; it is a form of encyclopaedism: a complete, commensurable scale, 
identifiable and consistent throughout. Yet re-reading ‘himself, his name and where he was,’ 
Stephen finds himself questioning this received version of reality: 
Then he read the flyleaf from the bottom to the top till he came to his own 
name. That was he: and he read down the page again. What was after the 
universe? Nothing. But was there anything round the universe to show where 
it stopped before the nothing place began? It could not be a wall; but there 
could be a thin thin line there all round everything. It was very big to think 
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about everything and everywhere. Only God could do that. He tried to think 
what a big thought that must be; but he could only think of God.90 
 
Stephen answers his question by deferring to God’s grace: only God is in a position to 
articulate the complexities of reality and its limits. As such, he must accept the formulation 
of totality he infers from his textbook; and in the impious connotations of the adjective ‘big,’ 
and his inability to think of anything but God, Joyce points to how Stephen’s youthful 
curiosity is bounded by his learned sense of the blasphemous. 
Joyce immediately sends up Stephen’s learned image of totalised reality. Upon deferring 
to God’s grace, Stephen begins thinking of the name for God in other languages, leading him 
to conclude that: 
though there were different names for God in all the different languages in 
the world and God understood what all the people who prayed said in their 
different languages still God remained always the same God and God’s real 
name was God.91 
 
In the image of totalised reality Stephen learns, linguistic diversity is subordinated to a 
language that is, by implication, more ‘real’ than the others: English.92 Moreover, when 
Stephen goes on to think about the picture of the earth on the first page of the book, which 
his friend has coloured green and maroon, he is reminded of ‘Dante’s press, the brush with 
the green velvet back for Parnell and the brush with the maroon velvet back for Michael 
Davitt.’93 Looking at the image of the world coloured green and maroon, Stephen wonders: 
which was right, to be for the green or for the maroon, because Dante had 
ripped the green velvet back off the brush that was for Parnell one day with 
her scissors and had told him that Parnell was a bad man. He wondered if 
they were arguing at home about that. That was called politics. There were 
two sides in it. Dante was on one side and his father and Mr Casey were on 
the other side but his mother and uncle Charles were on no side.94 
 
The encyclopaedic image of reality as totalised—internally consistent and unified, 
simultaneously knowable, articulable, and unquestionable through God’s indisputable 
grace—is undermined from its very first articulation: the unitary vision of ‘himself, his name 
and where he was’ belies a reality riven by its own complexity, in violent competition with 
other articulations of reality for dominance; indeed, conspicuously absent from Stephen’s 
address on the flyleaf, between ‘Ireland’ and ‘Europe,’ is ‘Great Britain,’ belying the 
immanent complexity that dominates Stephen’s life. 
																																																						
90 Ibid, p. 13. 
91 Ibid, p. 13. 
92 Conspicuously absent from Stephen’s thoughts in this moment is the Irish word for God: ‘Dia.’ 
93 Ibid, p. 12. 
94 Ibid, pp. 13–4. 
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The younger Stephen’s reality is one that the elder Stephen, by the time of Ulysses, has 
decided is shaped by the various forms of power that proscribe individual potential. While 
the young Stephen is taught an encyclopaedic ideal type for reality—knowable, articulable, 
unified, homogenous—the Stephen of Ulysses reasons to himself, while working as a teacher 
in the ‘Nestor’ episode, that all versions of reality are shaped, ineluctably, by the ‘candescent’ 
(2.76) observing individual.95 The young Stephen is able only to defer his thoughts about 
what comes ‘after the universe’ to God’s grace: the elder Stephen is portrayed stepping back 
from the issue to suggest that any shape given to the world is provided by the soul, since ‘the 
soul is in a manner all that is: the soul is the form of forms’ (2.75). For the Stephen of Ulysses, 
this means he is at odds with the education system—and his exchange with the school’s 
headmaster, Mr. Deasy, is a vital and instructive moment in understanding Joyce’s 
encyclopaedism to which I will return.96 Suffice it to say, if the observer shapes the form by 
which totalised reality is envisioned, and if by definition no observer can achieve objectivity, 
then multiplicity, inconsistency, and uncertainty must figure, inevitably, as essential 
components of any articulation of totality, even as they invalidate any authority that 
articulation might assume. This is to say that, for the Stephen of Ulysses, any attempt to 
articulate totality would have to try to work without the Anglo-centric, Jesuit assumptions 
that precede, and universalise, the idea of the world he is taught in Portrait. 
It may seem that there is a paradox here: if what Joyce’s writing does is to demonstrate 
that the impossibility of encyclopaedic thought leaves it freely open to being co-opted by 
power, why try to reclaim ‘encyclopaedism’ as a key element of his work? This paradox is 
central to two of the most significant recent studies of Joyce’s encyclopaedism: Len Platt’s 
genetic study of Joyce’s ‘dismemberment’ of the 1911 Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica in Finnegans Wake, and Paul K. Saint-Amour’s study of ‘encyclopedic modernism’ 
during the inter-war period, which draws heavily on Ulysses.97 For Platt, the Britannica, in its 
epistemological certainty and purported universality, ‘stands as the antithesis of the Wake,’ 
which goes about mocking the Britannica’s articles in ‘such randomized ways’ as to perform 
																																																						
95 James Joyce, Ulysses, ed. by Hans Walter Gabler, Wolfhard Steppe, and Claus Melchior (New York, NY: 
Vintage Books, 1986; repr. 1992), p. 2.76; all further references to this text in this chapter are from this 
edition and are given parenthetically. 
96 See ‘2.2 The Circle of Learning and the “cracked lookingglass of a servant,”’ pp. 52-65. 
97 Platt, p. 111; Saint-Amour, pp. 179–262. Other significant studies of encyclopaedism in Joyce include: 
Significant contributions include: Hugh Kenner, The Stoic Comedians: Flaubert, Joyce and Beckett (London: W.H. 
Allen, 1964); Herr; Theoharis C. Theoharis, ‘Unveiling Joyce’s Portrait: Stephen Dedalus and the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,’ The Southern Review, 20.2 (1984), 286–99; Clark, The Fictional Encyclopaedia; Richard Hardack, ‘Going 
Belly up: Entries, Entrees, and the All-consuming Encyclopedic Text,’ Lit: Literature Interpretation Theory, 7.2-3 
(1996), 131–51; Rasula; Matthew Creasy, ‘Inverted Volumes and Fantastic Libraries: Ulysses and Bouvard et 
Pécuchet,’ European Joyce Studies, 19.1 (2011); Novillo-Corvalán; Cóilín Parsons, The Ordnance Survey and Modern 
Irish Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 153–82. 
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a wrecking of ‘the order, the structure, and, by implication, the whole epistemology 
underlying’ the Britannica’s assumptions about itself and its project.98 In his formulation, 
Joyce’s work in the Wake represents a type of anti-encyclopaedism that makes any form of 
knowledge ‘infuriatingly impossible.’99 For Saint-Amour, conversely, Ulysses takes a more 
positive angle on encyclopaedism, transmitting a Diderotian approach to epistemology that 
models ‘comprehensiveness without coherentism’ as a strategy for ‘[contesting] the resurgent 
totality of the present,’ which is characterised by the ‘total war’ logic and discourse of the 
inter-war years.100 For Platt and Saint-Amour respectively, Joyce’s encyclopaedism is a 
disavowal of the possibility of a descriptivist encyclopaedism and an embrace of the analytical 
potentiality of a volatile encyclopaedism. Both arguments are convincing, but I want to push 
beyond the binary they jointly suppose, to consider a different formation of the relationship 
between encyclopaedism and totality that reasserts fictionality. Between Platt’s and Saint-
Amour’s respective understandings of Joyce’s encyclopaedism, I want to suggest that Joyce 
reasserts the necessary fictionality of encyclopaedic thought, and in so doing posits an 
epistemology resistant to completion, which can allow for its own failure through 
multiplicity, inconsistency, incoherence, and uncertainty.101 In this, I contend, is the 
potentiality of fiction for Joyce: in its ability to imagine an encyclopaedism that involves its 
own failure, and accordingly to reconceive the totality of the status quo without the moves 
of totalising thought that allow power to usurp and dominate reality by creating false certainty 
and homogenising difference. In this, for Joyce, is the possibility of reconceiving the world 
beyond that which is ostensibly ‘known.’ 
In what follows, I will build on the ways Platt and Saint-Amour read Joyce’s relationship 
with the Britannica in order to suggest how Ulysses can be seen to engage with the Britannica’s 
peculiar brand of progressivist encyclopaedism. From this, I will go on to explore how Joyce 
drives Ulysses’ narrative by placing incompatible visions of totality in competition with one 
another, which manifests in the text’s extended deconstruction of the totalised thought 
internalised by Bloom as a centre-margin binary. In this, Joyce creates the space for Ulysses’ 
own fictional encyclopaedism to imagine the world without totality. 
 
 
																																																						
98 Platt, p. 111. 
99 Ibid, p. 108. 
100 Saint-Amour, pp. 225, 215. 
101 Although I am following Herr’s lead in referring to this as Joyce’s ‘fictional encyclopaedism,’ her analysis 
is, as noted above, more focused on historicising the ‘dominating divisions at the heart of Irish life.’ My use is 
to slightly different ends. Herr, p. 32. 
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 2.1 Ulysses and the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
 
Platt’s study of the relationship between the Wake and the 1911 Eleventh Edition of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica is an excellent place to begin exploring Joyce’s relationship with 
encyclopaedism because it explicitly works to avoid the pitfalls of earlier scholarship. Platt 
casts as his strawman ‘the commonly held view that Joyce was a straight encyclopedic 
borrower,’ who alighted ‘magpie-like’ on whatever took his fancy and bent it to ‘whatever 
the particular demands of the Wake might be,’ arguing that such a formulation does not allow 
readers to consider there to be anything ‘specific about Joyce’s work with the Britannica’: ‘It 
becomes just one more source for his final work, albeit an important one.’102 Indeed, his 
reading of the Wake wrecking the Britannica’s epistemological assumptions is premised on 
exactly the opposite conviction: Joyce, Platt proposes, was ‘highly sensitive to the limitations, 
ambiguities, and downright impossibilities of the confident modern universalism that 
characterized the encyclopedic tradition,’103 and his genetic reading of the Wake and its 
notebooks is compelling. 
Taking the ‘Haveth Childers Everywhere’ section as a key example, Platt notes that 
Joyce’s use of information from the Britannica is traceable in the notebooks for the Wake, but 
the ‘ordering principle to their incorporation’ is unfathomable: ‘there is no apparent 
explanation as to why notes appear where they do.’104 For Platt, this can be read as a ‘very 
precise act of critical cultural sabotage’ that performatively dis-orders the Britannica’s 
totalising pretensions.105 In this, he argues, undermining the encyclopaedic principle seems 
in some sense central to the Wake’s ‘wider and foundational instincts,’ as when the dis-
ordering is acknowledged as such it begins to expose ‘in highly inventive ways the absurdities 
of culturally specific knowledge formation’ that poses ‘as the universal.’106 The Wake’s 
sabotage, Platt observes, persistently deflates the humanistic and progressivist aspirations 
that the 1911 Britannica outlines in its preface and uses to formulate its contents—to the point 
that the 1911 Britannica seems to provide another source for Joyce’s eventual choice of title 
for his Work in Progress: in its article on ‘Funeral Rites,’ the Britannica describes feasting as ‘an 
																																																						
102 Platt has in mind both Ellmann’s biography and Gilbert’s Paris Journal, and also by implication the use 
made of James S. Atherton’s early study-cum-catalogue of the Wake’s intertexts. Platt, pp. 116, 110; J. S. 
Atherton, The Books at the Wake: A Study of Literary Allusions in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1959).  
103 Platt, p. 116. 
104 Ibid, p. 111; James Joyce, James Joyce: The Finnegans Wake Notebooks at Buffalo, ed. by Vincent Deane, 
Daniel Ferrer, and Geert Lernout, 12 vols (Turnout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, 2001). 
105 Platt, p. 112. 
106 Ibid, pp. 116, 112. 
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essential feature of every primitive funeral [that] in the Irish “wake” still survives.’107 Platt’s 
argument shines light on how the Wake exposes the 1911 Britannica’s totalising universalism 
as merely a synthesis of scientific progressivism, paternalistic inclusiveness, and instinctive 
nationalism that ultimately reproduces Anglo-American cultural imperialism. Indeed, much 
of the Wake’s comedy derives from its near-slapstick deployment of knowledge that lies on 
or beyond ‘the shifting margins of contemporary knowledge,’ such as craniometry, heraldry, 
and blazoning: as Platt suggests, the Wake’s various send-ups of these terms, all highly-valued 
by the 1911 Britannica, serve to illustratively poke fun at points where its ‘knowledge’ becomes 
‘crude ideology’—Flaubertian idées reçues.108 
For Platt, the key value of reading the Wake’s relationship with the Britannica is how it 
‘helps us to position Joyce the intellectual’ and refine an idea of his ‘politics.’109 But can the 
same be said for Ulysses and the Britannica, particularly since it is largely absent from records 
of the novel’s genesis?110 Saint-Amour suggests that it can, and offers a twist on Platt’s 
understanding of the 1911 Britannica by positing that the inarguable failure of the Britannica 
to actually achieve its totalising aims results in a text that is inherently ‘self-contradictory and 
polyphonic.’111 In this, he suggests, Joyce may have extrapolated from the strictures of the 
Britannica some of the ‘Diderotian insight’ on the contingency of knowledge that he sees as 
central to Ulysses’ understanding of encyclopaedism.112 Indeed, for Saint-Amour, the ‘literary 
encyclopedism’ of Ulysses asserts at once the ‘yearning’ for ‘a social portraiture so total as to 
comprehend the future’ and ‘the recognition that large-scale social portraiture lies not in 
coherentism but in arranging particulars in competing orders of order’—or competing 
totalities.113 But Saint-Amour misses a trick by passing over an important reference to the 
Britannica in the ‘Ithaca’ episode: while imagining the particulars of his ideal home, Leopold 
Bloom conjures up the image of a ‘fumed oak sectional bookcase containing the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica’ (17.1581, 1522-3).114 As Mark Wollaeger has observed, one of the 
amusements of Ulysses is examining the ‘specific ideological appeals’ that underpin its 
																																																						
107 ‘Funeral Rites,’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edn (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 
1911), XI, 329d – 333a (p. 331c). 
108 Platt, pp. 113, 112. 
109 Ibid, p. 112. 
110 That is to say, the Britannica is not mentioned with regard to Ulysses either in Joyce’s letters, Gilbert’s 
journals, or Budgen’s study of the novel’s ‘making.’ It is, however, mentioned briefly in Ellmann’s biography, 
in which he implies that the Britannica’s description of poverty on Dublin’s Montgomery Street, or Monto, 
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112 Ibid, p. 202. 
113 Ibid, pp. 261–2. 
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characters’ ‘operations of desire,’115 and this is certainly the case here: it can tell us, I contend, 
something more specific about how Joyce conceives of the consequences of the Britannica’s 
brand of encyclopaedism in Ulysses. 
Legible as a fantasy alternative to Bloom’s actual homecoming, the reverie initiates an 
extended digression in which he imagines his ascent to the aristocracy: he envisions his 
‘ultimate ambition’ as having ‘civic functions and social status among the county families and 
landed gentry’—and being a Britannica-owner is implicated in this aspiration from its 
inception (17.1497, 1606-7). There are many ways of reading this peculiar and revealing 
moment—but its triangulation with the novel’s bathetic Homeric parallel is worth dwelling 
on. Of course, Bloom’s actual homecoming is severely ironic when compared with that of 
his mythical forebear: while Odysseus reunites with Telemachus and faithful Penelope, 
restores order to Ithaca by dispatching her suitors, and fulfils Athena’s wish for peace, Bloom 
returns home to a wife he knows to have been unfaithful, Stephen ‘Promptly, inexplicably, 
with amicability, gratefully’ declines the paternal offer of shelter, and the suitors are 
slaughtered by the near-parenthetical assurance that Bloom ‘would…have smiled’ if he had 
dwelt on the infidelity, which he does not (17.955, 2126). Bloom’s ideal homecoming might 
be expected to bear closer resemblance to that of Odysseus: instead, Joyce has ‘Bloom of 7 
Eccles street foresee Bloom of Flowerville’ (17.1581) in an extremely vivid picture of 
bourgeois aspiration. If Odysseus’ nostos is heroic, and Bloom’s actual homecoming is 
bathetic, there is something pathetic about Bloom’s fantasy homecoming. What might the 
Britannica, mentioned so conspicuously at the beginning of the reverie, have to do with this, 
and what can it tell us about Ulysses’ own relationship with encyclopaedism? 
While it may seem oddly materialist for Joyce’s ‘cultured allroundman’ (10.581) to idealise 
the Britannica as a route to nobility, Bloom’s utilitarian streak is called to attention earlier in 
‘Ithaca.’ Believing that Stephen is ‘engaged in mental composition,’ Bloom reflects on: 
the pleasures derived from literature of instruction rather than of amusement 
as he himself had applied to the works of William Shakespeare more than 
once for the solution of difficult problems in imaginary or real life. (17.384-
7) 
 
Although it is explained that despite ‘careful and repeated reading of certain classical 
passages, aided by a glossary, he had derived imperfect conviction from the text, the answers 
not bearing in all points,’ Bloom remains a devotee of instructional literature: and this is 
																																																						
115 Mark A. Wollaeger, ‘Reading Ulysses: Agency, Ideology, and the Novel,’ in Joyce and the Subject of History, ed. 
by Mark A. Wollaeger, Victor Luftig, and Robert E. Spoo (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
1996), p. 92. 
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attested to by the ‘catalogue’ of his bookshelves, provided moments before the ideal 
homecoming fantasy (17.389-91, 1361-1407). With this proclivity in mind, it follows that the 
Britannica might represent for Bloom a Weberian ‘ideal type’ for the ‘literature of instruction.’ 
The placement of this ideal type at the beginning of an ‘ideal’ homecoming gives an important 
clue as to the ideological appeals underpinning the desirability of instructional literature for 
Bloom—appeals that the vision suggests he is both endorsing and pursuing. 
Since the Britannica holds a position of such idealised significance in Bloom’s imagination, 
it follows that its own structures and proscriptions must influence to some degree what it is 
possible for Bloom to think. Indeed, just as Portrait’s young Stephen finds his thoughts resist 
questioning the limits of the totalised version of reality he is taught due to the inherent sin 
of being ‘very big,’116 Bloom, as he considers the ‘course of action’ he would take were he 
‘among the county families and landed gentry,’ suddenly finds himself having to ‘Prove that 
he had loved rectitude from his earliest youth,’ in one of the episode’s only catechistic 
imperatives (17.1616, 1606-7, 1634). The Britannica-led fantasy demands for its fruits a level 
of conformity for which Bloom feels he needs to make his case, even to himself. Of course, 
this is one of the key differences between Joyce’s two protagonists: Stephen grows up to 
blaspheme and question the totalised order, while Bloom seems, especially in this fantasy, to 
have embraced the Britannica’s image of totality and be trying to assimilate himself to its 
version of reality. Their divergence is suggestive: just like Stephen’s experience at Clongowes, 
it implies that the totalised, encyclopaedic version of reality demands a learned intellectual 
conformity that delimits the boundaries of thought; and while Stephen wants to claim his 
possibility beyond that status quo, Bloom can only envision his possibility according to it. 
That said, the revelation of Bloom’s relationship with the Britannica emerges only at the very 
end of Ulysses: before exploring it in full detail, it is helpful to outline how the preceding 
episodes of Ulysses present the encyclopaedic. In this, the ‘Nestor’ episode is vital: weaved 
through its narrative of Stephen’s morning teaching at a suburban school is a sophisticated 
argument about the ways in which totality can be imagined, and the ways certain 
representations of totality can establish dominance over others by shaping and proscribing 
that which is conceivable. 
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2.2 The ‘Circle of Learning’ and the ‘cracked lookingglass of a servant’  
 
As discussed in the introduction to this study,117 the notion that representations of totality 
themselves can define what is and is not possible by demarcating the boundaries of that 
which is and is not individually and collectively thinkable is built into the etymology of the 
word ‘encyclopaedia’: the metaphor of a ‘circle of learning’ suggests selective, didactic 
principles. ‘Nestor’ begins the novel’s critique of encyclopaedism by playing off the 
encyclopaedia’s literal meaning as a ‘circle of learning’ against another metaphor for totality: 
the ‘mirror of the world.’118 Since the mirror implies a mimetic reflection of the world, and 
the circle suggests a description that has already been interpreted and arranged for its 
audience, these two metaphors are at root incompatible: while the mirror replicates the reality 
to be interpreted, the circle makes visible the hidden, immanent order of reality, and in so 
doing infers reality’s true, infinite pattern.119 By pitting these two metaphors for totality 
against each other, Joyce uses ‘Nestor’ to make the pedagogical concerns of the ‘circle of 
learning’ start to look more like a form of social control, or indoctrination, which provides a 
framework for reading Bloom’s Britannica-led ideal homecoming in ‘Ithaca.’ 
																																																						
117 See: ‘1.1 Imagined Encyclopaedisms,’ pp. 8-11. 
118 Incidentally, this metaphor is typical more of Medieval and Renaissance encyclopaedism. Richard R. Yeo 
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The central application of true infinity is to the universe as a whole: God cannot be distinct from 
the world, since they would then be two finite entities, which could not be self-sustaining or self-
explanatory. Equally the world cannot go forward and backwards forever: it must have a self-
contained circular form. Again, thought about the world cannot be distinct from the world, for then 
thought and being would each limit the other and be two finite, non-self-supporting entities. Hence 
thought is identical to (but also different from) the world, and it too is circular. The concept is thus 
as infinite as the world. True infinity thus explains several features of Hegel’s system: e.g. why God 
must be the logical structure of the world and why forms of thought, such as the inference, must be 
embedded in the world. 
In this light, it is useful to recall that Hegel’s own Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 
(1817) was given a circular structure: 
as a whole [it] is seen as returning to its beginning, since logic, philosophy of nature and philosophy 
of spirit are respectively the sciences of the idea in and for itself, in its otherness, and in its return to 
itself out of its otherness. (The last phase of spirit, philosophy, itself begins with logic.) [It] thus 
portrays philosophy as a ‘circle of circles,’ and provides a ‘circular education.’ 
Of course, Hegel’s Enzyklopädie was never intended to be more than a series of supplementary notes for 
his lectures, and it’s likely that the title was chosen in line with contemporaneous Bavarian educational 
regulations, but his decision to structure the text circularly is instructive. M. J. Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 141, 86–8. 
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As noted earlier, at the beginning of ‘Nestor’ Stephen seems to have decided that unity 
is subjectively constructed by the ‘candescent’ observer, whose soul is ‘the form of forms,’ 
and this puts him at odds with an education system that insists on its version of reality as an 
objective, organic, totalised unity (2.75-6). It is Stephen’s experience teaching children ancient 
history that turns his mind to this; responding to a student’s ignorance of Pyrrhus beyond 
‘That phrase the world had remembered,’ he considers the position of Pyrrhus and Julius 
Caesar in cultural memory: 
Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a beldam’s hand in Argos or Julius Caesar not been 
knifed to death. They are not to be thought away. Time has branded them 
and fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they have 
ousted. (2.14, 48-51) 
 
The spatial image of the memory of Pyrrhus and Caesar locked into a specific formation 
within a room that could allow within it infinite permeations is key, and leads Stephen to 
more fundamental questions: ‘But can those [infinite possibilities] have been possible seeing 
that they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass?’ (2.51-2). In this 
moment, Stephen asks himself how possible it is for cultural memories of history to be 
wrong: could Pyrrhus and Caesar themselves have ‘ousted’ all possible formations of the 
memory of their lives other than that which they achieved, or could what is remembered 
deviate from the truth? He reasons, like Aristotle, that memory ‘must be a movement then, 
an actuality of the possible as possible’ (2.67). This is to say that the form of a memory must 
depend on the conditions that make its remembrance by the ‘candescent’ observing soul 
possible—and thus that what it is possible to remember must be determined to at least some 
extent by the conditions in which the ‘candescent’ observing soul lives. Stephen’s conclusion 
seems to be that memory’s possibility must be determined by the conditions in which the 
soul is acculturated. 
This reasoning is played out in his interaction with his ‘Ugly and futile’ student Cyril 
Sargent, who approaches Stephen after the class, when his students have left for hockey: 
His thick hair and scraggy neck gave witness of unreadiness and through his 
misty glasses weak eyes looked up pleading. On his cheek, dull and bloodless, 
a soft stain of ink lay, dateshaped, recent and damp as a snail’s bed. 
He held out his copybook. The word Sums was written on the headline. 
Beneath were sloping figures and at the foot a crooked signature with blind 
loops and a blot. Cyril Sargent: his name and seal. 
—Mr Deasy told me to write them out all again, he said, and show them to 
you, sir.  
Stephen touched the edges of the book. Futility. (2.123-32; emphasis in 
original) 
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While the ugliness and futility of Sargent weighs on Stephen’s perception, Joyce’s description 
of the mark on Sargent’s face as ‘dateshaped’ implicitly recalls Stephen’s thoughts on Pyrrhus 
and Caesar, who ‘Time has branded’—the mark could be equally in the shape of a date palm 
or the imprint of the date. By connecting Pyrrhus, Caesar, and Sargent like this, the 
suggestion seems to be that the time which brands the memory of ancient history is the 
contemporary moment of instruction: the formation that the memory of Pyrrhus and Caesar 
takes depends on how Sargent and his generation are acculturated. If historical memory is 
this malleable, it follows that the forces which allow for Sargent’s education, and cultivate his 
‘candescent’ form-giving soul, must play a key part in shaping and proscribing his historical 
memory. In this light, the fact that he could have the date marked on his face simply repeats 
the pessimism indicated by his conspicuously militaristic, Anglo-Irish family ‘name and seal’ 
and implicated in the pointless rote learning Mr Deasy has demanded of him. 
That said, Sargent’s clear similarities to the young Stephen do not escape the older 
Stephen. Watching Sargent attempt a sum himself, Stephen thinks: 
Like him was I, these sloping shoulders, this gracelessness. My childhood 
bends beside me. Too far for me to lay a hand there once or lightly. Mine is 
far and his secret as our eyes. (2.168-70) 
 
What is important about this moment of empathy, in which Stephen acknowledges their 
mutually unknowable depths, is that it follows Stephen’s only attempt to figure that which is 
universal beyond individual subjectivity: ‘Amor matris: subjective and objective genitive’ 
(2.165; emphasis in original). As Stephen talks to Sargent, he finds himself thinking that, ugly 
and futile though he may be: 
someone had loved him, borne him in her arms and in her heart. But for her 
the race of the world would have trampled him underfoot, a squashed 
boneless snail. She had loved his weak watery blood drained from her own. 
Was that then real? The only true thing in life? (2.140-3) 
 
This passage, particularly the final two interrogatives, directly recall Cranly’s advice to 
Stephen at the end of Portrait:  
Whatever else is unsure in this stinking dunghill of a world a mother’s love 
is not. Your mother brings you into the world, carries you first in her body. 
What do we know about what she feels? But whatever she feels, it, at least, 
must be real. It must be.120 
 
If a mother’s love ‘must be real,’ ‘the only true thing in life,’ then it follows that it is the 
universal basis for any version of reality—providing another way in which Stephen’s 
flashbacks to ‘Cranly’s arm’ (1.1.59, 3.451) haunt him. Although Stephen is posing the 
																																																						
120 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, p. 263. 
 40 
universality of amor matris as a question to which he does not know the answer, its implication 
is that amor matris may afford the only source for individual possibility beyond indoctrination. 
This at once casts an important light on Stephen’s relationship with his mother and her 
appearance in ‘Circe,’ as well as making motherhood a key idea through which to evaluate 
Joyce’s fictional encyclopaedism—a point to which I will return at the end of this chapter in 
greater depth.121 
For the moment, however, it is instructive to consider how Stephen reflects on the 
specifics of the education Sargent is getting. In a passage that also echoes Portrait,122 Stephen’s 
mind wanders as he demonstrates an equation’s solution for Sargent, who still cannot do 
them in spite of his additional copying: 
Across the page the symbols moved in grave morrice, in the mummery of 
their letters, wearing quaint caps of squares and cubes. Give hands, traverse, 
bow to partner: so: imps of fancy of the Moors. Gone too from the world, 
Averroes and Moses Maimonides, dark men in mien and movement, flashing 
in their mocking mirrors the obscure soul of the world, a darkness shining in 
brightness which brightness could not comprehend. (2.155-60) 
 
The equations remind Stephen that Arab and Jewish art and learning have contributed to 
contemporaneous Dublin’s culture—in the morrice, or Morris Dance, derived from the 
Moors who inspired it—and mathematics and philosophy—in the work of Averroes and 
Moses Maimonides. Importantly for Stephen, these figures, unlike those of Pyrrhus and 
Caesar, are forgotten, and as such are locked out of the ‘room of the infinite possibilities’ in 
which their memory might be ‘fettered.’ Although the room may contain infinite possibilities, 
it is bounded by walls that exclude other knowledges, rendering them marginal and 
incommensurable, and as such unrecognisable; as Stephen thinks, Moorish culture, Averroes, 
and Maimonides are ‘a darkness shining in brightness which brightness could not 
comprehend.’ While the ‘circle of learning’ may give an infinite structure to knowledge, and 
allow for ‘infinite possibilities’ within it, it creates at the same time a boundary that is 
demarcated by the power deciding what lies within it—a power that Stephen notes has 
manifested itself in a refusal to acknowledge the work of ‘dark men in mien.’ 
What is important about these figures’ exclusion from the ‘circle of learning’ is that it is 
in keeping with the narcissistic British Imperial exceptionalism subscribed to by the Britannica, 
and Mr Deasy.123 British Imperialism, as the dominant cultural force to which students’ 
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‘candescent’ souls are acculturated, decides where the boundaries of the ‘circle of learning’ 
are positioned. Stephen’s digression while solving the equation indicates his awareness that 
Averroes’ and Maimonides’ exclusion from the students’ education is a proscriptive effect of 
the very specific ideological appeal underpinning the ‘circle of learning’ by which they are 
taught, and which they are led to believe is objective and universal. In this, facticity within 
the ‘circle of learning’ can be seen to depend on the facts’ relationship to British Imperialism: 
facts selected for inclusion within the ‘circle of learning’ must support or be shaped to 
support it in some way—and the excluded becomes recognisable only insofar as it reaffirms 
the centrality of the included. 
Mr Deasy, the school’s headmaster, is the walking embodiment of the configuration of 
the Britannica’s ‘circle of learning’ as a valorised ideological formation. In his conversation 
with Stephen, Mr Deasy unwittingly elaborates the image of Averroes and Maimonides as 
dark-skinned men that the brightness of the contemporary refuses to comprehend: 
—Mark my words, Mr Dedalus, he said. England is in the hands of the jews. 
[…] 
—A merchant, Stephen said, is one who buys cheap and sells dear, jew or 
gentile, is he not? 
—They sinned against the light, Mr Deasy said gravely. And you can see the 
darkness in their eyes. (2.346-7, 359-62; emphasis added) 
 
The contrast between Mr Deasy’s anti-Semitism and Stephen’s liberalism is not hard to 
perceive, particularly from the vantage point of the Twenty-First Century; but besides their 
obvious disagreement, their interaction confirms Stephen’s vision of how knowledges can be 
wilfully marginalised, with Mr Deasy refusing to use his ‘candescent’ soul to see anything 
more than the ‘darkness in [the] eyes’ of an Other he believes are ‘the signs of a nation’s 
decay’ (2.347-8). In this, Mr Deasy makes the Other knowable only in its ambiguous 
formation as a nightmarish threat to the status quo. But if Mr Deasy can make understanding 
of the Other incommensurable within his ‘circle of learning,’ what is to be made of the 
knowledge he will recognise, like Pyrrhus and Caesar, in the room of ‘infinite possibilities’ 
where time brands and fetters them as commensurable? By way of Ulysses’ intricate web of 
allusions to Hamlet, Joyce makes clear precisely what inclusion in the ‘circle of learning’ does 
to knowledge. 
																																																						
limited to the entry on ‘Arabian Philosophy,’ which outlines a typically triumphalist narrative of Arab and 
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schoolmen. It was amongst them, especially in Maimonides, that Aristotelianism found refuge after the light 
of philosophy was extinguished in Islam.’ ‘Arabian Philosophy,’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edn (Chicago, 
IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 1911), II, 276c – 283a (p. 282d). 
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After Mr Deasy has admonished him for not being better at saving, he coerces Stephen 
into giving a letter he has written to his ‘literary friends’ (2.290) at the Evening Telegraph: 
I have put the matter into a nutshell, Mr Deasy said. It’s about the foot and 
mouth disease. Just look through it. There can be no two opinions on the 
matter. (2.231-3) 
 
Mr Deasy’s nutshell echoes that of Hamlet: speaking to Rosencratz and Guildenstern, he 
sardonically exclaims, ‘O God, I could be bounded in a nutshell and count/myself a king of 
infinite space, were it not that I/have bad dreams.’124 Mr Deasy, who earlier reveals his poor 
understanding of Shakespeare when he cites Iago as a model of thrift,125 is likely oblivious to 
the echo; but what the reference does nevertheless is to suggest that Mr Deasy has quite 
happily bounded himself in a nutshell and declared himself king of the infinite possibilities 
therein. Indeed, in response to Stephen’s comment that history is ‘the nightmare from which 
[he] is trying to awake’—the bad dreams that keep Hamlet from blissful ignorance—Mr 
Deasy assures him, ‘I am happier than you are’ (2.377, 389). 
The ‘circle of learning’ Mr Deasy represents may contain a ‘room of the infinite 
possibilities,’ but it is ultimately the space of a nutshell; and in his role as Headmaster of the 
nutshell, he can purvey as ‘the dictates of common sense’ his sycophantic praise of British 
Imperialism, attributing to the colonial status quo objectivity and universality (2.194, 335). 
While his letter to the Evening Telegraph is a relatively benign, and, in the context of the novel, 
uproarious, example of Mr Deasy’s ‘common sense,’ the dangers implicit in his ‘nutshell of 
learning’ are numerous. In his wilful ignorance, Mr Deasy embodies the power of British 
Imperialism to totalise its version of reality, asserting its centrality and dominance over its 
Others. Stephen notes how this dominance manifests itself in the way that Mr Deasy’s 
‘nutshell of learning’ enables criticism and dissent to be neutralised through incorporation. 
In pre-emptive response to any disagreement from Stephen, Mr Deasy says: 
You think me an old fogey and an old tory…I saw three generations since 
O’Connell’s time. I remember the famine in ’46. Do you know that the 
orange lodges agitated for repeal of the union twenty years before O’Connell 
did or before the prelates of your communion denounced him as a 
demagogue? You fenians forget some things. (2.268-72) 
 
By categorising him as a Fenian, Mr Deasy forces on Stephen an identity with which he has 
given no indication of identifying; indeed, Mr Deasy positions him within a Tory–Fenian, or 
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125 Mr Deasy enjoins Stephen to do as Shakespeare says and ‘put but money in thy purse’ (2.239; emphasis in 
original). Considering Stephen’s thoughts on ‘dark men in mien,’ that Mr Deasy is actually citing Iago 
scamming Roderigo with a fake plan to steal Desdemona from Moorish Othello adds a further layer of irony. 
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Unionist-Nationalist, binary in which Stephen has expressed no interest. The implication is 
that within the ‘nutshell of learning’ all oppositional thought can be absorbed, categorised, 
and re-cast in its service. As Stephen will think in ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ in the reality of 
contemporaneous Dublin his is ‘the voice of Esau’ (9.981), silenced by an ignorance that 
cannot and will not recognise him on his terms. 
Stephen reasons, then, that within Mr Deasy’s nutshell, what happens to the memory of 
Pyrrhus and Caesar must be the same as that which has happened to the memory of the 
Battle of Diamond: 
Glorious, pious and immortal memory. The lodge of Diamond in Armagh 
the splendid behung with corpses of papishes. Hoarse, masked and armed, 
the planters’ covenant. The black north and true blue bible. Croppies lie 
down. (2.274-7) 
 
While the Battle of Diamond saw Protestants murder a group of Catholics, at the beginning 
of a concerted effort to run Catholics out of Armagh, Stephen reflects on how the victorious 
Protestants like Mr Deasy have normalised their win by removing the memory of dead 
Catholics from their history, homogenising anti-Union resistance and Catholics under the 
term ‘Croppy.’ Indeed, while Mr Deasy claims the Orange Lodges’ initial opposition to union 
as an example of the ‘immortal memory’ of his ‘nutshell of learning,’ Stephen cannot forget 
that the Orangeman’s toast to ‘Glorious, pious and immortal memory’ ignores those ‘corpses 
of papishes.’ The irony in which Stephen’s thoughts place Mr Deasy’s pre-emptive rejoinder 
becomes even more pronounced when, immediately afterwards, he explains that he is 
descended from ‘sir John Blackwood who voted for the union’—which is untrue.126 In this, 
Mr Deasy’s description of Stephen as a Fenian starts to look less like a declarative and more 
like an imperative: ‘you fenians forget some things.’ 
Mr Deasy seems to do an awful lot of violence to people and memory: it is as if his 
conception of history is one that allows itself to be rewritten for expedience. There is 
something duplicitous, then, about his role as an educator, delivering the ‘circle of learning’: 
far from being the pedagogical expression of the infinite structure that holds the world’s 
‘infinite possibilities,’ his sense of the ‘circle of learning’ seems to be more like a performance 
of a specific ideology as universal epistemology. As such, it is unsurprising that, at the end of 
the episode, Mr Deasy reveals his eschatological conception of history. He insists to Stephen 
that ‘The ways of the Creator are not our ways…All human history moves towards one great 
goal, the manifestation of God’ (2.377, 380-1), revealing that his ‘circle of learning’ is in fact 
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a straight eschatological line: less an infinite structure that tries to capture the objective 
totality of universal reality than a totalised eschatological path on which he wants to set the 
world; as he tells Stephen, his motto is ‘Per visa rectas’ (2.282; emphasis in original), or by 
straight roads.127 It follows, then, that Mr Deasy’s pedagogical inclinations are more about 
proscribing knowledge than developing it: his insistence that ‘there can be no two opinions’ 
on foot and mouth disease is of a piece with his adage, to Stephen, that ‘To learn one must 
be humble’ (2.322, 406). For Mr Deasy, the purpose of his ‘nutshell of learning’ is to 
indoctrinate students with passivity, and to incorporate them as British Imperial subjects into 
his eschatological mission. Knowing what we do about Stephen from Portrait and 
‘Telemachus,’ it is unsurprising that he deems Stephen ‘not born to be a teacher’ (2.402). 
Stephen’s disagreement with, and response to, Mr Deasy’s eschatological progressivism 
is an important statement of his conviction that the ‘candescent’ soul is the ‘form of forms.’ 
Reflecting on the school’s students as ‘many forms’ (2.196), and that thus their souls provide 
many forms of forms, Stephen rebuts Mr Deasy’s univocal ‘manifestation of God’: 
Stephen jerked his thumb towards the window, saying: 
—That is god. 
Hooray! Ay! Whrrwhee! 
—What? Mr Deasy asked. 
—A shout in the street, Stephen answered, shrugging his shoulders. (2.382-
6) 
 
What for Mr Deasy can only be one thing, for Stephen, in keeping with his theory of the 
‘candescent’ soul as the form of forms, is ineluctably multiple. While for Stephen this 
multiplicity is to be embraced, for Mr Deasy the children are a problem to which he must 
‘restore order’ (2.191-2). In all of this, ‘Nestor’ can be read as introducing to the novel a 
vision of the status quo’s pedagogical encyclopaedism as a masquerade: if his ‘nutshell’ is a 
totalising eschatological march disguising itself as universal objectivity, it follows that the 
principles by which he delimits the boundaries of the ‘nutshell’ exclude multiplicity and 
complication, valorising British Imperialism and Protestantism. A jocoserious joke presents 
itself here, as the spatial assumption implicit in Mr Deasy’s eschatological progressivism links 
back to the straight line that introduces the episode: ‘Pyrrhus, a pier. […] Kingstown pier, 
Stephen said. Yes, a disappointed bridge’ (2.26, 39). If Kingstown pier is a disappointed 
bridge, then Mr Deasy’s eschatological ‘nutshell of learning’ may well be a disappointed 
bridge to God. Of course, the flip-side of this joke is that if Pyrrhus is remembered, in the 
room of infinite possibilities, as a pier, then Mr Deasy’s pier to God may also be pyrrhic. Out 
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of ‘Nestor,’ we may begin to speak of pyrrhic encyclopaedism: a pedagogically-inclined image 
of reality as totalised which exerts so devastating a toll on its students that it is worse than 
nothing. 
Stephen, clearly settled on Mr Deasy’s programme of learning as pyrrhic, has already lit 
upon the mirror as an alternative to the ‘circle of learning’ as an image for the totality of 
reality that may be less ‘futile’ than the Cyril Sargents the status quo produces (2.139). At the 
beginning of ‘Telemachus,’ Buck Mulligan flashes his cracked shaving mirror at Stephen, 
telling him: ‘Look at yourself…you dreadful bard!’ (1.134). Mulligan riffs on Oscar Wilde, 
describing Stephen’s response as ‘The rage of Caliban at not seeing his face in a mirror,’ to 
which Stephen replies that Mulligan’s mirror ‘is a symbol of Irish art. The cracked 
lookingglass of a servant’ (1.143, 146). As Gifford and Seidman note,128 Stephen’s quip is a 
riff on Mulligan’s reference that builds on Wilde’s Socratic dialogue ‘The Decay of Lying’: 
CYRIL: What do you mean by saying that life, ‘poor, probable, uninteresting 
human life,’ will try to reproduce the marvels of art? I can quite 
understand your objection to art being treated as a mirror. You think 
it would reduce genius to the position of a cracked looking glass. But 
you don't mean to say that you seriously believe that Life imitates Art, 
that Life in fact is the mirror, and Art the reality? 
 
VIVIAN: Certainly I do.129 
 
In this, Wilde asserts that reality is its artistic representations; and by identifying Mulligan’s 
‘cracked lookingglass,’ which he has stolen from his aunt’s servant, as a symbol for Irish art, 
Stephen seems to be suggesting that it follows that for Ireland Irish life must be the reflection 
of Irish art, which, in his vision, is invariably that ‘of a servant.’ In this, the mirror becomes, 
for Stephen, a metaphor of paramount significance: only in the image it provides, and not in 
the structure asserted by the ‘circle of learning,’ can reality be perceived. As such, Stephen’s 
digression on Averroes and Maimonides in ‘Nestor’ dwells on their ‘mocking mirrors,’ 
‘flashing…the obscure soul of the world’ (2.159)—as if their work provides a mirror against 
which the world may read its own collective soul, and discern the form by which it gives 
form. For Stephen, examination of the world’s soul in the mirrors provided by such figures 
is the route to identifying the proscriptions placed on society by the ‘circle of learning’ 
represented by such figures as Mr Deasy. Importantly, this inherently validates the ‘mirror of 
the world’ as a metaphor for shaping totality over the ‘circle of learning.’ The implication, 
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then, of Stephen’s ‘cracked lookingglass of a servant’ quip is that in the image it gives us we 
may find ‘the obscure soul of the world.’ 
Stephen provides a clue as to his interpretation of the obscure soul reflected by the mirror 
in the word ‘servant’: as he tells Haines moments later, ‘I am a servant of two masters…an 
English and an Italian…and a third…who wants me for odd jobs’ (1.638-41). As such, the 
two faces presented by the ‘mirror…cleft by a crooked crack’ (1.135-6) reveal the two faces 
of an Irish people subject to both colonial and ecumenical rule, with the implied single face 
that unites the two images subject to the expectations of Irish nationalism. Looking in 
Mulligan’s mirror, he sees these three ideological appeals proscribing him; as Stephen thinks 
later in ‘Nestor,’ while sitting in Mr Deasy’s office and contemplating his future at the school, 
‘The same room and hour, the same wisdom: and I the same. […] Three nooses round me 
here’ (2.233-4). In this light, it is tremendously significant that Joyce introduces Mulligan’s 
mirror in the novel’s very first sentence. Among the numerous ways of reading the novel’s 
opening must be asserted Joyce’s use of Mulligan’s mirror as his own ‘nicely polished 
lookingglass’130—the image cataphorically anticipating its association with Wilde’s argument 
that reality is constructed by its artistic representations, and Stephen’s explication of the 
mirror as a ‘symbol of Irish art’ that reflects back the ‘obscure soul of the world’ as a reality 
that is servant to three masters. The importance of this revelation in Stephen’s ‘cracked 
lookingglass’ becomes even clearer at the end of the ‘Proteus’ episode, when Stephen’s 
stream of consciousness settles on the image ‘Moving through the air high spars of a 
threemaster, her sails brailed up on the crosstrees, homing, upstream, silently moving, a silent 
ship’ (3.504-5; emphasis added). In the conclusion to the ‘Telemachia’ on Sandymount 
Strand, Stephen forges the ‘Nebeneinander’ and the ‘Nacheinander’ through the Proteus of his 
consciousness into a final ‘Signature…to read,’ an image that casts its shadow over the 
forthcoming ‘Odyssey’ and ‘Nostos’: the three masters that totalise reality, place it in a 
nutshell, and allow for characters like Mr Deasy to perform it as universal (3.13, 15, 2; 
emphasis in original).  
 
2.3 Bloom in the ‘giltbordered pierglass’ 
 
This returns us to Bloom of 7 Eccles street foreseeing Bloom of Flowerville in his fantasy 
of an ideal homecoming rooted in owning the Britannica. It is significant that Bloom’s 
thoughts are turned to his ideal bookshelf by ‘The final visual impression’ that is 
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‘communicated to him by [his] mirror’: but rather than reading the reflection, in the same way 
that Stephen might, he lets it become an occasion for fantasy (17.1357; emphasis added). If 
we accept Stephen’s suggestion that we can find in the mirrors of art and culture the ‘obscure 
soul of the world,’ then it is immensely suggestive that in Bloom’s own mirror he only 
perceives, besides his own ‘solitary (ipsorelative) mutable (aliorelative)’ image, art and culture 
as ‘The optical reflection of several inverted volumes improperly arranged and not in the 
order of their common letters’ (17.1350, 13578-9). As Bloom reverts the inverted volumes, 
leading the ‘reflections [that] occupied his mind’ is ‘The necessity of order, a place for 
everything and everything in its place’ (17.1408, 1410): if the Britannica is Bloom’s ideal type 
for literature, there is something unsurprising about his rather materialist response to the 
image of his bookshelf. Nevertheless, what this moment tells us is that, in his concern with 
order, Bloom is not fully aware of the ideological appeals that define that order, constructing 
it as both natural and necessary, and as such proscribing him. Of course, this is hinted at by 
the fact that Bloom’s consciousness finds its final representation, in ‘Ithaca,’ in a language 
and form that are alien to him; but by reading in the reflection of his ‘giltbordered pierglass’ 
(17.1343) the ‘necessity of order,’ Joyce suggests that Bloom believes, unlike Wilde and 
Stephen, that art and reality ought to be commensurate with each other, as the chiastic phrase 
‘a place for everything and everything in its place’ seems to corroborate. The problem with 
this, as the homecoming fantasy explores, is that if art and life are seen to reflect each other, 
then ‘the obscure soul of the world’ and the powers that shape and proscribe reality disappear 
in a mise en abyme; in keeping with the wordplay of ‘Nestor,’ Bloom’s ‘pierglass’ begins to look 
like a pyrrhic-glass. 
Examining the ideal homecoming, the structuring role of Stephen’s Irish servant’s three 
masters is easily perceived in Bloom’s vision of the kind of ‘Bloom’ required by ‘Bloom 
Cottage’ (17.1580). While the fantasy begins relatively modestly, as the outline of his ideal 
home, it becomes clear that the home would depend on Bloom’s social position: Bloom of 
Flowerville is described ‘In loose allwool garments with Harris tweed cap…achieving 
longevity’ (17.1581-7) in a vision that affects the trappings of the leisured, landed gentry. This 
vision digresses into a very specific configuration of Bloom of Flowerville’s formal and 
informal role: 
What would be his civic functions and social status among the county 
families and landed gentry? 
 
Arranged successively in ascending powers of hierarchical order, that of 
gardener, groundman, cultivator, breeder, and at the zenith of his career, 
resident magistrate or justice of the peace with a family crest and coat of arms 
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and appropriate classical motto (Semper paratus), duly recorded in the court 
directory (Bloom, Leopold P., M.P., P.C., K.P., L.L.D. (honoris causa), 
Bloomville, Dundrum) and mentioned in court and fashionable intelligence 
(Mr and Mrs Leopold Bloom have left Kingstown for England). (17.1606-
15) 
 
In this moment, Bloom imagines the version of himself that would suit his ideal home as one 
with recognition, status, and function among the British aristocracy; only ‘Bloom, Leopold 
P., M.P., P.C., K.P., L.L.D. (honoris causa)’ could exist in Bloom Cottage and be Bloom of 
Flowerville—not ‘Bloom of 7 Eccles Street.’ 
It is significant, then, that what Bloom of 7 Eccles Street requires to become Bloom of 
Flowerville, besides the ‘independent discovery of a goldseam of inexhaustible ore,’ is, as 
noted earlier, proof ‘that he had loved rectitude from earliest youth’ (17.1753, 1634). In the 
proof that is given, rectitude is clearly interpreted as serving the three masters of British 
Imperialism, religion, and Irish nationalism: Bloom recalls that he ‘had advocated during 
nocturnal perambulations the political theory of colonial (e.g. Canadian) expansion,’ recounts 
the move of him and his father from ‘the Israelitic faith’ to ‘the Irish (protestant) church’ and 
then ‘Roman Catholicism,’ and his support for the ‘constitutional agitation of Charles Stewart 
Parnell’ and the ‘programme of peace, retrenchment and reform of William Ewart Gladstone’ 
(17.1642-3, 1636-40, 1649-51). What is important about this definition of ‘rectitude’ is that, 
although it may not be internally coherent, it synthesises the demands of his three masters, 
and sets the parameters for the ‘course of action…he [would] outline for himself’ were he to 
become Bloom of Flowerville: 
A course that lay between undue clemency and excessive rigour: the 
dispensation in a heterogeneous society of arbitrary classes…of unbiassed 
homogeneous indisputable justice, tempered with mitigants of the widest 
possible latitude but exactable to the uttermost farthing with confiscation of 
estate, real and personal, to the crown. Loyal to the highest constituted power 
in the land, actuated by an innate love of rectitude his aims would be the strict 
maintenance of public order, the repression of many abuses…the upholding 
of the letter of the law (common, statute and law merchant) against all 
traversers in covin and trespassers acting in contravention of bylaws and 
regulations…all menial molestors of domestic conviviality, all recalcitrant 
violators of domestic connubiality. (17.1616-33; emphasis added) 
 
In this vision of his ‘ultimate ambition’ (17.1497), Bloom remains a servant of the three 
masters that constitute and manifest the nebulous ‘highest constituted power in the land’—
and the maximum potential permitted by his ‘innate love of rectitude’ is the ‘course that lay 
between undue clemency and excessive rigour,’ enforcing that same ‘rectitude’ 
homogenously across a heterogeneous society. 
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All this is to say that while the image of Bloom’s bookshelf in the ‘giltbordered pierglass’ 
reminds him of ‘the necessity of order,’ which in turn inspires his fantasy of an ideal 
Britannica-containing bookcase, that ideal image requires a version of Bloom that is not the 
one we know. Britannica-owning Bloom’s first aim would have to be ‘the strict maintenance 
of public order,’ with ‘order’ defined according to a ‘rectitude’ that can be identified as the 
moralising imperative of the Procrustean ‘circle of learning’ with which Stephen wrestles in 
‘Nestor.’ In this, the suggestion is that Bloom (of 7 Eccles Street) lives in a reality in which 
the latitude of possibility he can be allowed to envision as his ‘ultimate ambition’ is as a 
servant of the status quo with a more active role in the ‘strict maintenance’ of the order that 
dominates him. Over this ‘order,’ to which he can only be ‘Loyal,’ he can have no say, as he 
remains peripheral: even at ‘the zenith of his career,’ ‘fashionable intelligence’ parenthetically 
notes that ‘(Mr and Mrs Leopold Bloom have left Kingstown for England),’ as if to suggest 
that the version of Bloom most deserving of Bloom Cottage would always be marginal—
and, tragicomically, that the most agency he could exercise as an Irish subject would be to 
leave Ireland (17.1608, 1614-5). 
Bloom provides a succinct example of how his subjectivity is negated within the order to 
which he is ‘Loyal’ in his final moment with Stephen, as the pair stand outside the house in 
contemplation of the ‘heaventree of stars hung with humid nightblue fruit’ in the ‘penumbra 
of the garden’ (17.1039-40). Before they part ways, Bloom begins a ‘demonstration…of 
various constellations’—a party trick that, as Lenehan tells M’Coy in the ‘Wandering Rocks’ 
episode, he is wont to show off (17.1038–41). The stars inspire Bloom to consider alternately 
‘Meditations of evolution increasingly vaster’ and ‘obverse meditations of involution 
increasingly less vast’ (17.1040-69). In this, Bloom attempts to articulate the totality of reality 
according to an aesthetic that purports to be both objective and consistent, from the 
maximum down to the minimum. What is most suggestive about this otherwise rather 
mundane articulation of the outermost and innermost limits of totality is that, besides a 
reference to ‘a parenthesis of infinitesimal brevity’ (17.1055-6), Bloom does not locate the 
space filled by himself, Stephen, and the rest of humanity, or even account for their agency 
as observers: reality is simply a continuum independently of human observation. As the space 
from which measurement is taken is skipped over, observational agency is implicitly negated, 
acknowledged only by the unstated space at which increasingly vast meditations become 
increasingly less vast. In this, Bloom seems to accept as a universal truth an ‘order’ within 
which he is peripheral and over which he can have no influence—a totalised version of reality 
in which the place and power of everything appears natural and organic, and to which he can 
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be at best ‘Loyal.’ Bloom’s oft-referenced interest in star-gazing becomes coded, tragically, 
with the negation of his subjectivity. 
Yet something about this feels inconsistent with the interest in political and social reform 
attributed to Bloom throughout the novel. Among his peers, Bloom is reputed as a ‘cultured 
allroundman’ implying the esteem with which he is generally associated, and he is rumoured 
at the Castle to have advised Arthur Griffith, indicating a public sense of his politics as radical 
(10.581; 12.1634-6). Indeed, during ‘Lestrygonians’ and ‘Circe’ Bloom himself recollects his 
activism against the Boer War, and his involvement in the protest against Joe Chamberlain’s 
honorary degree (8.419-30; 15.791). Most strikingly, Bloom’s opposition to ‘injustice’ is 
articulated clearly during the argument at Barney Kiernan’s pub in ‘Cyclops,’ when he 
declares that he is against the ‘persecution’ that ‘[perpetuates] national hatred among nations,’ 
and asserts his Jewish ‘race’ (12.1474, 1417-8, 1467). The Bloom Ulysses figures across its 
day’s episodes does not seem exactly as ‘Loyal,’ or deferent, as the aspirational Britannica-
owner presented in ‘Ithaca.’ In what way can Bloom’s desire to reform and liberalise society 
be squared with his belief in ‘the necessity of order,’ and the deeply conservative aspiration 
that emerges from that belief in the form of the ‘Bloom Cottage’ fantasy (17.1410, 1580)? 
It is notable that, moments before demonstrating to Stephen his agency-negating 
observational scale of totalised reality, Bloom refers to his desire ‘to amend many social 
conditions, the product of inequality and avarice and international animosity’ as little more 
than a ‘recurrent frustration’ (17.989-93). Moreover, Bloom chooses to ‘desist from 
speculation’ on the idea that ‘human life was infinitely perfectible’ by concluding that ‘it was 
a task for a superior intelligence to substitute other more acceptable phenomena in the place 
of the less acceptable phenomena to be removed’ (17.1007-10, 983). This process, in which 
Bloom yields his reformism in deference to ‘superior intelligence,’ provides the platform 
from which to think through the relationship between, on the one hand, his desire for reform 
and, on the other, his attachment to the order of the status quo, as represented by his totalised 
observational scale of reality and his fantasy of his maximum potential as a peripheral agent 
within it. Is the suggestion that Bloom believes his reformism and the status quo are actually 
compatible? 
A useful clue is given in a comment he makes to Stephen, during ‘Eumaeus’: 
It is hard to lay down any hard and fast rules as to right and wrong but room 
for improvement all round there certainly is though every country, they say, 
our own distressful included, has the government it deserves. But with a little 
goodwill all round. It’s all very fine to boast of mutual superiority but what 
about mutual equality. I resent violence and intolerance in any shape or form. 
It never reaches anything or stops anything. A revolution must come on the 
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due instalments plan. It’s a patent absurdity on the face of it to hate people 
because they live around the corner and speak another vernacular, in the next 
house so to speak. (16.1094-103) 
 
In this, Bloom restates the key tenets of his reformism: his interest in universal equality, his 
hatred of violence and intolerance, his moderation, and his belief that fundamental 
improvements are necessary. At the same time, he insists on the actual occurrence of these 
reforms as certain: ‘A revolution must come on the due instalments plan.’ This peculiar metaphor, 
connecting revolution to mortgage repayment, suggests that, for Bloom, the certainty of 
reform is linked to the role of the bourgeois aspirant within the status quo; it is as if, for 
Bloom, bourgeois homeownership will lead, slowly but surely, to the end of ‘violence and 
intolerance’—as if revolution is inevitable so long as one is sufficiently invested in, or 
indebted to, the system. 
This would suggest that Bloom does see his reformism and the status quo as mutually 
compatible—indeed, it speaks neatly to the specific detail framing Bloom’s initial vision of 
Bloom Cottage as a ‘dwellinghouse’ that he is ‘Not to inherit…but to purchase’ (17.1499-
1504). But the metaphor of mortgage repayments suggests something more than mere 
compatibility between reformism and the status quo: if revolution ‘must come’ with the 
reliability of mortgage repayments, it follows that the status quo does not just allow for his 
reformism, but makes it inevitable. Bloom’s faith in homeownership within the parameters 
of the status quo seems to be linked to the certainty he believes that it provides for his 
reformism. But in what way could homeownership be understood to provide revolutionary 
certainty? Bloom’s extension of this metaphor to visualise hated others as those ‘in the next 
house, so to speak’ clarifies his logic here: for Bloom, homeownership provides the 
possibility of a platform from which all people can be recognisable in and commensurable 
with society as a whole. This develops one of the fundamental neuroses underpinning 
Bloom’s day: his identifiability within society. Indeed, this theme is established from the 
moment he is introduced to the novel: on seeing Blazes Boylan’s letter to Molly, in ‘Calypso,’ 
Bloom sees that it has been addressed to ‘Mrs Marion Bloom’: ‘His quickened heart slowed 
at once. Bold hand. Mrs Marion’ (4.244-5). The immediate concern here is the mounting 
evidence of Molly’s infidelity, but by using Molly’s title as the catalyst for this, Joyce draws 
attention to Bloom’s concern with how he should be represented formally: should all mail 
sent to 7 Eccles Street not be addressed to ‘Mr and Mrs L. M. Bloom’? This is what is 
suggested when Bloom subsequently distracts himself in the outhouse by imagining ‘Mr and 
Mrs L. M. Bloom’ (4.518) as the name under which he would publish, and is expanded 
throughout the day as Bloom frets about who and what he is (reaching, of course, the heights 
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of fantasy parenthetical gossip in the Bloom Cottage fantasy). Indeed, not long after the 
crowd at Barney Kiernan’s speculate on the fact that his father’s ‘name was Virag…He 
changed it by deedpoll’ and chase him out of the pub, Bloom finds himself writing ‘I. AM. 
A.,’ in an immensely suggestive moment that will be returned to shortly (12.1639-40; 13.1258-
66). This appellative anxiety goes on to reach one of its peaks in ‘Eumaeus,’ when he sees his 
name misspelt in the Telegraph as ‘L. Boom,’ which leads him to come up with a formula for 
‘who he in reality was’: ‘let x equal my right name and address, as Mr Algebra remarks passim’ 
(16.1260, 1645-7; emphasis added). While there are numerous ways of reading Bloom’s 
anxieties about his formal configuration, its use as a source of humour across the text 
highlights the importance of identifiability for Bloom; indeed, it explicitly connects 
recognisability in and commensurability with society with being known by the ‘right name 
and address,’ as if identifiability within society guarantees agency. In this light, the logic 
behind Bloom’s suggestion that homeownership must guarantee revolution is illuminated: 
because homeownership provides subjects recognisability in and commensurability with 
society, revolution is certain. 
Nevertheless, there is a presupposition in Bloom’s attachment to recognisability and 
commensurability that it is necessary to disentangle in order to fully grasp how Bloom can 
be certain about his reformism within the status quo. If identifiability within society leads to 
revolution, then it follows that revolution depends on subjects making themselves an 
identifiable part of the whole. Indeed, this is what Bloom of Flowerville represents to Bloom 
of 7 Eccles Street: a fantasy of his ‘ultimate’ self as at his most recognisable in and 
commensurable with the status quo. Ultimately, this means that, in Bloom’s eyes, revolution 
is only achievable by becoming an assimilated part of the whole—that is, by deferring one’s 
conception of the whole and how one might fit into it to the prevailing powers that define 
and give it shape. This is why Bloom’s maximum envisioned potential within the status quo, 
as Bloom of Flowerville, is necessarily ‘Loyal to the highest constituted power in the land’ 
(17.1622-3), rather than manifesting that power himself. Does it not undermine his 
reformism, to defer the definition of totality to the status quo? What exactly does deferral to 
the status quo afford Bloom that he cannot envision his reformism without? Looking again 
at his moment of deferral to ‘superior intelligence’ (17.1008) in ‘Ithaca’ clarifies his 
motivation. 
While the text implies that Bloom has Stephen in mind as at least one potential ‘superior 
intelligence,’ Stephen’s response to Bloom’s ‘dejection’ regarding the improvement of 
humanity’s ‘social conditions’ is described as such: 
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[Stephen] affirmed his significance as a conscious rational animal proceeding 
syllogistically from the known to the unknown and a conscious rational 
reagent between a micro and a macrocosm ineluctably constructed upon the 
incertitude of the void. (17.991, 1011-15) 
 
In this, Stephen tries, using terms from his internal monologue in ‘Proteus’ and his discourse 
on paternity in ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ to reassure Bloom that he himself can be confident 
that he has sufficient intelligence to ‘substitute other more acceptable phenomena in the place 
of the less acceptable phenomena to be removed’ (17.1008-10). Crucially, in this Stephen 
provides an image of totality that contrasts with Bloom’s observational scale: rather than a 
scale independent of the human observer, it is ‘a micro and a macrocosm’ that has been 
constructed ‘ineluctably,’ by ‘candescent’ observing individuals’ ‘modality of the visible,’ in 
order to construct shape amidst the void of reality, whose ‘incertitude’ signifies fathomless 
unknowability (2.76; 3.1). What is significant about this is that it provides, in the moments 
preceding Bloom’s agency-negating observational scale, a vision of totality as a human 
construction that is subject to ideological appeals, from the outermost macrocosm to the 
innermost microcosm, just like Mr. Deasy’s ‘nutshell of learning.’ Stephen, by affirming his 
confidence that Bloom is able to move ‘syllogistically from the known to the unknown,’ 
means to assure him that he can exist ‘conscious[ly]…upon the incertitude of the void,’ 
suggesting that Bloom can exist beyond human constructions of totality—that he can move 
into the unknown in the absence of a given totality.  
Stephen’s confidence in the face of epistemological incertitude is one of the sources of 
Bloom’s optimism in deferring to Stephen; indeed, it is Stephen’s assurance that Bloom can 
operate ‘upon the void’ that is the source of Bloom’s ‘misapprehension’ (17.1018). Bloom is 
described as apprehending Stephen’s comment ‘Substantially’ rather than ‘verbally,’ and 
being comforted by the fact that ‘as a competent keyless citizen he had proceeded 
energetically from the unknown to the known through the incertitude of the void’ (17.1019-
20).131 While Stephen seems to endorse conscious movement ‘from the known to the 
unknown,’ Bloom is comforted by the thought that they have both moved in the opposite 
direction: ‘from the unknown to the known.’ Moreover, while Stephen affirms Bloom’s 
‘significance’ as a ‘reagent…upon the incertitude of the void,’ Bloom comforts himself in the 
belief that they both have ‘proceeded energetically…through the incertitude of the void.’ The 
differences here are stark: while Stephen insists Bloom is capable of existing beyond versions 
of reality ‘constructed upon the incertitude of the void,’ Bloom is consoled by the idea that 
																																																						
131 Of course, since both Stephen and Bloom are ‘keyless citizen[s],’ this passage does implicitly refer to both 
of them. 
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they both have rediscovered order, and escaped ‘the incertitude,’ by passing ‘through…the 
void.’ 
In this light, Bloom’s deference to ‘superior intelligence’ in general, and to Stephen in 
particular, begins to look like a move to shut down epistemological uncertainty by embracing 
the familiarity of the status quo’s order. This brings us to the key issue underpinning Bloom’s 
belief in the compatibility of his reformism and the order of the status quo. For him, the 
status quo, as a ‘constructed’ totality that seems to take its subjects ‘through the incertitude 
of the void,’ rather than leaving them ‘upon’ it, provides certainty: certainty that there is 
‘superior intelligence’ for which objectivity is possible, and thus certainty that loyalty to that 
‘superior intelligence’ will allow for objective judgement to be dispensed. In this, it is clear 
that, for Bloom, reformism and the status quo are compatible as the latter will gradually lead 
to the former, since within the status quo it is possible to achieve objectivity, and since even 
peripheral subjects can become, through deference, commensurable agents that can dispense 
objectivity on its behalf. This is to say, despite having heard Stephen’s theory of how reality 
is ‘a microcosm and a macrocosm ineluctably constructed upon the incertitude of the void,’ 
Bloom presents Stephen with his totalising observational scale regardless, because, for him, 
it enables thought to exist with the certainty of objectivity as a possibility. The status quo 
provides the schema for an objective totality through which Bloom believes he can imagine 
an ‘infinitely perfectible’ (17.993) human life, without ‘the incertitude of the void.’ 
The relationship between certainty, objectivity, and revolution that emerges out of 
Bloom’s vision of himself in his ‘pierglass’ thus begin to look pyrrhic indeed, as a peculiar 
question immediately following Bloom’s observational scale clarifies: 
Did he find the problems of the inhabitability of the planets and their satellites 
by a race, given in species, and of the possible social and moral redemption of 
said race by a redeemer, easier of solution? (17.1083-5) 
 
The question’s final clause—‘easier of solution’—poses a genitival ambiguity typical, as 
Derek Attridge has noted,132 of Joyce: do the problems of the inhabitability of the planets 
and the concomitant redemption of their human colonisers have easier solutions than the 
computational problems of his observational scale, or does the possibility of observing from 
another planet make for an easier way of tabulating ‘a more precise result’ (17.1070) on the 
scale, and thus assist human redemption through knowledge? The difference between these 
interpretations, particularly in light of what Bloom’s observational scale does to his agency, 
is acute: the former asks whether Bloom can answer a question objectively, while the latter 
																																																						
132 Derek Attridge, Joyce Effects: On Language, Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
pp. 22–29. 
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asks whether existence on another planet would facilitate humanity’s objectivity. Bloom 
answers neither version of the question, bemoaning instead humans across the Solar System 
as ‘inalterably and inalienably attached to vanities, to vanities of vanities and to all that is 
vanity’ (17.1099-100). The pessimism of the answer recalls the warning against ‘wisdom’ at 
the beginning of ‘Ecclesiastes,’ wherein the reader is warned that ‘all is vanity […] For in 
much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow’ (Ecc. 1.14-
18). This allusion restates Bloom’s resistance to the uncertainty of consciousness ‘upon the 
void,’ as it sees him recoil from a thought questioning the nature of ‘objectivity’ as if it is 
impossible to do so without vanity—a move akin to the sin of being ‘very big’133 that 
preoccupies the young Stephen. In the face of uncertainty about objectivity, Bloom defers to 
the status quo, rather than searching for the ‘obscure soul’ through which, like Stephen, he 
could reconceive the world; the gnomic quip given in response to the restated question makes 
this clear: 
And the problem of possible redemption? 
 
The minor was proved by the major. (17.1101-1) 
 
This exchange reduces Bloom’s uncertainty about social reform into something like a 
reassuring aphorism that all will end well: at once building on the vision of reality as a 
homogenous continuum independent of human observation, which is consistent from the 
maximum to the minimum, or the macrocosm to microcosm, the idea that the major will 
prove the minor implies that all questions relating to social reform will be resolved by the 
power at the highest point within that continuum. That is to say, peripheral subjects can trust 
that the actions taken by ‘the highest constituted power in the land’ (17.1622-3) will, in the 
end, be redemptive, and thus the maintenance of the order of the status quo is as necessary 
and natural as Bloom habitually thinks it—as if humanity can be consoled that universal 
redemption will trickle down, beginning with those at the top and reaching, eventually, those 
at the bottom. 
Bloom’s attachment to the totalised reality of the status quo does indeed seem pyrrhic; 
but if it is the wordplay in ‘Nestor’ that gives us the framework for identifying this, then it is 
important to acknowledge that this does not mean he sits easily alongside the tyrannical and 
odious Mr Deasy and his pyrrhic encyclopaedism. Indeed, although Bloom’s reformism is 
built upon the same faith in totalised reality with which Mr Deasy indoctrinates his students, 
they are in many ways at odds with each other, not least because Bloom stands as an absolute 
																																																						
133 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, p. 13. 
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refutation of Mr Deasy’s final words to Stephen, that Ireland ‘never let [the Jews] in’ (2.442). 
How, then, does Joyce make them work together in the context of the novel’s argument 
about the totalised reality signified by the encyclopaedic ideals to which they both ultimately 
subscribe? 
In answering this question, it is helpful to look at Bloom’s rationale for his extended 
Britannica-ownership fantasy. After it peters out, on the vision of independence from the 
wealth of ‘eminent financiers’ by way of that cruelly optimistic ‘independent discovery of a 
goldseam of inexhaustible ore,’ Bloom thinks to himself that he ‘meditate[s] on schemes so 
difficult of realisation’ because: 
It was one of his axioms that similar meditations or the automatic relation to 
himself of a narrative concerning himself or tranquil recollection of the past when 
practised habitually before retiring for the night alleviated fatigue and produced 
as a result sound repose and renovated vitality. (17.1748, 1753, 1754-58) 
 
In this, the ‘Bloom Cottage’ fantasy is rationalised as efficacious preparation for the following 
day, as if a deferent vision of bourgeois aspiration fulfilled will prepare him for another day 
of personal aspiration unachieved. Leading directly from this, Bloom provides the 
‘justifications’ for his rationale, which are appended by his fear of the ‘malignant agencies 
chiefly operative during somnolence’: 
What did he fear? 
 
The committal of homicide or suicide during sleep by an aberration of the light 
of reason, the incommensurable categorical intelligence situated in the cerebral 
convolutions. (17.1759, 1764, 1765-68) 
 
In this moment, it is revealed that Bloom’s attachment to the status quo, and his desire to be 
recognisable in and commensurable with it, is connected to a fear that if he holds on to 
information that is unrecognisable to or incommensurable with the ‘categorical intelligence’ 
of the status quo, which has shaped his ‘cerebral convolutions,’ he might lose control of his 
basic capacity to prevent himself destroying himself and others. This is key to understanding 
Bloom’s relationship with the status quo, and the way he differs from Mr Deasy: for, if 
certainty of the possibility of reform is the carrot by which the status quo encourages Bloom’s 
deference, ‘fear’ that non-conformity would lead to a deadly ‘aberration of the light of reason’ 
is the stick by which it assures it, as Bloom is forced to let go of information that is 
unrecognisable to and incommensurable with its parameters. With this in mind, it is worth 
reflecting briefly on how ‘homicide and suicide’ recur in relation to Bloom’s concerns about 
his recognisability and commensurability throughout his day. 
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While suicide is associated directly with his father, homicide springs into Bloom’s mind 
more obliquely, in his thoughts on the Invincibles’ political assassinations in Phoenix Park 
and their later betrayal by James Carey.134 During the ‘Lotus Eaters’ episode, Bloom 
remembers that Carey used the ‘very church’ he is visiting at the time, and later during the 
‘Lestrygonians’ episode he recalls his betrayal to remind himself that you ‘Never know who 
you’re talking to’ (5.380, 8.441). Carey is a figure about whom Bloom is deeply ambivalent: 
while he has respect for ‘the courage of [Carey’s] political convictions’ and professes ‘a certain 
kind of admiration for a man who had actually brandished a knife,’ he is horrified by his 
treachery, and that he could lie to his ‘Wife and six children at home,’ who never realised he 
supported them by ‘drawing secret service pay from the castle’ (16.1058-9; 5.381; 8.444). That 
Bloom is never able to properly remember Carey’s full name is conspicuous, especially 
considering his own appellative anxieties: it is as if his respect for the Invincibles’ convictions 
and his instinctive condemnation of Carey’s ‘[turning] queen’s evidence’ to betray them, 
renders Carey in some sense unrecognisable to and incommensurable with the ‘categorical 
intelligence’ that structures his thoughts (5.378l; 16.1053; 17.1767).135 
Bloom’s association of his ‘categorical intelligence’ with control over those ‘malignant 
agencies chiefly operative during somnolence’ starts to look quite consistent in this light; and 
Bloom’s detumescent thought, at the end of ‘Nausicaa,’ that he might return to the beach in 
the same way ‘murderers do’ (13.1255) takes on tremendous significance. This thought is 
immediately followed by Bloom’s aforementioned writing of ‘I. AM. A.’ in the sand, before 
deciding there is ‘No room’ and effacing the letters—a moment fraught with interpretative 
possibility (13.1258-66). To the many ways of reading it I would add that it weaves together 
at once Bloom’s anxieties about his recognisability and commensurability with his fear that 
his agency outside of the parameters of the status quo may give life to those ‘malignant 
agencies’ that lead to ‘homicide and suicide.’ At the same time, the letters ‘I AM A’ 
anaphorically recalls Stephen’s quip to Haines—‘I am a servant of two masters…and a 
third…who wants me for odd jobs’—and as such connects the power to define those 
parameters to the ‘threemaster[s],’ or the ‘three nooses,’ that Stephen sees shaping his agency 
in Mulligan’s ‘cracked lookingglass of a servant’ (1.638-41; 3.504; 2.234; 1.46; emphasis 
added). In this, Bloom’s idealisation of the Britannica is synthesised into anxiety about his 
																																																						
134 Malcolm Brown provides a useful overview of Joyce’s treatment of Carey in terms of ‘the Judas theme.’ 
Malcolm Brown, The Politics of Irish Literature: From Thomas Davis to W. B. Yeats (London, England: Allen and 
Unwin, 1972). 
135 In ‘Lotus Eaters,’ Bloom thinks of ‘Peter Carey, yes. No, Peter Claver I am thinking of. Denis Carey’ 
(5.380-1). He comes closest to recalling Carey’s name in ‘Lestrygonians,’ when he thinks of ‘that Peter or 
Denis or James Carey who blew the gaff on the invincibles,’ but by ‘Eumaeus’ is again referring to ‘Denis or 
Peter Carey’ (8.442-3; 16.1053-4). 
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identity that ensures deference to a totalised order of reality which disguises its ideological 
appeals as universal truths; Bloom is proscribed, and unable, unlike Stephen, to read for the 
powers that are shaping him. 
For Mr Deasy, conversely, anxiety about his recognisability in and commensurability with 
the status quo does not play a role in his behaviour: indeed, his confidence in the significance 
of his own hereditary and professional status and his attachment to historical error suggest 
that he has a rather different relationship with ‘categorical intelligence’ than Bloom. As noted 
earlier, Mr Deasy’s conception of history has a tendency to proscribe and alter facts for 
expedience, particularly regarding Irish unionism and Jewish migration to Ireland; indeed, if 
Bloom is characterised by his desire to be recognisable in and commensurable with the status 
quo, Mr Deasy seems to be obsessed with deciding what does and does not fit within the 
status quo: it is notable that he sees himself as, by implication, ‘born to be a teacher,’ while 
at the same time a dictator of the ‘common sense’ of veterinary science, a historian of the 
‘Glorious, pious and immortal memory’ of Ireland, and a herald of the ‘decay’ brought by 
‘jew merchants’ (2.402, 294, 273, 348-50). Although Mr Deasy’s is a belief that Joyce uses 
‘Nestor’ to send up as pretentious and tyrannical, his confidence clearly emerges from his 
belief that he has the prerogative to categorise; Bloom, conversely, limits his categorising of 
others to his identification of them as ‘people…in the next house so to speak’ (16.1103). 
While Bloom is willing to defer to and proscribe himself for the status quo, Mr Deasy seems 
to assume the central prerogative of selecting what does and does not fit on its behalf. An 
important hint as to why is given in his tirade against the Jews who surround his influence at 
the Department of Agriculture ‘by difficulties, by…intrigues by…backstairs influence’ 
(2.343-4): if Bloom believes he is compartmentalising himself for the status quo, Mr Deasy 
could be described as believing he is its safeguard. Just as Bloom is certain of reform, Mr 
Deasy believes that ‘Old England is dying’ (2.350-1) and he is certain that he is a guardian of 
its light. As such, rather than acknowledging other ‘people…in the next house so to speak’ 
(16.1099-113), Mr Deasy actively curtails the realities of others, particularly Catholics and 
Jews, to support his nostalgia for an Imperial and millenarian totalised conception of the 
world; as he remarks, in implicit contradistinction to Stephen and Bloom, ‘I am a 
struggler…But I will fight for the right till the end’ (2.395-6; emphasis added). 
Mr Deasy’s fundamental epistemological difference with Bloom is one of prerogative: 
while Bloom concerns himself with fitting in with received wisdom, Mr Deasy believes it is 
up to him to safeguard that received wisdom from decay, and thus decide with what it does 
and does not fit. In this difference, we can read the heart of Joyce’s critique of 
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encyclopaedism: although ostensibly divergent, between Bloom’s deferral to the status quo 
and Mr Deasy’s paranoiac defence of it Joyce renders characters that, for all their obvious 
differences, are both attached to an idea of the world that is totalised, as represented by 
Bloom’s attachment to the Britannica and his associated observational scale and by Mr Deasy’s 
‘nutshell of learning.’ Both believe they require the status quo’s totalised version of reality as 
it produces certainty: for Bloom it is the certainty of reform that simultaneously secures his 
identity as recognisable and commensurable, while for Mr Deasy it is the certainty that he is 
at the self-confident centre, protecting order by performing the prerogative to decide what 
is and is not recognisable and commensurable. Yet, if their pyrrhic attachment to totalised 
reality is what unites them, a vital implication seems to be that they both depend on an idea 
of the world that is, in its totalised form, necessarily dependent on proscription and exclusion. 
That is to say, the attachment of Bloom and Mr Deasy to totalised reality implicates them 
inevitably in a Procrustean logic: for them, nothing can be thought without the supposed 
certainty afforded by the exclusionary boundaries of totalised reality. 
 
2.4 Paradise and the Periphery 
 
Such exclusionary logic may make sense for tyrannous Mr Deasy, who seems to relish 
the opportunity to occupy the ‘locus of enunciation,’ from which he can decide what is and 
is not registered as reality and what does and does not count as human,136 but does not seem 
entirely compatible with mild-mannered and moderate Bloom, whose definition of a ‘nation’ 
includes ‘the same people living in the same place […] Or also living in different places’ 
(12.1422-28). Indeed, Joyce elaborates on this specific difference between them—their 
willingness to occupy the ‘locus of enunciation’ from where the standards of recognisability 
and commensurability are set—by making it a central element of the Bloom Cottage fantasy. 
As noted, Bloom’s maximum potential as Bloom of Flowerville is ‘A course that lay between 
undue clemency and excessive rigour…Loyal to the highest constituted power in the land,’ 
and his maximum achievement in ‘fashionable intelligence’ would be having ‘left Kingstown 
for England’: Bloom’s agency at Bloom Cottage is peripheral and deferent to the standards 
set by that nebulous ‘highest constituted power’ (17.1617-23, 1614-5). In this, Bloom’s other 
digressive fantasy, earlier in the day, leaps out for comparative analysis: the so-called 
‘Messianic Scene,’ in ‘Circe.’137 Reading this scene alongside the Bloom Cottage fantasy’s 
																																																						
136 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance, p. 5. 
137 There is a solid genetic foundation for reading the ‘Messianic scene’ and the Bloom Cottage fantasy 
together. As Michael Groden notes in Ulysses in Progress and The James Joyce Archive, the ‘Messianic scene’ is an 
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investment in peripheral commensurability with a distant locus of enunciation, Bloom’s 
hallucination of himself as ‘Leopold the First’ of ‘the new Bloomusalem in the Nova Hibernia 
of the future’ looks fundamentally like a vision of himself were he to be that ‘highest 
constituted power,’ and as such occupy the locus of enunciation from which the standards 
for commensurability are set (15.1473, 1544-5; 17.1622-3). Taking these two fantasies as 
variations on Bloom’s epistemological centrality, in the paradise of the New Bloomusalem, 
and marginality, in the periphery of Bloom Cottage, they make an argument for 
understanding why the totalised reality to which he defers at the day’s end, as he reflects on 
his ‘solitary (ipsorelative) mutable (aliorelative)’ self in his Pyrrhic ‘pierglass’ and dreams of 
the Britannica, is so seductive—and provides the terms on which Ulysses can be read as 
fictional encyclopaedism, imagining a micro and a macrocosm ‘upon the incertitude of the 
void’ without the proscriptions of a given totality (17.1350, 1343, 1014-5). 
Suggestive parallels between the New Bloomusalem and Bloom Cottage present 
themselves readily: just as Bloom Cottage is a house from which Bloom of Flowerville 
pronounces judgement across society, so is the New Bloomusalem, which is described as ‘a 
colossal edifice with crystal roof, built in the shape of a huge pork kidney’ from which 
Leopold the First dispenses justice across his ‘beloved subjects’ (15.1548-9, 1542). The 
divergences, however, are clear: while at Bloom Cottage Bloom of Flowerville is fettered as 
a peripheral agent maintaining a ‘public order’ defined by a central power to which he must 
be deferent and over which he has no say, in the New Bloomusalem, Leopold the First blends 
all of society’s most important leadership roles,138 in a vision of a new Irish sovereignty that 
sees his own personal ‘judgements in Ireland and territories thereunto belonging’ setting the 
standards for objectivity, and announcing the dawn of ‘year 1 of the Paradisiacal Era,’ as he 
becomes and defines the epistemological centre (17.1624; 15.148-2, 1632). Indeed, if Bloom 
of Flowerville achieves his maximum potential having ‘left Kingstown for England,’ it is in 
stark contrast with Leopold the First’s command for ‘Immediate silence,’ from the centre of 
																																																						
anomaly in the narrative of Joyce’s writing of Ulysses. While the majority of Joyce’s edits to his previous drafts 
were small additions, rarely exceeding a sentence, the ‘Messianic scene’ constituted an entirely new and 
contiguous scene that was added some months after ‘Circe’ had been fully drafted. While Joyce informed 
Ezra Pound that ‘Circe’ was ‘finished’ in December 1920, and Ettore Schmitz that it had been completed 
‘some time ago’ in January 1921, the ‘Messianic scene’ was not drafted until the summer of 1921, during 
which period Joyce was working primarily on his first drafts of ‘Ithaca’ and ‘Penelope.’ Although a genetic 
reading does not bear heavily on my argument here, since the parallels present themselves as readily as 
anything in Ulysses, it is worth noting the likelihood that something about the writing of the ‘Bloom Cottage’ 
fantasy may have made Joyce require Bloom’s ‘Messianic scene.’ Michael Groden, Ulysses in Progress 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 173, 218, 171; Joyce, Selected Letters of James Joyce, p. 277. 
138 Mark Wollaeger’s essay on Bloom’s ‘coronation’ remains the key reading of how Joyce synthesizes 
different authorities into the fantasy—although while he focuses on solely the regal and papal elements, 
professional (as ‘chairman’) and juridical (at the ‘Court of Conscience’) aspects are also conflated (15.1471, 
1629). Wollaeger, pp. 93–5. 
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his apparently universal kingdom, by ‘hold[ing] up his right hand’ (17.1614-5; 15.499-500). 
While Bloom of Flowerville’s agency is negated as marginal, Leopold the First’s agency is 
literally the centre of the universe, with ‘Wireless intercontinental and interplanetary 
transmitters…set for reception of [his] message’ (15.1500-3). Little surprise, then, that while 
Bloom of Flowerville is ‘duly recorded in the court directory’ of a totality he cannot influence, 
Leopold the First repositions his ‘beloved subjects’ in relation to him, as the construction of 
the New Bloomusalem sees ‘Numerous houses razed to the ground’ and 
‘inhabitants…lodged in barrels and boxes, all marked in red with the letters: L.B.’ (17.1611-
2; 15.1542, 1552-4). Re-housing his subjects in boxes marked with his initials and naming his 
universal kingdom for himself, Leopold the First situates the paradisiacal sovereignty of his 
Ireland in his very name; and as such, the New Bloomusalem riffs on Bloom’s appellative 
anxieties by suggesting they would be quelled were he to become the indexical, normative 
principle against which everything else is measured—the central figure against which the 
shape of totality is constructed. 
The binary the fantasies set up between epistemological centrality and marginality is the 
variable that determines Bloom of Flowerville’s and Leopold the First’s divergent judicial 
careers. Indeed, if the former can only perfect the ‘infinitely perfectible’ human race through 
‘the dispensation in a heterogeneous society of arbitrary classes…of unbiassed homogeneous 
indisputable justice…Loyal to the highest constituted power in the land,’ the latter, as the 
epistemological centre, can take a more direct approach: as the locus of enunciation, he 
becomes that ‘superior intelligence’ which can ‘substitute other more acceptable phenomena 
in the place of the less acceptable phenomena to be removed’ (17.993, 1618-22, 993, 1008-
10). So while Bloom of Flowerville’s maximum potentiality is limited to ‘undue clemency or 
excessive rigour’ as defined by the power at the centre, Leopold the First has the prerogative 
to articulate a programme for reform. As such, his ‘assistant town clerk’ introduces Leopold 
the First’s ‘Court of Conscience,’ from which is dispensed ‘solution of doubles and other 
problems’ (15.1626-31): as the principle to which everything is epistemologically relative, 
Leopold the First’s own conscience defines the parameters for justice. 
This programme for justice and reform is worth dwelling on, as it provides the point at 
which his construction of a totality around himself fails, leading to the scene’s Messianic 
dénouement. Once the court has been opened, the trajectory of his vision for reform expands 
from the micro to the macro, or the minor to the major, as he advises on taxation, chemistry, 
and the family, until he announces his universal principles: 
I stand for the reform of municipal morals and the plain ten commandments. 
New worlds for old. Union of all, jew, moslem and gentile. […] General amnesty, 
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weekly carnival with masked licence, bonuses for all, esperanto the universal 
language with universal brotherhood. No more patriotism of barspongers and 
dropsical impostors. Free money, free rent, free love and a free lay church in a 
free lay state. (15.1685-93) 
 
In this moment, Joyce provides the most specific image of Bloom’s perfected human race. 
Yet, it is on this proclamation that the fantasy begins to fall apart, with O’Madden Burke 
immediately envisioned mocking it as ‘Free fox in a free henroost’ (15.1695). Moreover, in a 
manner absolutely antithetical to the proliferation of details in ‘Circe,’ when Lenehan asks 
Bloom about ‘mixed bathing,’ the stage directions outline that ‘Bloom explains to those near 
him his schemes for social regeneration. All agree with him’ (15.1701-3). In this imaginative 
ellipsis, the practicalities of his vision for reform are elided, revealing his inability to envision 
reform even were he to assume the privilege of the locus of enunciation from which totality 
is defined. Indeed, given that Leopold the First’s coronation devotes more than fifty lines to 
its spectators, it is revealing that his opportunity to articulate his programme for reform takes 
up merely a fraction of one. 
Moreover, it is conspicuous that this failure of imagination is followed by the appearance 
of: 
a lorry on which are the shaking statues of several naked goddesses…and plaster 
figures, also naked, representing the new nine muses, Commerce, Operatic 
Music, Amor, Publicity, Manufacture, Liberty of Speech, Plural Voting, 
Gastronomy, Private Hygiene, Seaside Concert Entertainments, Painless 
Obstetrics and Astronomy for the People. (17.1704-10) 
 
The appearance of these muses recalls the Enlightenment fascination with muses, as if Bloom 
requires the familiar order provided by the Enlightenment in order to reassure himself that, 
in the absence of his ability to think without totality, his vision for reform would be guided 
by a totality conferred by enlightened principles. In this light, the miscount of the number of 
muses (nine instead of twelve) looks like Bloom’s inability to retain control of the scale of a 
totality over which he is attempting to be the defining principle: even in a hallucination of 
himself at the paradisiacal centre, totality is, for Bloom, unimaginable without the certainty 
provided by the status quo. And indeed, that the last of his muses is ‘Astronomy for the 
People’ neatly anticipates Bloom’s agency-negating observational totality in ‘Ithaca,’ 
connecting the failure of his attempt to envision totality with his dependence on the version 
of totality he receives from the status quo.  
Rather than instantiating the reform he desires, it seems that even in his hallucination of 
centrality all Bloom can achieve is the imagination of the same totality in which he lives—
and, as such, of the same Procrustean policing of the boundaries of totality and performance 
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of that totality as universal rather than specific to him as its locus of enunciation. Indeed, just 
as the Bloom Cottage fantasy depends on subscription to a totality defined by a centre that 
decides what does and does not fit and renders Bloom of Flowerville peripheral as such, in 
the New Bloomusalem Bloom’s authority depends on the purging of those who do not fit 
with his worldview and the presentation of the universal inclusion of everyone else. Leopold 
the First’s epistemological restructure involves ‘The instantaneous deaths of many powerful 
enemies, graziers, members of parliament, members of standing committees’ and a 
complementary performance of inclusiveness, in which Bloom makes a show of including all 
members of society by ‘shaking hands with a blind stripling…[eating] a raw turnip…[taking] 
part in a stomach race with elderly male and female cripples’ (15.1566-8, 1600-15). 
Understanding the fantasies as envisioning opposite positions in relation to the locus of 
enunciation, they seem to suggest that the great responsibilities of paradisiacal 
epistemological centrality are unsustainable, while the consequences of peripheral 
epistemological marginality are comforting and benign, as well as progressive and 
meritocratically-enabling. It is significant that Bloom of Flowerville’s judicial career ends 
merely in the aforementioned cruelly optimistic vision of a ‘goldseam of inexhaustible ore,’ 
while Leopold the First’s leads to an insurgency of ‘antiBloomites’ that bring about his 
pseudo-martyrdom (17.1753; 15.1753). The unsustainability of the paradisiacal New 
Bloomusalem would seem to arise from the necessity of imagining the world as a knowable, 
articulable, unified, and homogenous totality, while the consolation of the peripheral Bloom 
Cottage emerges from the readymade Britannica-shaped totality to which he can defer. The 
epistemological consequences of each vision seem, then, to be apiece: both fantasies enable 
Bloom to be consoled by the order of the status quo; Leopold the First reassures Bloom of 
7 Eccles Street that, although it may be ‘difficult of realisation,’ Bloom of Flowerville is a 
vision not only possible but ultimately ‘renov[ating]’ for daily vitality (17.1754, 1758). 
Paradise consoles those in the periphery that their place in the periphery is preferable. If 
Bloom’s fantasy homecoming is a pathetic riff on his actual bathetic nostos, it is because that 
fantasy reassures and comforts him in his position; whereas Odysseus actively imposed order 
on his return to Ithaca, Bloom passively perpetuates the order of 7 Eccles Street, seeking the 
consolation of the order he knows rather than construction of ‘new worlds for old’ ‘upon 
the incertitude of the void’ (15.1685; 17.1014-15).  
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2.5 Amor Matris upon the Void 
 
It is in the nature of the order to which he returns and by which he is consoled that the 
terms on which Ulysses can be read as imagining a world without totality emerge; indeed, just 
as Odysseus’ journey returns him to matrimonial order, the prerequisite of Bloom’s 
consolation is his return to Molly. As such, if the epistemological consequences of Bloom’s 
fantasies for paradise and the periphery are mutually reinforcing, it is unsurprising to find a 
key element of that mutual reinforcement in the fantasies’ understandings of sex and gender 
roles. For all the differences engendered by the fantasies’ visions of occupation of and 
commensurability with the locus of enunciation, the role of women is ultimately the same: 
to reassure Bloom that his masculinity affords him a default centrality of sorts. 
This androcentrism is particularly clear in the New Bloomusalem, which is bookended 
by choruses of women heaping praise on Bloom. In the midst of his coronation, ‘Women 
whisper eagerly’:  
A MILLIONAIRESS 
(richly) Isn’t he simply wonderful? 
A NOBLEWOMAN 
(nobly) All that man has seen! 
A FEMINIST 
(masculinely) And done! (15.1460-66) 
 
This apparently diverse array of admirable women is an essential element in the construction 
of Bloom’s centrality—and his subsequent placing of ‘his right hand on his testicles’139 when 
taking his oath clarifies that his masculinity is an active component of his epistemological 
centrality. This privilege is reified even after the decline of the New Bloomusalem, and his 
diagnosis as ‘a finished example of the new womanly man,’ as a contemporaneous Irish 
nationalist women’s organisation chant a litany that conflates his day with the ‘Litany of the 
Sacred Heart’: 
THE DAUGHTERS OF ERIN 
Kidney of Bloom, pray for us 
Flower of the Bath, pray for us 
Mentor of Menton, pray for us 
Canvasser for the Freeman, pray for us 
Charitable Mason, pray for us 
Wandering Soap, pray for us 
Sweets of Sin, pray for us 
Music without Words, pray for us 
Reprover of the Citizen, pray for us 
																																																						
139 Notably, the same hand he uses to command ‘Immediate silence’ (15.1500) throughout his universal 
kingdom. 
 65 
Friend of all the Frillies, pray for us 
Midwife Most Merciful, pray for us 
Potato Preservative against Plague and Pestilence, pray for us. (15.1798-9, 1940-
52) 
 
Integral to the fantasy of the New Bloomusalem is women’s active curation of Bloom’s 
epistemological centrality—to the extent that he even figures Molly as ‘The former 
morganatic spouse’ who has been ‘repudiated’ for her infidelity, and ‘hastily removed’ to 
make way for Selene, Greek goddess of the moon (15.1506-11). In this moment, Bloom, who 
later dwells on the ‘special affinities…between the moon and woman,’ tacitly acknowledges 
that adulterous Molly is incompatible with a fantasy of centrality, and allows himself to 
imagine, albeit only briefly, that the goddess of the moon may affect that ‘satellitic 
dependence’ he so desires from women (17.1157-8, 1160). 
The role of women in Bloom Cottage is ostensibly far different, but ultimately serves the 
same androcentric ends. Women are conspicuous by their complete absence from Bloom 
Cottage: as Austin Briggs has recently noted, ‘Bloom seems as solitary as Crusoe in his island,’ 
and so completely is Molly missing that it seems in the fantasy as if ‘a divorce might have 
already taken place’—suggestively, among the catalogue of furnishings for the cottage, ‘no 
bed is inventoried.’140 That said, Molly does get one important mention: as part of Bloom’s 
aforementioned vision of his maximum commensurability and potency as ‘Mr and Mrs 
Leopold Bloom’ (17.1614-5)—and it is as a type of incorporation into and containment 
within his identity that Bloom fantasises women’s reinforcement of his masculinity in Bloom 
Cottage; indeed, it is a vision of the incorporation he has been longing for since Boylan’s 
letter arrives in ‘Calypso.’ A similar process is at work in the decision to name his estate 
‘Flowerville’: just as he incorporates and contains Molly in his maximally commensurable 
title, in the name ‘Flowerville’ he is able to incorporate and contain his philandering 
pseudonym, Henry Flower, sublimating his libido into the public sphere. It is as if, in Bloom 
Cottage, women and the desire for women can be controlled by way of a sublimated 
containment that reaffirms the normativity of an androcentric order. 
One of the givens that the New Bloomusalem and Bloom Cottage fantasies jointly 
proffer, then, is that androcentrism is a foundational element of both paradisiacal, Bloom-
shaped and peripheral, Britannica-shaped totalities. Whether embodying the locus of 
enunciation at the centre or being relative to it in the margins, both totalised visions converge 
																																																						
140 Austin Briggs, ‘Bloom’s Dream Cottage and Crusoe’s Island: Man Caves,’ in A Long the Krommerun: Selected 
Papers from the James Joyce Utrecht Symposium, ed. by Onno Kosters, Tim Conley, and Peter de Voogd (Leiden: 
Brill Rodopi, 2016), pp. 63–75 (p. 70). 
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in their implicit understanding that women afford men centrality. In thematising this in both 
fantasies, Joyce necessarily questions the extent to which imagining without totality means 
imagining without androcentrism. Androcentrism is, of course, implicit in the novel’s 
Homeric parallel—but if we accept that gender is an active component in the creation of 
totalities, then in what way can a micro and a macrocosm be articulated ‘upon the incertitude 
of the void’ with totalising androcentrism? 
Since the act of totalisation always involves the Procrustean act of exclusion, it is 
unsurprising to find, in the New Bloomusalem, an extremely vivid image of Leopold the 
First’s policing of gender, in the moments after his imaginative failure when explaining to his 
subjects his ‘schemes for social regeneration’ (15.1702-3). As people hurl accusations at him, 
women, led by a ‘Veiled Sibyl,’ rush to defend him: 
THE VEILED SIBYL 
(enthusiastically) I’m a Bloomite and I glory in it. I believe in him in spite of all. I’d 
give my life for him, the funniest man on earth. 
BLOOM 
(winks at the bystanders) I bet she’s a bonny lassie. […] 
THE VEILED SIBYL 
(stabs herself) My hero god! (she dies) 
(Many most attractive and enthusiastic women also commit suicide by stabbing, drowning, 
drinking prussic acid, aconite, arsenic, opening their veins, refusing food, casting themselves under 
steamrollers, from the top of Nelson’s Pillar, into the great vat of Guinness’s brewery, 
asphyxiating themselves by placing their heads in gasovens, hanging themselves in stylish garters, 
leaping from windows of different storeys.) (15.1735-51) 
 
In this moment, as Bloom envisions a voluntary femicide in his own honour, androcentrism 
starts to look like that which he fears most: ‘the committal of homicide or suicide…by an 
aberration of the light of reason’ (17.1766-7). The pressure of imagining a totality is thus 
restated as an anxiety about his ability to retain control over the emotional excess signified 
by women—to the extent that the Bloom Cottage fantasy allows for a compartmentalising 
of women that renders them invisible while allowing androcentrism to continue to function. 
The effect of this, however, is to render women, in each fantasy, as knowable only through 
their emotional excess—as if even idealised women are ultimately unknowable. And this is 
where Bloom of 7 Eccles Street is cannier than his fantasy selves. 
While Bloom becomes extremely fatalistic about his relationship with Molly over the 
course of the day, the consolation of his return to matrimonial order is not merely passivity, 
but suggestive of a bond that makes him less androcentric than either of his ideal selves. 
Although he mourns, during Simon Dedalus’ song in ‘Sirens,’ that ‘all is lost’ of their marital 
‘Order,’ and proceeds to imagine paradisiacal and peripheral worlds in which her agency is 
severely curtailed, in these moments Bloom is allowing himself to forget his more instinctual, 
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empathetic connection with Molly (11.638-41). As he muses on food served in hotels during 
‘Lestrygonians,’ Bloom suspiciously notes that ‘[you] Never know whose thoughts you’re 
chewing’ (8.717-8), conflating gustation with personal intimacy. Yet, moments later, having 
eaten his lunch and while drinking his burgundy, Bloom’s thoughts turn to his proposal to 
Molly among the rhododendrons on Howth: 
Ravished over her I lay, full lips open, kissed her mouth. Yum. Softly she gave 
me in my mouth the seedcake warm and chewed. Mawkish pulp her mouth had 
mumbled sweetsour of her spittle. Joy: I ate it: joy. (8.898-9, 906-8) 
 
If Bloom is distrustful of chewing the food of others, and of being exposed to their thoughts, 
he takes joy in chewing food Molly has chewed for him, of sharing thoughts with her. Indeed, 
as Molly famously thinks, during ‘Penelope’: 
first I gave him the bit of seedcake out of my mouth and it was leapyear like now 
yes 16 years ago my God after that long kiss I near lost my breath yes he said I 
was a flower of the mountain yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes that 
was one true thing he said in his life (18.1573-7) 
 
While Bloom later reflects, in ‘Ithaca,’ that ‘What to do with our wives’ is the ‘domestic 
problem’ that engages his mind ‘as much as, if not more than, any other,’ and laments, after 
demonstrating the stars to Stephen, that there is ‘no known method from the known to the 
unknown,’ the convergence between his and Molly’s thoughts seem to suggest that he may 
be able to move into ‘the unknown,’ but only without ever knowing it for certain—as if the 
pursuit of certainty and completeness of knowledge of anything renders the quest for 
knowledge as such pyrrhic (17.657-9, 1140-1). 
In this, Ulysses as a novel invested in imagining without totality ‘upon the incertitude of 
the void,’ implies that its own method ‘from the known to the unknown’ must be one that 
allows for such uncertainty and incompletion—what might, in other words, amount to an 
aesthetic incoherence that depends on failure. Only in this can an idea of the world without 
the tyrannies of totalisation be thought—and in ‘Penelope,’ Joyce provides Ulysses’ clearest 
stab at this. Indeed, if the New Bloomusalem and Bloom Cottage are totalised fantasies 
emerging from the totalised reality in which Bloom exists, ‘Penelope’ enables types of 
knowledge that are not possible within any of those realities. Typified by Molly’s objection, 
near the start of the episode, to Bloom’s unspoken assumption that ‘nothing can happen 
without him knowing’ (18.282), ‘Penelope’ enables knowledge by casting the androcentrism 
of the rest of the novel against Joyce’s performance of gynocentrism. As such, the episode 
suggests that Molly has an inkling of Bloom’s salacious pen pal, when she thinks that he may 
have ‘picked up on the sly’ ‘some little bitch or other…because the day before yesterday he 
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was scribbling something a letter when I came into the front room’; that she may not have a 
straightforwardly Irish or English accent, since she spent so long in Gibraltar and expresses 
anxiety about whether Gardner ‘mightnt like [her] accent’; and that she can actually still ‘get 
[her] tongue round…Spanish’ (a fact Bloom denies outright in ‘Calypso’) (18.45-7, 879, 1471; 
4.60-1). Most importantly for our discussion of totality and universality is the knowledge that 
‘Penelope’ affords of Molly’s mother: Lunita Laredo, about whom Bloom ‘hadnt an idea…till 
[they] were engaged otherwise hed never have got [her] so cheap,’ and about whom she 
concedes to knowing relatively little, referring to her as ‘my mother whoever she was’ 
(18.282-3, 846-7). As Gifford and Seidman and Jonathan Quick have noted, the ambiguity 
about Lunita Laredo suggests, among other things, that Molly may be illegitimate, and that 
her mother may be Moorish.141 
If for Stephen, who Bloom describes as the ‘salient point’ of his narration to Molly at the 
end of the day, the mother and the love of a mother may be the only universal, as noted 
earlier, ‘Penelope’ both explores and negates the suggestion that ‘amor matris,’ subjective in its 
affect and objective in its existence, may be the only basis from which a universal idea of the 
world can be imagined. For, if Molly is able to encompass the scale of female potentiality, 
from ‘earth goddess’ to ‘shrewish whore,’142 the ambiguity of her relationship with Lunita 
Laredo necessarily suggests that that ‘only true thing’ may be as much of a ‘legal fiction’ as 
the conception of fatherhood Stephen outlines in his discourse on paternity in ‘Scylla and 
Charybdis’ (9.844). Indeed, while Molly asserts the objective sense in which ‘[men] wouldnt 
be in the world at all only for [women],’ she negates the affective sense in which mother’s 
love is an equivalent universal when she wonders ‘where would they all of them be if they 
hadnt all a mother to look after them what I never had’ (18.1439-42; emphasis added). 
‘Penelope’ uses Molly’s voice to complicate Stephen’s tentative theory of ‘Amor matris [as] 
subjective and objective genitive,’ and in so doing provides a gynocentric locus of enunciation 
against which the androcentric loci enunciating across the novel can be relativised. In this, 
Ulysses establishes two poles between which a ‘micro and macrocosm…Upon incertitude, 
upon unlikelihood’ can be imagined in relation to each other. Molly’s final affirmative, then, 
could be read as negating her negation of universality by suggesting that women will always 
be available to say ‘Yes’ to men—although Molly’s voice is entirely delegitimised by Joyce’s 
																																																						
141 Gifford and Seidman, pp. 612–3; Jonathan Quick, ‘Molly Bloom’s Mother,’ ELH, 57.1 (1990), 223–40 (p. 
223). 
142 Richard Pearce, ‘Introduction,’ in Molly Blooms: A Polylogue on ‘Penelope’ and Cultural Studies, ed. by Richard 
Pearce (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), p. 3. 
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audacious signposting of his own ‘dateshaped’ signature on the final two lines: ‘Trieste-
Zurich-Paris/1914-1921’ (9.841-2; 2.126; 18.1610-1). 
If, in ‘Nestor,’ Stephen concludes that reality is constructed by a ‘candescent’ observing 
soul, because the soul is the ‘form of forms,’ and goes on to assert in ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ 
erratically and without confidence, that mothers and their love may be ‘the only true thing in 
life,’ in ‘Penelope’ Molly reasserts the importance of recognising that the soul is form-giving, 
and reduces ‘amor matris’ to merely ‘one true thing [Bloom] said in his life’: that ‘[women] are 
flowers all a womans body yes’ (2.143; 9.844; 18.1577). In this, any semblance of truth can 
only be affirmed through interaction, and as such the world and its obscure soul can only be 
imagined, for Joyce, through the uncertain and incomplete empathetic thought, like that 
between Bloom and Molly, that fiction can make visible. 
In the context of the discussion about how totalisation requires exclusion, which reaches 
its imaginative apogee during the Messianic scene in Bloom’s fantasy of voluntary femicide 
in his honour, ‘Penelope’ offers up a grotesque and triumphant joke as a final coda. As Molly 
thinks to herself that she would ‘rather die 20 times over than marry another of their sex,’ 
she ostensibly offers simple corroboration of Bloom’s feelings of consolation on his return 
to their matrimonial inaction (18.231-2). Yet the implicit parallel that this moment makes 
with the Messianic scene gives the line a different weight: the suggestion is not that Molly 
would die for Bloom, but that she would die twenty times and still retain her agency to 
choose—though she would still choose Bloom. Moreover, as their imaginations converge, 
Molly and Bloom seem once again to have thought themselves into each other’s thoughts. If 
the Messianic scene affords a vision of totality that is commensurate with androcentrism, 
‘Penelope’ asserts that women’s agency will never be comprehensible within an androcentric 
order. By using ‘Penelope’ to open up a gynocentric locus of enunciation, Joyce creates 
another layer of fiction that enables Ulysses to generate an idea of the world without totality, 
upon the unknown—and, in the mirror it sets up between androcentrism and gynocentrism, 
a gesture towards discerning the ‘obscure soul’ by which we might reconceive the world.
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3. Leslie Marmon Silko in ‘the World of the Different’ 
 
Just as Joyce uses Ulysses to respond to the strictures of the Britannica’s brand of 
encyclopaedism—imagining the world’s ‘obscure soul’ through the mixture of his fictional 
characters’ mutually incommensurable senses of totality—Silko uses Almanac of the Dead to 
insist on worlds beyond the totalised world picture of settler colonists that assumes 
universality. Nevertheless, Almanac of the Dead bears the dubious honour of functioning as 
the ‘odd one out’ in this project: while Bolaño works fairly explicitly under the influence of 
what César A. Salgado has recently described as a type of ‘transLatin’ Joyceanism, Silko’s 
sense of the novel and its potentiality emerges from a rather less Western idea of the 
possibility of fiction.143 Arguably, this non-Western provenance is part of what made the 
publication of Almanac of the Dead, in 1991, such a toxic mixture of celebration and 
disappointment. Silko, whose Ceremony had won the 1977 Pulitzer Prize, had become known 
for a subtle lyricism that explored contemporary Indigenous life while blending Pueblo 
storytelling with the novel-form. Almanac, her much-anticipated second novel, is a novel that 
can feel very far away from subtlety or lyricism. Weighing in at 763 pages, Silko took as her 
subject the ‘depravity and cruelty’ in the Americas since European occupation began in 1492, 
and used her novel to prophesy the ‘eventual disappearance of all things European’ from the 
Americas.144 Fourteen years after Ceremony, and an entire MacArthur Foundation ‘Genius 
Grant’ later, Silko seemed far less interested in letting the novel seem as if it could 
comfortably house Indigeneity. As she explained after Almanac’s publication, her previously 
minimal aesthetic had exploded into something aimed at nothing less than a reconstruction 
of time and American history: 
I could not think of the story of Almanac as a single line moving from point A to 
point B to point C. I knew that I wanted to shape time inside my Almanac. I 
wanted to use narrative to shift the reader’s experience of time and the meaning 
																																																						
143 Notwithstanding their clearly divergent approaches to style, Silko has not expressed much interest in Joyce, 
besides noting his role in what she describes as ‘the breakdown between poetry and prose’ in Western 
Europe. That said, the parallel between Ulysses and Almanac has been made, in passing, by Janet Powers and 
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of history as stories that mark certain points in time…I had to figure out how to 
do this and still tell stories people could understand.145 
 
There was immediate disagreement over whether she had achieved her goal: what Melissa 
Hearn described as a ‘profound teaching story and a spiritual vision for the planet,’ Sven 
Birkerts dismissed as a series of ‘wish-fulfilment scenarios’; where Linda Niemann saw a 
‘radical, stunning manifesto,’ Alan Ryan perceived an author and a novel ‘in need of remedial 
help.’146 As Rebecca Tillett has pointed out, the themes of Almanac are best read alongside 
this controversy: ‘Silko’s popular readership had, and often still has, real problems with the 
text,’ and these problems can be instructive when looking for a way into a novel that can, 
from a Western European standpoint, feel at times overbearing and unwieldy.147 When 
identifying how Silko uses Almanac to intervene in encyclopaedic thought, the terms of the 
controversy that engulf the text are a helpful place to begin. 
The Birkerts review has become a favourite strawman among Silko scholars,148 and the 
shrill tone of Ryan’s indictment a badge of honour for Silko herself.149 What is useful about 
their responses, though, is that they demonstrate a tendency for Almanac’s readers to find 
problems not so much in its McCarthian levels of violence, as might be expected, but with 
the extremities of viewpoint it presents: while Birkerts decries the text’s culminating events 
and characters as a disappointing ‘rush’ towards ‘prophesied catastrophe,’ Ryan moans 
odiously that Silko prioritises a ‘teetering truckload of politically correct themes, from racial 
oppression to ecology’ instead of presenting a ‘special insight into the lives and minds of 
Native Americans.’150 Much valuable critical work has been done to address the extremities 
of Almanac by making sense of some of the discrete political contexts that it narrates. Keely 
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Byars-Nichols and Amanda Walker Johnson, for example, have focused on elucidating 
Almanac’s ‘African-Native crossroads,’ while critics like Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, Paul Beekman 
Taylor, Ellen L. Arnold, Arnold Krupat, and Antonio Barrenechea have, in their various 
ways, tried to frame its Indigenous context.151 Nevertheless, some of Almanac’s most 
problematic criticism—and most of its denouncements—have stemmed from approaches 
that, unlike these critics, overvalue the novel’s investment in certain of its stories relative to 
its many other stories. 
Richard Rorty, for example, erroneously characterises Almanac as ending with a vision of 
the descendants of European conquerors and immigrants ‘forced back to Europe,’ and goes 
on to condemn it for its ‘whole-hearted, gut-wrenching disgust for white America.’152 Rorty’s 
indictment is light on textual evidence, but it is not impossible to see how he reached this 
conclusion: consider the poem Wilson Weasel Tail delivers to the International Holistic 
Healers Convention, which culminates in the line ‘The whites are crazy—Ahe’yuhe’yu!’ (725). 
The poem is interpreted by a delighted audience as a direct threat to the U.S. government: 
‘Give back what you have stolen or else as a people you will continue your self-destruction’ 
(725). Yet, inferring that such a statement stands in for the text’s political unconscious does 
not sit comfortably either with the complexities of Wilson Weasel Tail, or with the text’s 
overarching focus on the emotional and political awakening of Seese, a white American, or 
even with the text’s actual ending, which sees, in the penultimate chapter, Lecha recall a 
dream of a future Amsterdam in which ‘the streets…were full of Indians from all the tribes 
of the Americas…many of the Indians had looked pale, as if they had been born there’ (756). 
Walter Benn Michaels falls into a similar trap, focusing misleadingly closely on Comrade 
Bartolomeo’s tragicomic execution by Mayan insurgents in Chiapas for ‘Crimes Against 
Tribal Histories’ (525). Michaels reads this moment as bespeaking the promotion of 
‘ethnonationalism’ at the expense of ‘class and the elimination of economic difference’;153 
and indeed, the repurposing of Marx along the lines of Indigenous land reclamation by one 
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of the insurgents’ leaders, Angelita La Escapía, could be made to fit this reading. Yet 
Michaels’ spin is unable to account for the text’s flagrant ‘cosmopolitanism.’154 The text’s 
aforementioned figuring of the ‘African-Native crossroads’ in the history of the Americas is 
its most obvious rebuttal of this: the narrative of Clinton, a homeless ‘Black Indian’ activist 
and a key insurgent in the text, outlines his discovery of how the history of slavery has 
entwined Africans and Native Americans. Clinton’s very existence in the novel is a critique 
of ethnonationalism—one that Byars-Nichols has described as challenging ‘both Eurocentric 
paradigms and Native American notions of separatism.’155 That Clinton’s narrative positions 
Almanac very clearly on one side of the explosive and ongoing ‘Freedpeople’ controversies 
ought to make this more easily perceived.156 
Confusion about the political extremes contained within the text has reached its apogee 
in scholarly debates about its approach to sexuality: accusations of Silko’s homophobia are 
hotly contested, but often accepted even by her champions. Janet St. Clair has defined this 
peculiar strand of Almanac criticism, regretfully asserting that readers must identify the novel’s 
proliferation of malevolent gay men as ‘a metaphor of the insane solipsism and androcentric 
avarice that characterize the dominant culture’: ‘Mired in negative stereotypes, it offends. On 
the other hand, the metaphor works.’157 But Silko’s ‘cannibal queers’ could not be said to 
include Eric, who is one of the text’s only sympathetic characters, and whose suicide takes 
place in the context of his meaningful friendship with Seese: his sexuality does not fit along 
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St. Clair’s allegorical lines. As Caren Irr, Dorothea Fischer-Hornung, and Penelope M. Kelsey 
have suggested, sexuality and desire in Almanac cannot be reduced to metaphor without 
failing to account for the equal amounts of heterosexual and bestial cruelty, or the specificities 
of Pueblo ideas of gender: desire as Almanac figures it is the outcome of a society 
‘psychologically ravaged’ by the history of conquest.158 
That the controversy tends to emanate from prioritising particular sets of opinions 
among Almanac’s characters gives us the outline of a trap into which it is too easy to fall when 
trying to understand how it works as a whole. While certain ideas leap out of the novel for 
their ostensible abhorrence or bluntness, it is imperative to think about how those ideas 
interact with the novel’s other ideas: indeed, characters within Almanac have a frustrating 
habit of contradicting one another, both literally and as agents within the novel’s structure. 
Mosca is an instructive example of this: while his misogynistic rants occupy long sections of 
‘The Fifth World,’ his condemnation of the Brito sisters’ involvement with the Church is 
undermined by the revelation of their clandestine operations with communist priests and 
nuns to rescue migrants abandoned in the Sonoran desert. An uncomfortable and unsettling 
amount of space is given over to Mosca’s prejudices—but his is just part of Almanac’s method 
of placing relatively equivalent focus on subjectivities broadly at odds with one another. Root 
notes, in one of the novel’s pivotal moments, that ‘If you weren’t born white…or if you 
weren’t born what they called normal, or if you got injured, then you were left to explore the 
world of the different’ (202-3): Silko uses Almanac to re-imagine the world from the position 
of the different. 
As such, getting a grip on Almanac, and understanding how its narrative ‘shift[s] the 
reader’s experience of time and the meaning of history,’159 necessitates focusing on its 
heteroglossia as its salient point—indeed, it is the very thing that makes critically powerful 
what can seem simply unpalatable. This has been a popular route for many of Almanac’s most 
successful critics. David L. Moore, for example, has made strong arguments for 
understanding Almanac’s plurality of subjectivities as the structuring principle of an elaborate 
retelling of the Pueblo Arrowboy/Estoy-eh-muut myth, whereby the text positions the 
reader as a ‘circulating witness’ who is forced to identify difference among the novel’s cast, 
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and is asked to reassemble history and the future accordingly.160 Not dissimilarly, Eva 
Cherniavsky identifies the text’s politics by looking at how its sprawl of characters collectively 
establishes a ‘tribal epistemology’ that is resistant to ‘a system of equivalence’ she describes 
as ‘the incorporative logic of identification.’161 For Cherniavsky, the text’s heteroglossia 
proposes a new grounding for identity politics—a vision of identity with a resemblance to 
the inclusive disjuncture in which Deleuze and Guattari see such revolutionary potential.162 
Tillett’s numerous essays on Almanac also draw on its heteroglossia, focusing on how the 
characters and storylines are always collectively in dialogue with U.S. policy, reacting to events 
such as Evan Mecham’s impeachment as Governor of Arizona and the U.S.-backed Contra 
revolt in Nicaragua, and prophetically anticipating the establishment of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and the concomitant Zapatista revolt, and the militarisation of the 
U.S.-Mexico border.163 For Tillett, Almanac uses heteroglossia as a tool by which ‘the final 
boundaries between textual and “actual” social justice activism’ can be dismantled, and as 
such is nothing less than a vision for understanding difference as a fundamental pillar of an 
‘alternative worldview’ based on ‘reciprocity and justice.’164 
One of the similarities that can be inferred from the approaches of Moore, Cherniavsky, 
and Tillett to Almanac is an implicit critical dependence on understanding the text’s 
heteroglossia according to the binary it seems to presuppose between its elite and non-elite 
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voices. Cherniavsky is keenly aware of this: she contextualises her argument using Ranajit 
Guha’s definition of subalternity ‘as the difference, or remainder, when all forms of elite 
identity…are subtracted from the totality of “the people.”’165 Moore and Tillett err, as I will, 
away from the term ‘subalternity’: the use of terms from ‘postcolonial’ studies in 
Indigenous/Native American studies is, of course, controversial—not least since Indigenous 
Americans can hardly be said to be post-colonial, as numerous scholars have noted.166 Indeed, 
as Jace Weaver, Craig S. Womack, and Robert Allen Warrior have succinctly noted, since 
‘The study of American literature involves and proceeds from different critical assumptions 
than the study of Native American literature,’ the ‘norms in the second instance should derive 
from internal sources within the Native community itself.’ 167 In the case of Almanac, this is 
as much as to say that it can be productively considered in terms of postcolonial theory’s 
‘subaltern–elite’ binary, but to do so in those terms would be to transplant a set of 
assumptions that risks erasing the norms with which Silko is working. As such, I will be 
following the lead of Moore and Tillett by using Silko’s own terms in considering ‘the people–
the rich/elite.’ Indeed, both depend on the concept, albeit more implicitly than Cherniavsky: 
the former’s notion of ethically witnessing difference beyond the appropriative aggression of 
voyeurism and the latter’s attention to the novel’s specific investment in the stories of the 
politically oppressed both presuppose that Almanac’s sprawl of characters is selected and 
positioned according to the relationship between the subaltern and the elite. The arguments 
of Moore, Cherniavsky, and Tillett all imply that the ‘people–elite’ binary is the principle by 
which Almanac is populated; they identify as the heart of its heteroglossia those who live in 
‘the condition of the non-elite…without access to the exercise of institutional power or, by 
extension, to those institutions that produce the historical record of colonialism and its 
aftermath.’168 For them, Almanac’s politics are best perceived when approaching the difficulty 
posed by its diverse, contradictory, heterogeneous mass of characters as an attempt to grasp 
the totality of the Americas by adding ‘the people’ to all forms of elite identity. Or, to take 
the title of Almanac’s final section as a hint, it is a portrayal of ‘One World, Many Tribes’ 
(707) in all its necessary internal fractiousness. 
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Where critics like Moore, Cherniavsky, and Tillett stop short, however, is in considering 
what exactly it means that Almanac’s heterogeneous mass of ‘the people’ added to all forms 
of elite identity presupposes an image of totality. Adam Sol and Deborah L. Madsen begin 
this work in their readings of Almanac’s prodigiousness, with Sol considering the novel in 
terms of Edward Mendelson’s aforementioned definition of ‘encyclopedic narrative’ and 
Madsen focusing on how the narrator of Almanac works as the novel’s unifying principle to 
perform across the text’s narratives a ‘transcendent narratorial ontology’—but, as with 
Cherniavsky, Moore, and Tillett, the role of totality in the ‘people–elite’ binary is left in the 
background.169 The notion that ‘the people’ exist in relation to an elite presupposes an 
identifiable, if theoretical, totality of people from which either group can be subtracted. It is 
conspicuous, then, that Almanac makes clear a very particular approach to ‘totality’ in a pivotal 
moment from its eponymous ‘Almanac of the Dead’:  
A day began at sunset. ‘Reality’ was variously defined or described. 
 
Narrative as analogue for the actual experience, which no longer exists; a mosaic 
of memory and imagination. […] The image of a memory exists in the present 
moment. (574-5) 
 
These passages reflect on the relationship between representation and power. If it is accepted 
that reality is ‘defined or described,’ it follows that any representation of reality is necessarily 
politicised by the presence doing the defining or describing. Awareness of this is crucial 
because ‘actual experience’ of ‘the present moment’ has to be represented using those 
definitions or descriptions in order to be understood: the ‘mosaic of memory and 
imagination’ is always ideological. Just as Derrida critiqued Heidegger’s ‘world picture’ for 
depending on ‘Being’ as a ‘transcendental signifier’ that enables the misguided assumption of 
objectivity,170 Silko suggests that the totality of humanity cannot be objectively known or 
measured, only imagined and represented—and since all representations are subjective 
definitions and descriptions, all representations of totality are by definition partial or 
incomplete or inaccurate. 
As such, the term that carries the most weight in Silko’s gnomic fragments is ‘variously’: 
that reality has been ‘variously defined or described’ suggests that more than one presence 
has done the defining or describing. The ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ that constitutes 
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the present will therefore be a negotiation between different discourses. Of course, since the 
‘Almanac of the Dead’ is a pre-contact document, the story immediately following these two 
passages is the beginning of the domination of ‘various’ definitions or descriptions of reality 
by a univocal, Eurocentric discourse: ‘Four piles of skulls: Spaniards, mestizos, Indian slaves, 
Africans. […] Eleven Ahau is the Katun when the aliens arrived’ (575). Since contact, the 
‘Almanac of the Dead’ suggests, the definitions and descriptions informing the present’s 
‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ have been Eurocentric: where once reality had been 
characterised ‘variously’ by a diversity of discourses, it is since understood ‘totally,’ univocally, 
by Eurocentrism; reality is re-organised into four piles of skulls—categorised according to 
European priorities. In this, it is clear that Almanac’s focus on ‘depravity and cruelty’ post-
1492 ultimately emerges from a vision of a present ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ that 
is dominated by a totalising Eurocentric discourse. As such, Almanac’s heterogeneous bulk 
can be read as an attempt to rediscover and rearticulate the oppositional, antagonistic variety 
of realities that totalising Eurocentrism oppresses. 
It is in this context, I contend, that Almanac intervenes in encyclopaedic thought. Over 
its numerous stories, it connects the totalising discourse of settler colonialism with the legacy 
of the intellectual activity that accompanied the European invasion and settlement of the 
Americas. In what follows, I will explore how Almanac achieves this by framing and 
reinterpreting the proto-encyclopaedic works of Bartolomé de Las Casas, a key figure of 
Spain’s ‘intellectual’ conquest. Against the totalising discourse of Eurocentrism, I will argue, 
the text’s mass of narratives work, at various levels, to dramatise the logic whereby decolonial 
insurgency against the elite, and the reconstruction of reality as the unity of inherently plural 
difference, becomes inevitable. In this, Almanac undoes the homogenising dominance of the 
history of European encyclopaedic thought in the Americas, supplanting it with its vision of 
a de-totalised world, reassembled by a pan-American solidarity among diversity; or, to use 
Silko’s terms, a ‘network of tribal coalitions’ that will emerge from ‘the world of the different’ 
(727, 203).  
 
3.1 Conquest Encyclopaedism 
 
Almanac’s vision of the present’s ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ (574) as defined 
and described from a totalising Eurocentric standpoint is not dissimilar to Joyce’s 
engagement with the 1911 Britannica’s brand of encyclopaedic discourse in Ulysses. Although, 
as noted, the comparison between Joyce and Silko may not be intuitive, it is notable that both 
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authors are demonstrably focused on encyclopaedism as a form of colonising dominance: 
while for Joyce, it is connected to a cruelly optimistic imperial status quo, for Silko 
encyclopaedism is part of the settler colonialism that seeks to overwrite Indigenous reality by 
producing ‘objective’ knowledge which simultaneously disguises the conditions of its 
production and erases Indigenous agency.171 
The homologies between their respective approaches to their critiques are revealing. Both 
texts prioritise aspirational social outsiders in the development of their critiques of 
encyclopaedism: Ulysses’ Bloom and Almanac’s Menardo. Both Bloom and Menardo secrete 
anxieties about their ethnicity, their relation to women, their progeny, the possibilities of 
technology, and their self-destruction. Curiously, both are also in pursuit of their dream 
homes: while Bloom settles on his fantasy homecoming at Bloom Cottage, Menardo hires an 
architecture firm to build him an outsized mansion in the suburbs of Tuxtla Gutiérrez. At 
the centre of Bloom’s dream home is the ‘oak sectional bookcase containing the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica’—and behind Menardo’s castle is an organisation which teaches 
its staff that when working with clients ‘of darker skin and lower class who had managed to 
amass a fortune’ they must channel ‘the holy man Bartolomé de Las Casas’ (277), a 
Dominican missionary in the early days of New Spain and author of two important proto-
encyclopaedic treatments of the New World. Just as Joyce presents the Britannica’s aesthetic 
as shaping and subduing Bloom, Silko portrays Menardo’s will to conspicuous consumption 
as directed by a form of settler colonial discourse. As with Joyce and the Britannica, by 
examining the ideological appeals that underpin Almanac’s invocation of Las Casas, the 
operations of desire that lead Menardo to his spectacularly inexorable self-destruction 
become clear—and the text’s critique of encyclopaedism comes into view.172 It is useful to 
consider briefly Las Casas’ legacy, his texts, and the context in which he worked. 
Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566) is best known for his campaigns against the brutality 
of the Spanish in the New World, particularly in his roles as the Bishop of Chiapas and the 
Spanish Crown’s ‘Protector of the Indians’ during the early days of New Spain.173 
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Accordingly, he is popularly remembered, more or less problematically, as a proto-anti-
colonialist, with his capital in Mexico high enough for his name to have become attached to 
numerous schools, an ecumenical centre for human rights, and the city of San Cristóbal de 
Las Casas, the cultural centre of Chiapas and neighbour of Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Menardo’s 
hometown.174 Pablo Neruda’s Canto general provides some sense of the esteem in which Las 
Casas is widely held: 
Father, it was fortunate for mankind 
that you arrived on the plantation, 
that you bit into crime’s 
black grains, drank 
each the daily cup of wrath.175 
 
A brief look at Las Casas’ life makes this hagiography understandable. On his first trip to the 
New World, Las Casas witnessed and documented the massacre of hundreds of Arawaks by 
Spanish soldiers in Cuba in 1514, and subsequently devoted his career to refuting the 
philosophical and theological reasoning used to justify the exploitation of the ‘indios.’176 His 
very public defence of the rights of the indios led to his royal post, and eventually to a Crown-
organised debate at Valladolid in 1550-1 with humanist philosopher Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda 
over whether indios could be defined as ‘natural slaves.’177 Among his writings, the most 
widely circulated was a short treatise entitled Brevíssima relación de la destruyción de las Indias 
(1552), which exposed the exceptional mistreatment of the indios by colonists.178 
So far, so ‘fortunate for mankind’—in this light Las Casas’ image as an anti-colonial hero 
in Latin America, particularly in Chiapas, makes some sense. So why does Silko have his 
named invoked by Federal District businesspeople to facilitate for-profit exploitation? It 
could certainly be argued that Silko is indulging in Las Casas revisionism: Angelita La Escapía 
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is portrayed discovering that Las Casas is implicated to at least some degree in the rise of 
chattel slavery of Africans in the Americas. But the architects’ use of Las Casas signals more 
than a simple revisionist spin on his legacy, as suggested by Menardo’s class-based motivation 
for hiring the firm in the first place: 
Menardo had been greatly relieved that Señorita Martinez-Soto [Alegría] was 
proceeding slowly and from the very beginning. For although Menardo had 
boldly ventured into many business arenas in previous years and had become a 
self-made ‘millionaire,’ he was quite aware that many of the intricate customs and 
rituals of the upper classes were still unknown to him. He had never engaged an 
architect before. He had simply understood this was the practice when one 
wished to build the castle of one’s dreams. (267) 
 
When Alegría is advised to channel Las Casas by her boss, it is with ‘the benefit of all the 
knowledge his years in the profession had accumulated’ (277): a learned sense of how 
Eurocentrism shapes aspiration because it ‘passes as universal.’179 Indeed, it is not a house 
that Menardo wants, but a ‘castle’; Alegría promises her boss, ‘If the wife wanted Gothic 
vaunted ceilings in the closets’ she would get them (267, 277). For the architects, channelling 
Las Casas is a way of engaging with and profiting from the establishment of Eurocentricism 
as a universal norm; his is the charitable face of dominance. Las Casas’ role as a progenitor 
of Eurocentrism is what motivates Almanac’s invocation of his legacy; and, as José Rabasa, 
Anthony Pagden, and Walter D. Mignolo have all pointed out, Las Casas’ longer writings 
were foundational in the formation of totalising Eurocentrism.180 
Las Casas wrote two major descriptions or definitions of the New World: Historia de las 
Indias (1527-61), a natural history, and Apologética historia sumaria (c.1559), a lengthy 
ethnological supplement to the Historia. These texts, however, cannot be understood as 
natural histories or ethnographies in quite the same way as Pliny’s Natural History or 
Herodotus’ The Histories. Rather than describing and organising nature and humanity to an 
audience familiar with the objects of description, Las Casas’ Historia and Apologética were 
communicating to a European audience a world of ‘phenomena without precedent in the 
European stock of knowledge.’181 Las Casas, of course, was neither the first nor the last to 
attempt this: Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés’ La historia general y natural de las Indias 
(1526-35) and Bernandino de Sahagún’s La historia general de las cosas de Nueva España (1545-
90) are two other important summas.182 What makes their attempts to communicate 
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‘phenomena without precedent’ to Europeans important is that the task necessitated 
confronting what Pagden describes as the ‘problem of recognition’: how could a ‘new’ world 
and its people be communicated by a language that was ‘the creation of university intellectuals 
who had never left Europe and never set eyes upon an American Indian’?183 As Pagden 
outlines, the natural response among early settlers was to cope as well as possible in the belief 
‘that the new could always be satisfactorily described by means of some simple and direct 
analogy with the old’; this is how, for example, the Spanish word for ‘pineapple’ has ended 
up the same as the word for ‘pinecone’: ‘piña.’184 All this is to say that even as the Old World’s 
need for information about the New World grew, the chronicler was never ‘equipped with 
an adequate descriptive vocabulary for his task and was beset by an uncertainty about how 
to use his conceptual tools in an unfamiliar terrain.’185 For want of any alternative, European 
words were made to approximate American reality. 
By the time writers like Oviedo, Las Casas, and Sahagún were compiling their summas, 
the problem of recognition was joined by the problem of organisation. As Rabasa notes, the 
texts were attempting to ‘reconstitute an original New World’ for a European audience, and 
as such aimed to codify ‘a whole field of reference, of registered facts and opinions.’186 This 
endeavour necessitated a form of categorisation, and as with the problem of recognition, the 
issue was managed by analogy between ‘old’ and ‘new’; this is where the influence of Pliny 
and Herodotus, as well as Isidore of Seville and Bartholomaeus Anglicus,187 becomes 
extremely significant. In the same way that explorers paved over the problem of recognition 
by describing New World objects using Old World terms, Las Casas and his peers organised 
the vast quantities of ‘newness’ they observed by deploying the organisational structures 
bequeathed by their generic forebears. Accordingly, Oviedo explicitly sets out to ‘follow and 
to imitate Pliny himself’ and fits everything into his categories, while Sahagún’s Florentine 
Codex bears a clear structural debt to the categories of Anglicus’ Pliny-inspired De proprietatibus 
rerum (1220-40).188 Similarly, Las Casas’ organisation of his texts into constituent crónicas owes 
much to Herodotus’ approach in The Histories.189 As Mignolo comments, their texts were 
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written in the belief ‘that it was perfectly natural to organize all the information… without 
asking how the [indios] themselves organized and transmitted their knowledge.’190 
To grasp fully the extent to which these problems of recognition and organisation 
established an image of the world ‘historically located from a European perspective,’191 it is 
vital to consider the peculiar point in the history of the development of encyclopaedic 
thought and practice at which these texts were written. As Mignolo has pointed out with 
reference to Sahagún, although they were undertaking an encyclopaedic endeavour using 
tools bequeathed by writers of ancient and medieval encyclopaedias, they were doing so 
before Francis Bacon’s rethinking of the European ‘epistemological tradition’ and 
organisation of knowledge in Advancement of Learning (1605) and Novum Organum (1620) had 
established the aesthetic principles for the recognisably modern encyclopaedia. This points 
to a major difference between the objectives of Las Casas and his peers and Bacon and his 
descendants, and by extension to the encyclopaedisms engaged with by Silko and Joyce: while 
the former adapted an inherited aesthetic to assimilate and organise ‘new’ information into a 
recognisable totality, the latter rethought that very aesthetic in order to re-examine ‘old’ 
information into a totality reshaped by pedagogic and democratic principles.192 Las Casas and 
his peers took a pre-modern model for encyclopaedism to their task, but rather than trying 
to transmit a general system of knowledge to all people, they were occupied in the orientation 
of European epistemology outside of its European context; theirs was less a ‘circle of 
learning,’ more an intellectual conquest: not quite encyclopédistes, but enciclopedistas de la conquista. 
The development by Las Casas and his peers of an aesthetic to organise and articulate, 
or define and describe, the New World stands as an unparalleled demonstration of how the 
European epistemological tradition evolved to sustain itself and its settlers outside of Europe. 
But, as indicated by Silko’s presentation of Las Casas’ legacy channelled to exploit Menardo 
500 years since contact began, conquest encyclopaedism did more than just keep European 
epistemology alive in the New World: it constructed a power relationship between Old and 
New Worlds whereby the Old could exert power over the New because the New had been 
cast as marginal to, and epistemologically dependent on, the Old. Following Rabasa, I 
contend that the texts of Las Casas and his fellow conquest encyclopaedists achieved this by 
making the concept of ‘newness’ the focal point in their definitions and descriptions of the 
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reality of the Americas: for if the Americas’ reality, its ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ 
(574), depended on its ‘newness’ to the European observer, its Indigenous reality is 
subordinated, dependent for its existence on the European gaze and its informing ideologies. 
The way in which the themes ‘originally motivating the notion of a new world’193 shape the 
summas of Oviedo, Sahagún, and Las Casas illustrates how this centralisation of European 
perspective works concurrently to ‘replace rather than represent’194 Indigenous reality. By 
unpicking the logic of conquest encyclopaedism, the type of intervention Almanac is making 
becomes clear. 
Oviedo’s Historia, the first conquest encyclopaedia, is a good place to begin outlining this 
phenomenon. Compiled after he was made ‘Royal Chronicler of the Indies’ (1532-56),195 the 
Historia was an essential informational link between the New World and the Crown. As K. 
Myers points out, Oviedo was fully aware of the direct role his chronicles would play in 
determining legislation passed in Spain.196 Accordingly, his encyclopaedia addressed the 
problems of recognition and organisation by defining and describing the New World’s reality 
along lines he believed would motivate the Crown’s interest: its potential for new wealth. To 
return to the piña, Oviedo’s overloaded attempt to define and describe it illustrates exactly 
the New World’s potential. Using Pliny’s schema, Oviedo classifies the piña as a ‘thistle,’ but 
describes it as an artichoke that looks like a pinecone that smells like a combination of peach, 
quince, fine melons, ‘and all other excellencies of all these fruits together and separate.’197 
The pineapple’s objectification in Oviedo’s taxonomy takes place alongside ‘sensual excess 
that overburdens the will to classify.’198 Within the Spanish Crown’s stock of knowledge, the 
piña is installed as an exotic spoil, full of western promise. 
While the piña is a relatively trivial example of how conquest encyclopaedism established 
a Eurocentric worldview by defining and describing the reality of the Americas according to 
what motivated its European audience’s conception of its ‘newness,’ the deterministic 
trajectory of Oviedo’s exoticising appeals to the Crown come to light in his handling of the 
indios. For Oviedo, these were not simply a people of ‘thick skulls’ and ‘beastly and badly 
inclined understanding,’ but the people of ‘those famous islands, the Hesperides, thus named 
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after the twelfth King of Spain, Hesperus.’199 Oviedo used his encyclopaedia to explain that, 
as a people ‘formerly known to and possessed by the Sovereigns of Spain’ the New World’s 
inhabitants must be understood as having degenerated from antiquity.200 This meant that they 
were accountable for their sins and due legitimate punishment and subjugation by Spain. In 
this light, the effect of Oviedo’s Historia is clear: the Americas’ Indigenous reality is 
supplanted by the Spanish Crown’s overriding interest in new sources of wealth, from the 
piña to the esclava/o. 
Sahagún’s Florentine Codex works to a similar purpose. Both Mignolo and Rabasa point to 
it as a key moment in the Franciscan proselytising of the New World.201 As an example of 
conquest encyclopaedism, it is unique for having incorporated a large amount of information 
directly from Mexica informants, having been written in both Spanish and Nahuatl, and 
having used both alphabetic and glyphic writing systems. But, as Rabasa points out, these 
innovations were ultimately motivated by the Franciscans’ need to identify sources of 
paganism among the Mexica: the text ‘has less to do with an intention to be value-free than 
with the task of reconstructing a native text that would allow missionaries to decipher public 
[Indigenous] behaviour and trace symbolic references and associations in confession’: it is 
‘an arsenal for future battles against the devil.’202 Just as Oviedo’s Historia defines and 
describes the Americas’ ‘newness’ in line with its exoticism, the Florentine Codex invents a New 
World in which Indigenous reality is simply the next frontier in the Franciscan theological 
mission. 
Looking at Oviedo and Sahagún, it is possible to see how conquest encyclopaedism’s 
codification of the New World’s reality according to that which was ‘new’ to the European 
observer effaced the Indigenous perspective from representations of the New World’s reality; 
as Rabasa writes, in their encyclopaedias, the reality of New World phenomena comes to be 
dependent on the European gaze: the ‘European presence becomes an integral element in the 
descriptions.’203 Unsurprisingly, ‘newness’ emerges as a motivating principle in Las Casas’ 
texts too. His Historia and Apologética explain to his audience a new type of primitivism among 
the indios: using the familiar metaphor of the ‘noble savage’ as a mediating concept, he creates 
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the model of an ‘ideal primitivism’ that stood as ‘a purely rational explanation’ for the New 
World, and in itself supported his condemnations of the conquistadors’ violence.204 
Yet, Las Casas’ conquest encyclopaedism does something with the indios’ ‘newness’ that 
is slightly different to that of Oviedo and Sahagún: in his attempt to define and describe their 
humanity, he constructs a hierarchical model for the whole of humanity—Europe and its 
Others—that positions the Western European Christian subject at its top. In this model, the 
Western European Christian is both the ideal human and ‘the criteria and measuring stick 
for ranking’ the extent to which Western Europe’s ‘Others’ were civilised.205 This model is 
clarified in the epilogue of his Apologética, ‘Kinds of Barbarism’ [‘Especies de Barbarie’], in 
which he sets out the four different ways [‘acepciones’] in which humans could be considered 
‘barbarous’ [‘bárbaros’].206 Rabasa summarises these accordingly: 
1) in a broad (an equivocal) sense barbarism refers to a temporal loss of reason, 
as when a person blinded by passion becomes cruel and commits crimes worse 
than those of a wild beast; 
2) in a more restricted sense those who lack letters and a learned language such 
as Latin are barbarians secundum quid that is, they lack some cultural aspect but 
otherwise are polished and wise. It also includes those who speak a different 
language; 
3) in its proper sense, simpliciter, the term refers to peoples who have strange 
customs, lack laws, settlements, cities, have no marriage rules, and live scattered 
in the woods fleeing contact with other humans; 
4) in the cultural sense of lacking the true religion barbarism comprises all infidels 
however wise and civil they might be.207 
 
Las Casas’ classification of all those other to Western European Christians into different 
categories of barbarism had two important effects that clarify the epistemological impact of 
conquest encyclopaedism: firstly, it universalises a ‘European Renaissance model of 
humanity’ which set a value by which different degrees of humanity could be ranked; 
secondly, even as it differentiates between barbarisms, it homogenises those not at the top 
of the scale—non-European Christians—as barbarous, immanently inferior.208 This 
intellectual move is clarified later in his epilogue, when Las Casas appends a fifth sort of 
barbarism: contrarian barbarism’ [‘la “barbarie” contraria’]. Practitioners of ‘la “barbarie” 
contraria,’ he explains, are simply ‘enemies of the Christian faith’ [‘los enemigos de la fe 
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cristiana’], which is to say non-Christians.209 Las Casas provides the following summary of 
his rationale: 
Barbarous are those who are outside of the Roman Empire, namely, outside of 
the universal church, because outside of the church there is no Empire…and this 
applies to the first barbarians and infidels as much as to the 4th and other types. 
 
[‘Bárbaros son aquellos que están fuera del imperio romano, conviene a saber, 
fuera de la universal iglesia, porque fuera della no hay imperio…y esto cuanto a 
los primeros bárbaros e infieles desta 4a especie o diferentia.’]210 
 
Las Casas’ simultaneous universalising of European discourse and homogenising of ‘Other’ 
discourses as barbarism is what Almanac summons by invoking his legacy: in Las Casas’ 
summas, any variety of definitions or descriptions of reality are supplanted by his universal 
hierarchy of humanity—the present’s ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ turns Eurocentric 
(574). The Federal District architects are able to invoke Las Casas as the charitable face of 
dominance because ‘the image of [his] memory’ has shaped ‘the present moment’ (575). 
In Las Casas’ conquest encyclopaedism, Indigenous reality is ‘replaced rather than 
represented’211 by a Eurocentrism that aims to totalise its own definition or description of 
reality—indeed, Las Casas’ encyclopaedic work encodes Indigeneity as irreducibly marginal. 
To recall Gerald Vizenor’s analysis of the Britannica, Indigenous reality becomes mislabelled 
in simulations that populate an ‘encyclopedia of dominance.’212 In the shadow of European 
domination over American reality, Indigeneity is recognisable only within Eurocentric 
parameters that have encoded it as a barbaric Other. Almanac explores this phenomenon 
variously: from the European father of the half-Yaqui Zeta and Lecha, for whom 
‘Indians…simply did not exist,’ to Lecha’s son Ferro, who is only attracted to ‘handsome 
country-club boys,’ to Wilson Weasel Tail’s savvy attempts to grab Europeans’ attention 
(‘Have no fear of aging, illness, or death!’), the mass cultural discourse represented in Almanac 
typically ignores, represses, or makes consumable Indigeneity in order to fit it to a settler 
colonial reality that conceives of ‘things European’ as not just normative but objective, 
valuing them over and above everything else (119, 454, 717, 14). In the worldview 
bequeathed by conquest encyclopaedism, settler colonialists can conceal their practice as 
‘objective’ while the Indigenous subject becomes merely the extension of Europe’s 
‘intellectual dominion.’213 As Almanac’s auspiciously-named Cuban communist Bartolomeo 
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explains to the Chiapan Mayans that will later execute him for denying ‘the people’s history,’ 
‘Jungle monkeys and savages have no history’ (525).214 
This is the challenge Almanac locates as inherent to encyclopaedic thought and practice 
in the Americas: historically, its totalising form has been used to attempt an epistemological 
erasure of Indigeneity, that makes it recognisable only by way of Europe’s imagination of it. 
By constructing the dominance of Europe in this way, Eurocentrism becomes a privilege of 
the European ‘elite’ through which the Americas’ barbarous Indigenous underclass can be 
defined or described. Silko suggests in Almanac that Las Casas’ work and his contemporary 
reputation are implicated in this, and that by reappraising his legacy as a part of the story of 
the construction of the world as a Eurocentric totality, the work of re-imagining a world 
without totalising Eurocentrism can begin. 
 
3.2 Menardo in the ‘castle of one’s dreams’ 
 
Thinking about the political challenge inherent in the act of writing from an Indigenous 
perspective, Krupat invokes Antonio Gramsci to posit that ‘the question is whether dominance 
has also achieved hegemony, the internalization on the part of the colonized of the worldview 
of the colonizer.’215 Does Almanac cast totalising Eurocentrism as hegemonic? Has conquest 
encyclopaedism completely overtaken its Indigenous subjects? Given the text’s investment 
in so many insurgent subjectivities, and its prophesied ‘disappearance of all things European’ 
(14), the answer is a clear no. So what, then, to make of Menardo, whose narrative is privileged 
with the introduction of Las Casas’ legacy that connects the text to the history of conquest 
encyclopaedism? By unpacking Menardo’s narrative, the importance of Las Casas’ legacy to 
the text’s vision of the ‘disappearance of all things European’ (14) is clarified; and the way 
Almanac manifests a peculiar form of decolonised encyclopaedic thought comes into view. 
Menardo’s narrative is something like a cross between an Alger-esque ‘rags-to-riches’ tale 
and Nella Larsen’s Passing with a Naipaulian ‘mimic man’ playing the protagonist: rising out 
of relative poverty as a self-made businessman, he falls in an accidental suicide highly 
symbolic of his decision to ‘pass’ off his mestizo heritage as European. What is important 
about Menardo’s narrative, in terms of Almanac’s focus on the conflict between the people 
and the elite, is that it becomes a paradigm through which to understand ‘Indigenous 
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possibility’216 when it is totally ‘defined or described’ (574) by Eurocentrism. As I will outline, 
it functions as a tragicomic allegory for the ways that Eurocentrism proscribes Indigenous 
possibility by simultaneously curtailing Indigenous subjects’ agency in the present and 
determining their dreams and aspirations for the future. 
Menardo’s narrative contains two conspicuous structural features that make for helpful 
signposts in unravelling its polemical study of Indigenous possibility within Eurocentric 
reality. Firstly, its use of narrative voice, and secondly, its division between two non-
contiguous sections (Part 2, ‘Mexico,’ and Part 4, ‘The Americas’). By understanding the 
former as a metaphor for the narrative as a whole, the way that the latter transforms the 
allusion to Las Casas’ legacy into one of the text’s central thematic kernels becomes clear—
and Menardo’s archetypical colonised subjectivity and allegorical downfall begins to look like 
the diagnosis of a contemporary American malaise shaped by the persistence of conquest 
encyclopaedism’s ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ (574). 
Menardo’s narrative begins with the only passage of first person prose in the entire novel: 
The old man was slow, lazy, and dangerous. He would get enough of his smelly 
home brew in him and then he would start bragging about his ancestors and how 
they had been the most illustrious and powerful. Full of beer he used to get very 
serious, and when I was a young child, I felt frightened. (257) 
 
As the story of Menardo’s education and emotional development begins, his voice, in a 
Flaubertian twist, vanishes: 
Menardo had loved the stories his grandfather told him right up until the sixth 
grade when one of the teaching Brothers had given them a long lecture about 
pagan people and pagan stories. (258) 
 
In the disappearance of his nascent narrative voice, the text performs a loss of identity: he is 
shaped by his Catholic education to prioritise Europe over his ‘pagan’ (or ‘barbarous’) 
heritage. The realisation that he is counted among these pagans is the crucial moment in his 
development: ‘His grandfather’s nose had been much shorter and wider than his was; the 
people the old man called “our ancestors,” “our family,” were in fact Indians’ (259). 
Menardo’s lament that ‘Without the family nose, [he] might have passed for one of sangre 
limpia [clean blood]’ (259), and his subsequent decision to tell people that his Mayan nose 
was the unfortunate outcome of a boxing match, clarifies why his voice disappears: he 
chooses to deny his Indigenous ancestry and ‘pass’ for European. The reasoning behind his 
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decision to ‘pass’ is unambiguous: to achieve the privileged possibility he associates with the 
elite sangre limpia. 
In the metaphor of Menardo’s vanishing voice, the narrative posits that ‘passing,’ 
repressing one’s identity by negating one’s history and ‘actual experience’ (574), is not 
compatible with privileged agency: as the voice disappears, so does the possibility for self-
representation and concomitant critical self-awareness. ‘Passing’ is, rather, an affective 
symptom of colonisation, as the rest of Menardo’s narrative demonstrates. Ngũgĩ wa 
Thiong’o’s description of the effects of internalised colonisation is helpful to bear in mind: 
The effect…is to annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in 
their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities 
and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of 
non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that 
wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed 
from themselves; for instance, with other people’s languages rather than their 
own. It makes them identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those 
forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants serious doubts 
about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen 
as remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are despair, despondency and 
a collective death-wish.217 
 
Menardo’s decision to ‘pass’ can be read as an attempt to distance himself from the 
‘wasteland’ of his barbarous grandfather: it is the decision of a mind colonised. It is 
unsurprising, then, to find that Menardo’s agency is equally colonised: in his ability to do 
things in the present, and his aspirations, his sense of his own futurity, he is fully proscribed 
and pre-determined, or ‘defined and described’ (574), by Eurocentrism. 
Menardo’s proscribed agency is clear in the joke the text makes of his practical failure at 
‘passing’: it is clear that everyone, from the Federal District architects to the local tribes to 
the members of Tuxtla’s elite men’s club, El Grupo, to their wives to his own servants, know 
and treat Menardo as a ‘monkey-face who passes himself off as a white man’ (274). It is 
Menardo’s ‘large fortune’ (277), as Mr. Portillo reminds Alegría, that permits him this 
cognitive dissonance: although it is unconvincing, Menardo can attempt to ‘pass’ for 
European because he can afford to. Nevertheless, his ‘otherness’ remains ultimately 
inescapable, as is clear in his relationship with his wife, Iliana. 
Menardo’s marriage to Iliana is clearly meant to signal that he too is one of sangre limpia: 
‘her great-grandfather on her mother’s side had in fact been part of the original Gutiérrez 
family that had settled the area,’ ‘descended from the conquistador De Oñate’218 (260, 269). 
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Yet, of course, during the courtship Menardo cannot help thinking that ‘her father was staring 
at his nose,’ and ‘had to swallow hard to keep from blurting it right out like a maniac: “It got 
broken in a boxing match!”’ (260). This augurs badly for Menardo; and their engagement is 
only announced ‘after one of [his] greatest triumphs as an insurer’ (262) proves that to Iliana’s 
family that he is profitable. In the same way that Menardo’s wealth means he can afford some 
cognitive dissonance about his inability to pass, it provides the excuse by which his ‘dark skin 
and lower class’ can be considered acceptable to Iliana’s family, who ‘had lost much of their 
wealth over the years’ (277, 269). 
The elite privilege Iliana and her family enjoy over Menardo reaches its fullest expression 
when Menardo’s affair with Alegría is uncovered. During the affair, he promises Alegría that 
if his wife, Iliana, ever found out, ‘“Arrangements would be made”’ (286) to protect her and 
her career; auspiciously, Alegría looks at his ‘brown moon face and flat nose and the shining 
dark eyes,’ and thinks ‘how little he knew or understood, despite the wealth he had begun to 
accumulate’ (286). And indeed, on the revelation of their affair, Iliana and her family go to: 
great lengths to make sure that Miss Martinez-Soto would not find new 
employment in any of the prestigious architectural firms. This had been 
accomplished rather simply via the grand old family connections in Mexico City, 
and with the aid of the women at the club. (295-6) 
 
Menardo’s sangre limpia in-laws cut him down and humiliate him by demolishing his claims of 
agency, and they can do this because his ‘darker skin and lower class’ (277) remain 
determining factors. 
So why does Menardo persist with the lie if it convinces no one and the privilege it affords 
fails when it counts? The answer, to borrow again from Thiong’o, can be found in the way 
that colonisation of the mind makes Indigenous subjects ‘want to identify with that which is 
furthest removed from themselves.’219 By submitting his agency to Eurocentric dominance, 
Menardo allows it to determine his sense of future: because he can only imagine himself as a 
European, he can only aspire to become that which is determined by Eurocentrism. Menardo 
must persist with the lie because, within the Eurocentric ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ 
(574), it is all he can do. He thinks, in a moment of frustration, that ‘The silence of Indians 
is maddening’ and that he understands ‘why his ancestors found it necessary to kill a few’ 
(324; emphasis added). Menardo’s inability to do anything but ‘pass’ is what the Federal 
District architects are manipulating when he commissions his castle in suburban Tuxtla; and 
this absence of critical self-awareness develops, tragicomically, as Menardo pursues the 
aspirational dreams he believes to be the privileges of the elite, but are actually the proscribed 
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and pre-determined functions of a totalising Eurocentrism that depends on erasure of 
Indigenous reality and possibility. 
Tacho, Menardo’s Indigenous chauffeur, finds himself thinking that ‘the battle would be 
won or lost in the realm of dreams’ (475)—and in Menardo’s case, the loss is absolute, as the 
Eurocentric moulding of his sense of futurity culminates in his spectacularly inexorable and 
highly symbolic death. In the days leading up to the incident, insurgent activity begins to 
increase across Chiapas, and Menardo finds himself so worried that he has ‘no control over 
his thoughts’: ‘the voice of the old man, his grandfather, acting out stories and changing his 
voice for different characters’ reappears in his mind (494). The return of Menardo’s 
Indigenous grandfather’s repressed voice in some sense speaks for itself: as Almanac’s 
Indigenous uprisings gain momentum, his repressed Indigenous unconscious instinctively 
returns, reminding him that ancestry cannot be escaped through denial. Yet the way that 
Eurocentrism determines Menardo’s sense of his future by blinding him from such 
introspection and redirecting his agency towards Indigenous genocide is striking. 
Menardo specifically recalls his grandfather’s story ‘about Prince Seven Macaws, who had 
been undone by two sorcerer brothers’ (494). By this point in the text, it is clear that he is 
being plotted against by Tacho and his twin brother, El Feo. Menardo lacks the critical 
wherewithal to draw the connection between his grandfather’s story and his reality; that is, 
to interpret the message sent to him by his own unconscious. In keeping with his inability to 
represent and think critically about himself without his Indigenous voice—the voice that 
vanishes at the start of his narrative—he is unable to situate himself in a narrative that is non-
European. This moment, which neatly restates the narrative’s initial performance of his 
vanishing voice, emphasises Menardo’s absolute inability to conceive of a personal future 
connected to Indigeneity. It is instructive that, on the story’s repetition ‘over and over inside 
[his] brain,’ his subsequent action is to meet his colleagues at El Grupo to discuss genocidal 
‘solutions’ to Indigeneity: 
Menardo had agreed with the police chief and the general: only blood spoke 
loudly enough […] the best policy was to kill [Indians] as you found them. 
Otherwise, you ran into all the logistical problems the Germans had encountered 
with disposing of the Jews. (494-5) 
 
Eurocentrism’s proscription of Menardo shapes his belief that his future is connected to a 
purge of Indigeneity; his internal desire to ‘pass’ is externalised into a desire for Indigenous 
genocide. 
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Since Menardo comes to see ‘quick annihilation on the spot’ (495) as the only solution 
to his worries, it is little wonder that concurrently Menardo becomes obsessed with the 
supposed corporeal invulnerability provided by his bulletproof vest: 
[Menardo] had begun to enjoy the nightly ritual of the brandy, then looking at 
himself in the mirror wearing the vest and pajama bottoms. The vest was bright 
white against his skin. (497) 
 
Menardo’s developing interest in the necessity of genocide is inseparable from his 
fetishisation of his bulletproof vest: it signals his total faith in his ability to ‘pass,’ and an 
absolute surrender of any critical faculties to the parameters of Eurocentrism; indeed, it 
literally masks his skin ‘bright white.’ As he thinks to himself: 
All of it was a matter of trust—trust of the high technology that had woven the 
vest fibers, and trust in those most intimate with you. Trust. Menardo had 
repeated the word over and over until he was asleep. (497) 
 
If Menardo is to enact a genocide of Indigenous people with the police chief and the general, 
he ought to be able to demonstrate that he, like them, can ‘pass’ through its ethnic cleansing. 
By trusting in Eurocentrism and the privilege he thinks it bestows upon him, he comes to be 
certain that, although he is ‘passing,’ he could survive the genocide: 
Menardo gazed back over his shoulder at the shining white palace that was his 
home: how silly his lapses of confidence had been! All was safely protected, 
securely guarded, and shielded; each detail, each element, each person, in his life 
was secure. No one and nothing could touch him! (499) 
 
It is by this logic that he decides to perform the ‘test’ (340, 498) of his bulletproof vest by 
having Tacho shoot him in front of El Grupo. That ‘microscopic imperfections in the fabric’s 
quilting’ mean the bullet is not stopped and Menardo is himself annihilated on the spot 
figures everything that Almanac has to say about the possibility of Indigeneity within the 
Eurocentric ‘definition or description’ of reality (509, 574): nostalgic for a genocidal past that 
belongs to the coloniser, enslaved through proscriptions on agency in the present, and 
doomed to re-enact the story of its own ‘conquest’ for the future, Indigenous possibility 
under conquest encyclopaedism’s totalising Eurocentrism looks less like the rise out of 
barbarism that Las Casas wrote towards and more like the ‘collective death-wish’220 of the 
colonised. Menardo’s death-by-misadventure is ultimately suicide, not ‘A freak accident’ 
(509). Menardo thinks that he ‘wanted to feel it, to experience it and to know the thrill, to 
see the moment of death and not have to pay’ (338), but the joke, as always, is on him: in his 
commitment to demonstrating his own racial ‘purity,’ he gives for El Grupo a performance 
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of how their race conquered his; a form of internalised colonisation Rabasa describes, in 
relation to the role undertaken by Sahagún’s Indigenous informants in the compilation of the 
Florentine Codex, as ‘ethnosuicide.’221 If the references to Las Casas are Almanac’s key 
identification of the prevailing representational challenge posed to Indigeneity by conquest 
encyclopaedism in the Americas, Menardo’s ‘ethnosuicide’ is its diagnosis of how that same 
encyclopaedism continues to colonise Indigenous subjects in the present. Menardo is the 
logical conclusion of an attempt to fit into the Procrustean ‘mosaic of memory and 
imagination’ (574) bequeathed by the workings of conquest encyclopaedism: compliance 
with its instruction to become commensurate within its parameters is colonisation of 
subjectivity that necessitates personal ethnic cleansing through attempted negation of history. 
In this, Almanac suggests, conquest encyclopaedism’s parameters proscribe Indigeneity to the 
point of programming it to destroy itself. 
 
3.3 Trust 
 
Just as Leopold Bloom renovates his vitality by deferring to the Britannica, Menardo lulls 
himself to sleep by uttering the word ‘trust’ (497), as if all both characters need to do is have 
faith in the certainty of their respective aspired-to totalities. The difference, of course, is that 
while Bloom’s encyclopaedic aspirations specifically assure him against ‘suicide during sleep,’ 
Menardo’s ‘trust’ leads him to precisely that somnambulant suicide. Out of Menardo’s 
ethnosuicide, we could speak of his cognitive dissonance as his ‘dialectic of trust’: ‘trust’ that 
creates affective certainty that the dominant order is not just dominant but absolutely, 
universally hegemonic. To recall Krupat’s Gramscian distinction,222 Menardo’s investment in 
Eurocentric dominance requires that he ‘trust’ in it as hegemony—since, as the novel makes 
resoundingly clear, Eurocentrism has not achieved hegemony. Indeed, one of the key 
arguments that Silko uses Menardo’s narrative to make is that the difference between 
dominance and hegemony is certainty: hegemony is dominance that is certain of its 
perpetuity—and certainty is the highest form of ‘trust.’ Although Menardo’s narrative ends 
up as a performance of Eurocentric hegemony, the text structures his narrative to assert that 
hegemony is just that: a performance. In this Almanac posits that conquest encyclopaedism’s 
‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ (574) depends on mere faith in its hegemony; and this, 
as the novel prophesies, disappears as soon as it is recognised as such. 
																																																						
221 Rabasa, Tell Me the Story of How I Conquered You, pp. 12–3. 
222 Krupat, p. 21. 
 95 
This argument is staged in the narrative’s structural division between Parts 2 (‘Mexico’) 
and 4 (‘The Americas’), with Part 3 (‘Africa’) introducing a new series of characters and 
stories based in Tucson. At the end of ‘Mexico,’ Menardo is left meditating on the 
forthcoming ‘test’ (338) by which he will demonstrate his certainty about both his sangre limpia 
and the ‘high technology’ (338) that secures the clients of his company, Universal Insurance, 
completely. At the beginning of ‘The Americas,’ the nature of Tacho’s work as a spy against 
Menardo is clarified, and the specifics of his, El Feo’s, and Angelita La Escapía’s roles among 
the local Mayans are fleshed out. The thematic connection between these two aspects of 
Menardo’s narrative is their illustration of his hubristic certainty: he is certain about the 
forthcoming test and his insurance company’s efficacy, and convinced of Tacho’s loyalty to 
him. The interjection of ‘Africa’ between these two sections is ostensibly digressive, but taken 
in the context of the narrative’s exposition of Menardo’s certainty it looks a lot like an 
elaboration on exactly that theme. ‘Africa’ opens with mob boss Max Blue’s recollection of 
an ambush that marked the catastrophic failure of the ‘security precautions’ that had provided 
him and his uncle certainty, and closes with a meeting of members from the elite Owls Club 
discussing measures to insure themselves against the ‘human refuse’ littering the U.S. and 
spilling over the border (349, 461). The symmetry is suggestive: Max remembers that on the 
day of the ambush that his uncle ‘had been lecturing [him] about security precautions,’ while 
at the Owls Club an Arizona senator waxes to Max and Judge Arne about ‘order and control 
at home, order and control abroad’ (349, 462). 
Before unpacking how ‘Africa’ explores certainty in Menardo’s narrative, it is helpful to 
remind ourselves that certainty is integral to the standpoint of conquest encyclopaedism. And 
indeed, since Menardo is so invested in the totality bequeathed by Las Casas and conquest 
encyclopaedism, to the point that he blinds himself to evidence to the contrary, it is 
unsurprising to note that his professional career is devoted to curating ‘trust’ in its received 
order. Menardo’s company, Universal Insurance (or ‘Seguridad Universal,’ as it is sometimes 
rendered), is the key here. Universal Insurance is what takes Menardo from rags to riches: 
‘the concept of life insurance and insurance for buildings, livestock, and crops was new to 
the people outside the Federal District,’ so his decision to sell ‘“insurance of all kinds” to the 
whole region around Chiapas’ is innovative (260). It is through Universal Insurance that 
Menardo becomes rich, marries his sangre limpia wife, and ascends to El Grupo. The 
symbolism of Menardo’s career in insurance is clear: if Menardo’s decision to ‘pass’ signals 
an acceptance of Eurocentric dominance, selling insurance ‘against all losses, no matter the 
cause, including acts of God, mutinies, war, and revolution’ (261) represents a very literal 
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commitment to helping Eurocentrism retain its dominance. Menardo rises ‘quickly in the 
insurance business because he knew exactly what people wanted to hear’ (260): that a society 
premised on the unjust dominance of masses of people by a small elite—that is, the 
inheritance of ‘conquest’—can be certain that its privilege is hegemonic. Pitching his offer 
to businessmen left sceptical by the remembered upheaval of the Mexican Revolution, 
Menardo uses suggestive terms: ‘the “new world” could belong to them just as the old one 
had’ (261)—the world pre-Mexican revolution could still belong to the elite post-revolution, 
in the same way that the ‘New World’ of the Americas could belong to the European ‘Old 
World.’ Universal Insurance must, then, be understood as a vessel through which Menardo 
exhibits his commitment to the status quo: it is the externalisation of his internalisation of 
totalising Eurocentrism. Universal Insurance’s function is to provide the status quo with 
certainty that its dominance is hegemonic: it gives it a vehicle by which hegemony can be 
affected. 
But there is also an inconsistency in this story: why do elites who, due to his racial 
difference, never fully accept Menardo as one of them entrust their insurance to him? This 
is what connects Menardo and the local and Federal District elite to which he aspires: it is 
not that either he or they are actually certain or secured against all losses, but that they need 
to feel that certainty in order to maintain their privilege and to continue to perform their 
dominance as hegemony. They are united by their desire for certainty of Eurocentrism’s 
perpetuity, of their insulation from the people, and of their security amidst inevitable change. 
This shared need for certainty is what ‘Africa,’ in its oblique way, unpicks. Through the 
narratives it introduces, ‘Africa’ posits that the elite investment in certainty is the key means 
by which Eurocentric hegemony is performed, and that that performance depends upon 
aggressive militarisation of the boundaries of its definition or description of reality. 
The introduction of Max Blue at the start of ‘Africa’ articulates clearly how the desire for 
certainty is concomitant with violence. Max is a former mob boss from New Jersey, who 
decides to move to Tucson and live out his retirement orchestrating assassinations from his 
golf course. He plans the assassinations’ details and lets subcontractors carry them out: ‘Max 
never lifted a finger, or if he did, he was hundreds, even thousands, of miles away lifting only 
a telephone receiver’ (354). Max’s thoughts on death provide a useful entry-point into 
understanding how the text links certainty and hegemony: 
Max believed in death because death contained certainty. The changes in once-
living tissue, the decay, were absolute. The dead were truly destroyed and gone. 
Max was fascinated by the thought that death terminated all being; death changed 
a man to a pile of rotting waste. (353) 
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The certainty that death contains is twofold. Firstly, it is final: once a person is dead, a person 
becomes ‘waste’ and they and the entirety of their life can be defined or described by those 
who remain, since the dead are ‘truly destroyed and gone.’ Secondly, it is universally 
inevitable. As Max thinks: 
All death was natural; murder and war were natural; rape and incest were also 
natural acts. Serial murderers who chewed their signatures on victims’ breasts and 
buttocks and even the baby-fuckers—they were all consequences of human 
evolution. (353) 
 
For Max, since death is the universal certainty, anything it touches is justifiable as ‘natural.’ 
What this obviously amounts to is a sophistic defence of murder, in which ‘human evolution’ 
is a convenient tool for rationalising any death, regardless of context; but what is instructive 
about Max’s conception of death is how, as an assassin, it enables him to think of himself as 
an artist working with certainty. 
Indeed, Max thinks of himself as ‘an executive producer of one-night-only performances’ 
(353). Since, for him, death contains certainty constituted of its finality and universal 
inevitability, his job as an assassin is to make that finality and universal inevitability converge 
in a way that is legible both to his clients and to potential investigators. That is to say, he has 
to manufacture at least two discrete perceptions of the death’s certainty: one for the client 
and one for the Police; and in this Max ‘liked to think of himself as somewhat a scholar’ 
(354). He thinks dismissively of Ferdinand Marcos’ assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr. ‘at 
the airport instead of the whorehouse’: an amateur mistake, resulting in ‘instant sainthood 
for Aquino and political jet-power for his widow’ (354). He believes that: 
the ordinary details and normal circumstances of accidental death had been the 
components of his success. The one-car accident at night, the hit and run while 
the subject jogs a residential street, the garden hose to the car exhaust and the 
victim at the wheel with the engine running; irrefutable accidents. People slipped 
and died of blows to the head in tubs and showers all the time. […] The key to 
success was to give the cops ample simple explanations for the death. Any 
appearance of even a remote possibility of accident or suicide was explanation 
enough to satisfy the police and relieve them of further investigative work. (354-
5) 
 
Max manipulates the certainty of death to give both clients and investigators what they want; 
as his nephew Angelo jokes to himself, ‘What had the movie been called, Dial Max for 
Murder?’ (372). 
Max’s role as an assassin allegorises the text’s key argument about certainty: the only way 
to control certainty, to achieve ‘universal insurance,’ is by controlling death. Absolute 
certainty necessitates control of the lives of others and the stories of those lives, and this can 
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only be attained through death. Indeed, Menardo is programmed not just to eliminate his 
possibility, but to kill himself: for Eurocentrism to perform its hegemony, it requires certainty 
that its Others are dead or dying. It is unsurprising to find, then, that Universal Insurance’s 
growth depends on blurring the line between ‘traditional’ insurance and paramilitary security: 
Universal Insurance ‘had been the first insurance company to employ a private security 
force,’ some time after Menardo’s arms dealer, Greenlee, has convinced him that ‘the real 
future lay in insurance and security of a different sort’ (261, 266). In ‘The Americas,’ it 
transpires that Universal Insurance has become ‘Universal Insurance and Security’ (490), and 
has grown the capacity to co-ordinate the Indigenous genocide Menardo, the general, and 
the police chief intend to commit. 
Max Blue’s interjection in the midst of Menardo’s narrative hints at the connections 
between certainty, hegemony, and death that define the logic of Universal Insurance’s 
culmination as a paramilitary force. If Menardo’s company is to provide ‘universal insurance,’ 
total coverage against all losses the status quo may endure, it necessarily has to take control 
of the certainty of death, just like Max Blue. If the totalising Eurocentrism needs its 
dominance to feel like hegemony in the face of the vicissitudes of chance, it is only able to 
do so through murder. Eurocentrism, supplanting the various definitions or descriptions of 
reality with its total, dominant version, needs violence to sustain itself. In a sly joke, Max’s 
eldest son thinks about the policy he has bought with Universal Insurance: 
Sonny agreed to the ‘foreign businessman’s protection package’; the package had 
been expensive, but had included everything. ‘Everything’ included the use of 
Universal Insurance’s ‘air force,’ and in the event of emergencies, one of General 
J.’s Learjets. (435) 
 
‘Everything’ is militarised: any totalised definition or description must necessarily be secured 
against that which is outside totality—totality is seen to depend on the act of exclusion. 
Eurocentrism’s total definition or description of reality creates margins that undermine its 
affected hegemony, and as such it must be protected from them. 
The division between the Eurocentric centre and its marginalised others is another way 
of articulating the division between the elite and the people that preoccupies the text. Indeed, 
‘Africa,’ like Menardo’s sales pitch for Universal Insurance, demonstrates that the pursuit of 
certainty is only for the dominant elite through the parallels that it offers between the two 
convalescences it narrates—Max’s and Trigg’s—and that of Root, who is introduced in Part 
1 (‘United States of America’). While Max is in the hospital, he is disgusted by the ‘permanent 
“wheelies”’ (352) in his ward, and determines never to become like them. Although he makes 
a full recovery and returns to the privilege of physical ability, he finds that: 
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he could not remember what it felt like to be Max Blue […] A different Max had 
somehow pulled himself back into this world, but not completely. […] Max had 
told Leah exactly how he felt; emotional bonds between everyone and himself 
had been severed. (350-3) 
 
Max’s rejection of these ‘emotional bonds’ transforms him into a solipsist, disinterested in 
his wife and estranged even from his own body: 
In the shower he’d lather his balls with soap, then work the suds in the top of his 
dick. But that was all. It might have been his foot he was touching. […] They had 
been in Tucson for a year and a half, and Max had not had sex with [Leah Blue] 
or even slept in the same bed with her. […] All Max could tell her was the 
shooting had changed him. He lived and sometimes even slept at the golf course. 
(360) 
 
In his subsequent rebirth as an artist of certainty, Max chooses the certainty of death over 
the unpredictability of life. His golf course is the key figure of this solipsism: besides being 
an obvious Eurocentric aberration in the Arizona desert, Max’s pleasure in it is described in 
terms of its simulated exemption from time and space: it is only on the golf course, where 
he ‘loved to watch the arc of the ball and the way wind currents held the ball aloft perfectly 
suspended as if time no longer existed,’ that Max conducts business and initiates 
assassinations thousands of miles away, insulated from the ‘danger and death’ of his actual 
desert surroundings (637). After pulling himself back from death, Max entombs himself alive; 
he could be described using the same words that ironically describe Menardo before his 
death, at his most certain: ‘All was safely protected, securely guarded, and shielded; each 
detail, each element, each person in his life was secure. No one and nothing could touch 
him!’ (499). 
If Max is read as an illustration of an elite, ableist mind-set making a full physical recovery, 
Trigg can be read as his Borgesian forking path: he is of a similarly elite mind-set but has to 
live as a ‘wheelie,’ or ‘Steak-in-the-Basket’ as Max labels him (378). Trigg comes from wealth, 
but is effectively abandoned by his family after his car accident; he lives in the belief that ‘All 
it would take was enough money and his mother would be telephoning to invite him for tea’ 
(388). He never gives up the belief that he will become elite again, and convinces himself that 
one day he will walk again using ‘electronic-impulse hook-ups to his legs and skull’ (389). 
Similarly to Menardo, Trigg aspires to be elite by assuming elite behaviours: he makes huge 
amounts of money with real estate, and internalises the elite’s disgust at otherness; as he 
writes in his diaries, ‘The chair is not me. The chair is not part of me’ (384). He uses his 
fortune to found Bio-Materials, inc., which helps ‘research teams obtain the fresh 
biomaterials they needed’ to find the cure for his paralysis (389), and allows his sense of his 
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own superiority to inform a eugenicist approach to his blood and organ donor business. Two 
contiguous entries in his diaries summarise his internalisation of the elite-subaltern division 
neatly: 
I see myself as being superior to others. I am better than all of them. 
 
Tucson, city of thieves. Third generation burglars and pimps turned politicians. 
These alleged human beings, the filth and scum who pass through the plasma 
donor center, get paid good money for lying with a needle in their arms—an 
activity they pursue the rest of the day anyway. I could do the world a favor each 
week and connect a few of the stinking ones up in the back room and drain them 
dry. They will not be missed. (386) 
 
 ‘Africa’ posits that Max and Trigg are two sides of the same coin: both cling to their elite 
status, and in doing so become solipsists, barricading themselves into a world where they can 
trust in their own dominance, secure and supreme. 
Yet, as Root’s mentor Calabazas explains to him in ‘United States of America,’ ‘“Those 
who can’t learn to appreciate the world’s differences won’t make it. They’ll die’” (203). Max 
and Trigg subscribe to a form of ableism, among other prejudices, that constructs the able-
bodied as hegemonically normative and the disabled as homogenously deviant; and in 
keeping with Calabazas’ sense of justice, Max is, in a statistical aberration, struck by lightning 
on his golf course, and Trigg is murdered by seditious employees. Root is the foil against 
which Max and Trigg can be read. Root decides to embrace the ‘difference’ conferred on him 
by his severe injury in a motorcycling accident, and in this finds friends and comfort. Root is 
descended from an elite Tucson family, who grew wealthy running ‘whorehouses and 
gambling halls’ during the ‘Indian Wars’ in the 1880s; his mother, like Menardo, feigns 
European ancestry, insisting her father is ‘of “Spanish descent,” not Mexican’ (168-9). After 
Root wakes up from his coma and is reintroduced to his family, he decides to tell people that 
‘all his family had died in his accident. That the instant his skull had bounced off the car 
bumper, mother, grandmother, sisters, and brothers died’ (169). He explains to Lecha that at 
that point he realised ‘they weren’t really my family. All they cared about was how much I 
was going to cost them, and whether I was going to mean extra work for anyone’ (170). 
Root’s experience with physical disability is the opposite of Max’s: he makes peace with the 
certainty of death, and discovers a world of emotional bonds to which he had previously 
been blind; indeed, to recall his thoughts in full: 
Being around Mexicans and Indians or black people, had not made him feel 
uncomfortable. Not as his own family had. Because if you weren’t born white, 
you were forced to see differences; or if you weren’t born what they called 
normal, or if you got injured, then you were left to explore the world of the 
different. (202-3) 
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While Max and Menardo entomb themselves in the world of the elite, Root embraces 
otherness; he keeps himself alive and, conspicuous in a novel concerned with depravity and 
cruelty, happy.  
The interjection of ‘Africa’ in the middle of Menardo’s narrative must be read, then, as 
making a series of related arguments that elaborate the text’s narrative of his rise and fall and, 
accordingly, his relationship with conquest encyclopaedism. Firstly, through Max, and the 
section’s other elites, ‘Africa’ posits that the elite desire to see Eurocentric dominance 
become hegemony can only be attained by achieving total certainty of its security and 
perpetuity, and that that level of certainty can only be realised by controlling death. In this, 
the pursuit of total certainty becomes an expression of the Eurocentric categorical 
prerogative bequeathed by conquest encyclopaedism: the power to categorise ‘individuals 
according to their level of similarity/proximity to an assumed model of ideal humanity,’223 
which ultimately entails, in Judith Butler’s words, the power to decide ‘whose lives count as 
lives.’224 Yet, just as Max’s assassinations are ‘one-night-only performances,’ total certainty is 
not actually realisable, only performable, and thus dependent on its militarised enforcement, 
particularly in the forms of ‘high technology’ over which Menardo and Trigg obsess (353, 
338, 380). Of Menardo, then, ‘Africa’ suggests that the dominance he assumes by ‘passing’ 
into conquest encyclopaedism’s ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ (574) is sustained by 
the ‘certainty’ he generates through Universal Insurance’s ability to perform hegemony 
through its military power. In this light, is it any surprise that Menardo’s answer to his 
resurgent memories of his Mayan grandfather is genocide, the ‘gunning down from the air’ 
of any ‘illegal refugees’ (495)? 
For Almanac, the salient point in all of this is that dominance can never achieve 
hegemony, but only perform it through force. It is worth stating again how clearly this is 
illustrated by the various narratives’ dénouements: besides Max Blue getting struck by 
lightning, Trigg’s betrayal by his staff, and Menardo’s bulletproof vest snafu, David, for 
example, is killed by an ‘unkenneled’ horse, while Greenlee is murdered by Zeta while reciting 
his ‘Never Trust an Indian’ joke, and Beaufrey’s certainty that with a ‘kilo of coke’ Seese 
would ‘dispose of herself automatically’ is thwarted by her recovery and survival (545, 704, 
50). There seem to be only two certainties in Almanac: firstly, its prophecy of the 
‘disappearance of all things European’ (14), and secondly, the ironic twists of fate that will 
																																																						
223 Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, p. 16. 
224 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2006), p. 20. 
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visit anyone insured against that prophecy. It becomes clear that all it takes is probability to 
bring the performance of hegemony to an end. As Clinton explains to Rambo Roy, in ‘Africa’: 
The white man would stop everything before it started; the white man would 
pretend to know all the answers ahead of time, but of course, really, the white 
man didn’t have a clue. The white man had made some monumental errors in the 
five hundred years Europeans had disrupted Africa, China, and the Americas. 
The Chinese and the Africans had broken free; now it was only a matter of time 
before all captive people on the earth would rise up. (413) 
 
The question for Silko, then, is how to envision that rising up: what are the strategies for 
bringing it about? The analysis ‘Africa’ offers of certainty in relation to Max and Trigg, and 
summed up by Clinton’s reading of the white man’s hubristic certainty—his ‘[pretending] to 
know all the answers ahead of time’—suggests that uncertainty must be the starting point for 
reimagining the world without the performed hegemony of totalising Eurocentrism. But how 
is it possible to build uncertainty into revolutionary prophecy? By looking at how Silko 
associates blindness with totalising Eurocentrism, the novel’s vision of how uncertainty 
creates revolutionary inevitability becomes clear. 
 
3.4 Blind Universalism 
 
In the narrative of Leah, Max’s property tycoon wife, ‘Africa’ satirises the performance 
of hegemony through hubristic certainty as a universalism that generates types of blindness 
which makes it unstable and unsustainable. After Max gives himself over entirely to solipsism, 
Leah becomes an Arizona realtor; ‘Buying real estate was a real rush, Leah was fond of saying’ 
(360). Leah is able to procure large swathes of desert land cheaply, and as her portfolio grows 
she begins to execute her grand development scheme: a recreation of Venice in the desert 
surrounding Tucson, literally called ‘Venice, Arizona, city of the twenty-first century’ (375). 
As Leah explains to Max: 
People wanted to have water around them in the desert. People felt more 
confident and carefree when they could see water spewing out around them. Max 
had frowned. ‘I didn’t say human beings were rational,’ Leah said. (374) 
 
Her plan is not without precedent: 
The water gimmick had really worked in Scottsdale and Tempe. A scattering of 
pisspot fountains and cesspool lakes evoked memories of Missouri or New York 
or wherever the dumb shits had come from. Leah wanted Venice to live up to its 
name. […] Market research had repeatedly found new arrivals in the desert were 
reassured by the splash of water. […] her dream-city plans revolve around water, 
lake after lake, and each of the custom-built neighbourhoods linked by quaint 
waterways. (374-5) 
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‘Venice, Arizona’ is an unambiguous performance of Eurocentric hegemony: it is a project 
to reconstruct literally the Old World in the New World, and the parched aridity of the 
Sonora is made to resemble the cool, ‘familiar’ comfort of Western Europe. In the 
performance, Europe is affected as universal: it is not only replicable universally but the 
universal standard of desirability. In this, ‘Africa’ satirises the way that Eurocentric 
dominance performs the hegemony it needs to provide itself certainty by masking its 
location—its referring back to Europe—as a universal norm. As Mignolo writes, one of the 
ways in which the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ can be used to advance colonialism is by 
masking or disguising the ‘locus of enunciation,’ from which are assigned simultaneously ‘the 
standards of classification’ and ‘the right to classify,’ as universal—simply ‘the natural course 
of history.’225 Venice, Arizona sums this up neatly: within the Eurocentric imagination, it is 
not possible for the Sonora desert to exist in its own right—as if the geography of the 
coloniser must be internalised by the geography of the colonised. 
Nevertheless, as previously noted, ‘the truth’ is always ‘relative to the locus of 
enunciation.’226 It is not surprising, then, that ‘Venice, Arizona’ is deeply, comically 
unconvincing in its absolute unsustainability. Leah is aware of this: she explains to Max that 
although ‘The amount of water needed for such a grand scheme was astonishing,’ she is 
ultimately ‘in the real estate business to make profits, not to save wildlife or the desert’ (375). 
For Almanac, what is important about ‘Venice, Arizona’ is that Leah’s universalising of the 
idea of ‘Venice’ masks the fact that ‘Venice’ is emphatically local and specific to Europe and 
its geography—and this masking is easily identifiable as such because the idea of Europe’s 
universality falls apart under any scrutiny; indeed, Leah has to rely on the corrupt Judge Arne 
throwing out a number of cases against her for the project to begin. In this, ‘Venice, Arizona’ 
can be seen to manifest the same act of marginalisation that enforces the division between 
the ‘elite’ and the ‘people.’ 
This becomes especially clear during an argument between Leah and Trigg about ‘Venice, 
Arizona’ towards the end of the text. Trigg is sceptical of the project’s profitability, since the 
insurgency in Mexico and Arizona’s ‘water problems’ have led to a drastic ‘drop in population 
in Tucson and Phoenix’ (660): 
Trigg was not interested in hearing about the security features that the canals and 
lakes would provide; he wanted to know who were these people and why would 
they bother to come to, much less buy property in, a state such as Arizona, the 
first state ever forced into federal receivership by her creditors. As both the U.S. 
																																																						
225 Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, p. 8. 
226 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance, p. 186. 
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economy and the civil war in Mexico got worse, Arizona’s population would 
continue to drop. Why build a new city from scratch when you could buy Tucson 
already built for ten cents on the dollar? (661) 
 
Leah is intransigent: ‘Her dream city had been calculated with Arizona’s financial collapse 
and Mexico’s civil war in mind’ (662). Trigg is missing a basic point about the market and its 
relationship with the division between the elite and the people: ‘Residential property priced 
over a million was still reliable. Leah’s homes in Venice would be priced beginning at two 
million’ (661). Indeed, that their argument is interspersed with descriptions of ‘the dead 
weight of [Trigg’s] thighs and hips’ (661) serves as a useful reminder that Trigg, like Menardo, 
is irreversibly non-elite: he does not understand ‘Venice, Arizona’ because it is not for him.227 
In response to Trigg’s suggestion that Leah ought to invest in Tucson because ‘the only 
whites downtown’ are now ‘police, lawyers, and the clerks and workers in the county and city 
courts,’ Leah confirms this as evidence that ‘Tucson had been run-down too long’ and would 
be of no interest to the elite (661, 662). She explains: 
Venice, Arizona would rise out of the dull desert gravel, its glazing purity of white 
marble set between canals the color of lapis, and lakes of turquoise. The ‘others’ 
had to live someplace; let it be Tucson. (661) 
 
For Leah, ‘Venice, Arizona’ will be the citadel to Tucson’s garrison. Europe’s affected 
universality becomes the mode through which dominance performs hegemony, making the 
marginalisation of non-elite communities look natural, inevitable, and normal. 
Yet, unconvincing though it is, in the way Leah maps the division between the elite and 
subaltern onto a division between ‘Venice, Arizona’ and Tucson, Almanac makes its key point 
about the potency of the affected universality: if universality is simply affected, then it follows 
that the ‘the standards of classification’ and ‘right to classify’ from the European ‘centre’ that 
that universality encodes are vulnerable to rejection.228 Indeed, affected universality is 
presented in ‘Venice, Arizona’ as the ‘right’ to draw a ‘natural’ boundary between the elite 
and the people: but in its comic unconvincingness, it is obvious that these are simply tools 
for elite self-preservation and gain. Leah will set up deep wells for her ‘city of the twenty-first 
century’ (375) because she knows the activity will affect ‘Arizona’s Indian tribes’ 
specifically—and in spite of the fact that ‘The water supplied by the deep wells might be 
enough now, but [there was] no guarantee in ten years or even five’ (375, 660, 661). In 
																																																						
227 Indeed, this moment provides an interesting coda to Leah’s initial conversation with Trigg during ‘Africa’: 
‘Leah hated handicap-designed toilets…Leah wondered if Trigg had thought about a custom development 
strictly for the physically handicapped. Was there “soft money” available from the government specifically for 
the disabled?’ (381). For Leah, there is nothing objectionable about segregating the disabled from the 
‘normal.’ 
228 Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, p. 8. 
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keeping with her elite privilege, Leah sees the long-term sustainability of her ‘city of the 
twenty-first century’ according to the elite prerogative to marginalise: in the long-run, ‘federal 
water-management’ will be encouraged to stop ‘too much of the Colorado river’ running 
down into Mexico (374, 660). The power to set standards for classification and to assign 
those classifications is, for Almanac, ultimately the power to position boundaries to develop 
and sustain elite privilege; and this gets to the tools Almanac provides for its insurgents’ 
dismantling of Eurocentric dominance and its definition or description of totality. 
If the various narratives of ‘Africa’ deconstruct the elite performance of a transcendent 
hegemony by the construction of a certainty that is merely violent and militarised 
Eurocentrism that is disguising its locus of enunciation as universal, they concurrently 
suggest that that very totalising definition or description of reality is only capable of existing 
by generating a blindness to that which does not fit in its categories and is not posing an 
immediate threat. Eurocentric dominance exerts the categorical privileges conferred by being 
the locus of enunciation so as to fortify itself, and, as Leah’s long-term plans for ‘Venice, 
Arizona’ demonstrate, 
draw boundaries that 
sustain its privilege in 
relation to the margins. But 
dominance starts to fall 
apart when the power 
relationship encoded into 
these boundaries is 
perceived, and their 
function solely as a 
guarantor of elite certainty 
is understood. It is with 
this in mind that the text’s 
prefatory map (Fig. 3) must be read: not only does the map revise the North American map 
without European standards of objectivity, but the straight line dividing Mexico from the 
unlabelled U.S.A. emphatically asserts the fraudulence of the frontera. The map reimagines the 
border between the two countries as a point of transition, rather than the southward-tending 
frontier through which the elites of each country protect and enrich themselves.229 
																																																						
229 This is one of the key ways in which Almanac repeats and elaborates Ceremony: as Tayo realizes towards the 
end, ‘he had only seen and heard the world as it always was: no boundaries, only transitions through all 
distance and time.’ Leslie Marmon Silko, Ceremony (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 246. 
 
Fig. 3. ‘Five Hundred Year Map,’ (14-15). 
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Beyond its prefatory map, the text repeatedly asserts that the U.S.-Mexico border is both 
arbitrary and purely a guarantor of elite privilege on either side. Root’s mentor, Calabazas, is 
once again a font of wisdom in this regard, introducing this idea to the text. Calabazas is a 
Yaqui Indian, whose lands stretch over what is now Sinaloa, Sonora, and Arizona; for the 
Yaqui, the U.S.-Mexico border is one of the clearer statements of the incommensurability of 
their Indigeneity, dividing their lands into two according to the agreement of two colonising 
federations. Calabazas makes his living running an ‘import-export business,’ which is 
effectively a smuggling operation across the border, from the ‘Indian Country’ near Tucson 
(236, 220). It is explained that, in spite of ‘thefts from both private citizens and the city of 
Tucson’ (220), Calabazas’ business grew year on year. Calabazas, for whom doing things 
‘Indian Style’ is paramount, allows himself to become a patriarch of sorts, taking in ‘the whole 
family, cousins and stray in-laws.’230 Assuming this role is in itself a tacit rejection of the 
‘imaginary line’ dividing his tribe (215, 236, 214). His business is able to take off through a 
more explicit refusal, however: rather than seeking to make his fortune according to the rules 
of the states invested in the U.S.-Mexico border’s continued existence, he puts his Indigeneity 
to practical use and plays on border guards’ unwillingness to see the reality of his difference. 
As he explains to Root, border guards: 
‘hated to see the Indians coming because they knew that meant rat-trap cars, 
pickups loaded down with pigs and firewood, corn and melons. The U.S. guards 
were on the alert for brothers and uncles hiding under firewood. They didn’t 
think we were smart enough to bring across anything else.’ (217) 
 
Calabazas outlines to Root his confidence in his smuggling abilities accordingly: 
‘We don’t believe in boundaries. Borders. Nothing like that. We are here 
thousands of years before the first whites. We are here before maps or quit claims. 
We know where we belong on this earth. We have always moved freely. North-
South. East-West. We pay no attention to what isn’t real. […] We don’t see any 
border.’ (216) 
 
Calabazas’ peculiar use of present tense verb phrases—‘We are here’—is notable, explicitly 
connecting the Yaqui refusal to acknowledge the border with a broader refusal to allow 
Eurocentric domination to categorise Indigeneity out of history and the present. For 
Calabazas, while the border provides the U.S. security against ‘brothers and uncles’ from the 
rest of America, it protects the Mexican state from the possibility of its people arming 
themselves.231 
																																																						
230 As the text makes clear, however, Calabazas’ patriarchal privilege is complicated, and his acceptance of its 
dismantling is one of the text’s most important thematic dénouements. This will be returned to below. 
231 By putting together various clues, it is possible to infer that the business Calabazas is referring in his 
conversation with Root is smuggling weapons from the U.S. to the insurgents in Mexico. The ‘blue Samsonite 
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By playing on the blindness of dominance to realities that persist independently of the 
categories it enforces, Calabazas resists the definitions and descriptions of the colonisers’ 
reality; this is why he insists on Root learning ‘“to appreciate the world’s differences”’ (203). 
Root recalls, early in their relationship, having once ‘remarked that he thought one dull gray 
boulder looked identical to another dull gray boulder a few hundred yards back’: 
Calabazas took his foot off the accelerator, and Mosca tried to save Root by 
adding quickly, ‘Maybe in the dark they look alike.’ But that had not prevented 
Calabazas from giving them one of his sarcastic lectures on blindness. Blindness 
caused solely by stupidity, a blindness that Root and Mosca would probably 
always suffer from, just as they would always suffer from the location of their 
brains below their belts. ‘I get mad when I hear the word identical,’ Calabazas had 
continued. ‘There is no such thing. Nowhere. At no time. All you have to do is 
stop and think. Stop and take a look.’ […] Root’s ass had been dragging he was 
so tired; but that night Calabazas marched them up and down, up and down the 
same stretch of the arroyo, until Root suddenly realized what the old bastard was 
saying. ‘Look at it for what it is. That’s all. This big rock is like it is. Look.’ (201-
2; emphasis in original) 
 
In this very literal demonstration of the world’s differences, Calabazas asserts the importance 
of perception beyond names: for Calabazas, accepting the equivalence of objects because of 
their shared name is tantamount to accepting the categories that have been imposed by the 
European settlers. Indeed, later on Calabazas reminisces about the time he spent among the 
Yaqui elders when he was younger, recalling their observation that ‘one of the most 
dangerous qualities of the Europeans’ was that they ‘suffered a sort of blindness to the world. 
To them, a “rock” was just a “rock” wherever they found it’ (224). They note that ‘the whites 
put great store in names. But once the whites had a name for a thing they seemed unable 
ever again to recognize the thing itself’ (224). The subsequent illustration of this through the 
farcical story of the various Apaches mistaken for ‘Geronimo’ by the U.S. army makes clear, 
as Moore has outlined, that ‘A looser relation to definitions…allows a more alert perception, 
freeing the witness from her own filtering categories, from the illusion that the sign is the 
signified.’232 
Moore calls this Almanac’s ‘epistemology of witness,’ and opposes it to a Euro-American 
epistemology of ‘commodification, colonization, and demonization of nature and the people 
																																																						
suitcases’ to which he refers crop up again three times: first, during ‘Africa,’ when Leah rents warehouse space 
to a U.S. army major who ‘paid cash up front: out of his blue Samsonite suitcase’; secondly, during ‘The 
Americas,’ when Root informs Seese that all the cocaine in Tucson is ‘“packed up in blue Samsonite”’; and 
finally, during ‘The Fifth World,’ when Awa Gee is described as having found evidence that Greenlee has 
been making ‘“cocaine for guns” transactions’ (218, 434, 597, 690). Between these mentions of the Samsonite 
suitcase it is possible to surmise that cocaine is being smuggled into the U.S. for sale to Greenlee in exchange 
for weapons, and that Calabazas, in this conversation with Root, is considering a request to help smuggle the 
weapons South. 
232 Moore, ‘Silko’s Blood Sacrifice,’ p. 168. 
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of the desert.’233 Cherniavsky touches on a similar idea, describing Calabazas as articulating a 
‘tribal epistemology’ that is ‘excorporative (decentred; temporalized)’ in contrast with the 
Eurocentric, ‘incorporative (identitarian; spatialized)…system of equivalence.’234 In the 
context of my argument here, both Moore and Cherniavsky offer mutually complementary 
theories of how Silko uses Calabazas to introduce a form of resistance to conquest 
encyclopaedism’s prevailing ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ (574) that is dependent on 
vision beyond Eurocentric categories. For Moore, this vision is a witnessing that is the 
opposite of voyeurism: ‘Voyeurism erases difference; witnessing asserts difference. The one 
is a compressing and capturing, the other an expansion and releasing. The one wants closure, 
the other wants openness.’235 For Cherniavsky, this vision is not vision as such, but rather an 
‘antidote to “blindness”’ that is more ‘a particular kind of cognitive process (thinking) 
initiated through arrest…a de-mobilization of the thinking/viewing subject.’236 Both share 
common ground in their reading of Calabazas’ epistemological vision as a type of perception 
that is consciously rooted in a pluralist ethics which tries to move away from the 
marginalisation inherent in acts of totalised definition or description; but in the context of 
Almanac’s larger idea of the world, I would assert that the importance of Calabazas’ vision is 
also that it emanates from the standpoint of the unrecognised and incommensurable—that 
is, from the agency of those to whom settler colonialism’s performance of hegemony permits 
blindness. 
This, for Almanac, is how a revolution can be at once certain to occur and rooted in 
uncertainty: by making space for the unpredictable agency of those on whose 
unrecognisability and incommensurability the colonial status quo depends, the dominant 
Eurocentric totality will be inevitably countered and pluralised, and thus made to disappear. 
The epistemology Calabazas learns during the Geronimo story, and teaches to Root with the 
boulders on the reservation, establishes for Almanac a way of thinking and knowing without 
Eurocentric totality and the cognitively dissonant ‘dialectic of trust’ that permits it hegemonic 
certainty: by accepting the agency of people who are rendered invisible by reality’s 
parameters—those to whom blindness is universally encouraged. In this, it is instructive to 
note that Calabazas’ narrative across the text is a journey from patriarchal dominance to the 
acceptance of uncertainty and the agency of women. Indeed, Calabazas’ narrative across the 
novel follows the culmination of his acceptance of the negation of his traditional patriarchal 
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role by his wife and her sister. The story of Calabazas’ relationship with the Brito sisters, and 
his acceptance of their agency beyond his traditional vision of women, illustrates plainly how 
the epistemology he learns from his tribe, and eventually teaches to Root, necessitates an 
embrace of uncertainty.  
Eager to impress the Brito family, Calabazas had helped their father out with some 
gambling debt, and in return, ‘Old Brito had worked a deal: Calabazas would marry Brito’s 
eldest daughter, Sarita’ (241). Calabazas spends the rest of his life lamenting that he had never 
‘spoken up’: 
Because long before the wedding Calabazas had been in love with Liria. Liria had 
loved him too, but she had also been confused and frightened by her betrayal of 
her sister. Sarita was the eldest, the one the other children looked up to and had 
to obey. (236) 
 
Calabazas accepts the marriage and his role as a family patriarch, and continues his affair with 
Liria; Sarita is not bothered, he figures, because he ‘had lived up to his side of the bargain; he 
had accepted responsibility for Sarita, as his wife, but also for the others, Liria included’ (236). 
For Calabazas, the marriage to Sarita was ‘an arrangement with the family, as well as an 
arrangement with Sarita’ (238). In his patriarchal role, Calabazas becomes certain of his 
privilege to the extent that he forgets that Sarita herself has agency of her own; indeed, that 
part of the ‘arrangement with Sarita’ may be to do with more than finding jobs for her 
‘clanspeople’ (238). And of course, although he recalls Liria ‘telling him about Sarita’s unusual 
devotion to the Church and to the altar society,’ it is only when he catches them in the act 
that he realises ‘Sarita had been in love with the monsignor when she had married Calabazas 
in the cathedral’ (239). 
Calabazas uses conspicuous terms to chastise his younger, hubristic self for not guessing 
this: 
Calabazas could look back on that day with Sarita and laugh at himself. Because 
in those days he had been such a cocky bastard. He had thought back then he 
could “read” what was going on inside a person. How wrong he had been about 
Sarita! […] How stupid! How blind! How arrogant! A more humble man would 
have seen it. (238, 239; emphasis added). 
 
Calabazas’ realisation that masculinist hubris leads him to the ‘Blindness caused solely by 
stupidity’ (201) on which he will lecture Mosca and Root as an elder is pivotal in his own 
history. From being ‘so certain he knew the score on everything and on everyone,’ he goes 
to laughing at his ‘absurd pride, his absolute belief in himself and in his little world’ (244). 
Sarita’s affair with the monsignor forces Calabazas to realise that to identify a thing ‘for what 
it is’ (202) necessarily involves acknowledging that thing’s agency and possibility, and 
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imagining a world in which various agencies can co-operate interdependently, rather than 
positioned around a central patriarch. From then on, Calabazas tries to embrace the requisite 
uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in accepting the agency of others, and of women in 
particular; he is very relaxed, as arch-misogynist Mosca complains (601), about what the 
sisters get up to. 
Yet Calabazas’ evolution over the course of the text suggests that, even at the beginning, 
he has not yet fully got to grips with the ramifications of embracing the agency and 
uncertainty of others. At the beginning, Calabazas is introduced as a patriarch and 
businessman, and by the end has decided he should take a back seat in the insurgency, and 
give women the space to take control. It is in this movement that the text envisions 
Calabazas’ epistemology being enacted to imagine a reality more plural and interdependent—
albeit more uncertain and unpredictable. Although Calabazas laughs at his own youthful 
hubris, his ability to let the Brito sisters have a say in directing the family’s priorities is still 
lacking. His catalyst for relinquishing his privilege almost entirely is their argument over the 
sisters’ involvement in refugee smuggling across the border. Initially enraged by the danger 
in which the sisters’ operations put the family, Calabazas goes on to accept that maybe they 
are simply better at fighting the U.S. government than he is; ‘Liria and Sarita had recently 
accused him of getting soft inside like white-bread dough; maybe they were right’ (629). This 
de-privileging of his own agency reaches its head at the text’s end, at the International Holistic 
Healers Convention, where many of the text’s insurgents, the majority of whom are women, 
meet to discuss the insurgency. Calabazas mostly spectates, assuming no privilege among the 
various viewpoints, and finds himself giving himself over to their agency and the uncertainty 
that entails: 
Calabazas felt uneasy. He had trusted the men who had been in Room 1212, but 
he wasn’t sure about the women, especially not the Eskimo or the Maya woman. 
[…] Calabazas had seen the Maya La Escapía talking to Zeta, and he knew what 
that meant. For years Zeta had been buying and stockpiling weapons in the old 
mine shafts. Calabazas was content to retire from smuggling, politics—
everything; he had put in his time and had earned a rest in the shade with his little 
mule and burros. Calabazas would sit back and let the others make the decisions 
and give the orders, the way he always had, since he was a child with the old time 
people in the Yaqui mountain strongholds. They had told him what must be done 
and he had done it. Since he was an old man now, maybe the women would give 
him something easy to do. (740) 
 
Putting together Leah’s and Calabazas’ narratives, a strategy for undoing the conquest 
encyclopaedism’s ‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ becomes clear: because it is a 
performance of hegemony that depends for its dominance on affecting total certainty in the 
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universality of its locus of enunciation, those who are unrecognised and incommensurable 
are able to exert an unpredictable agency on it that may overturn it, bringing about the variety 
of definitions and descriptions of reality lost to Europe’s colonisation of the world. In 
Almanac, it is those to whom the status quo is blind—those within the ‘world of the 
different’—that will destabilise the legacy of totalising Eurocentrism left by conquest 
encyclopaedism—and generate the ‘network of tribal coalitions’ by which plural ideas of the 
world can co-exist. 
 
3.5 Universal Insurance/Seguridad Universal 
 
In this, the eponymous ‘Almanac of the Dead’ is vital: just as it sets up the text’s vision 
of reality as ‘a mosaic of memory and imagination’ (575), it provides, in Old Yoeme’s own 
addition to the notebooks, a model for how those unrecognisable to and incommensurable 
with the status quo can undo Eurocentric certainty. Yoeme’s entry narrates her improbable 
escape from ‘hanging and dismemberment’ at the hands of the federal government, who have 
convicted her for ‘sedition and high treason’ (579). As she explains, although she is 
imprisoned, her execution is ‘delayed by their needs for pageantry’: ‘Elected officials from 
other jurisdictions arrive. I am on display, an example to all who dare defy authority. 
Postponement is due to the governor’s busy schedule’ (579). She is mocked in her cell by 
police and guards, whose chief makes her count down the days till her death. Yoeme’s retort 
is significant: ‘I laugh and call him “barbarian” in my language’ (579). In this key moment, 
Yoeme asserts an Indigenous epistemological space entirely independent of the European 
gaze: she challenges and disrupts Eurocentrism’s assumed prerogative to classify ‘otherness’ 
as ‘barbarism’—an intellectual move Las Casas typifies in his Apologética’s concluding 
‘Especies de Barbarie.’237 Using her own language, which is incomprehensible to the guard, 
Yoeme instantiates the possibility of knowledge without the European gaze. Of course, the 
chief’s response is to mock her, in terms that explicitly recall Menardo’s planned Indigenous 
genocide and Max Blue’s assassinations: 
‘You will die! That is certain!’ All the others of my kind have already been sent to 
hell, he says. My death is certain. I am not afraid to die. I am sorry to leave the 
people I love when the struggle is only beginning. (579) 
 
																																																						
237 Las Casas, II, pp. 637–54. 
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But just as the certainty of Menardo and Max Blue is ironically cut short, Yoeme’s ‘Day of 
Deliverance,’ as she names the story, sees her escape once everyone in the town is killed by 
the Spanish Flu:  
Influenza infects the governor and all the others. The police chief burns to death 
from fever. The jailer leaves a bucket of water and a bowl of parched corn. 
 ‘The authorities want to keep you alive,’ he says, ‘until they recover enough to 
hang you.’ […] 
 I laugh out loud but the jailer reacts slowly. 
 ‘Someone will come to hang you,’ he reassures me, but when I ask who, the 
jailer shakes his head. […] 
 The Blessed Virgin of the Indians had just worked me a miracle; I had been 
saved by the hand of God. (579-80) 
 
As Lecha thinks, there is something unsettling or absurd about Yoeme putting this story 
in the ‘Almanac of the Dead’: 
What good was the story of one woman’s unlikely escape from the hangman? 
Had old Yoeme known or cared that 20 to 40 million perished around the world 
while she had been saved? Probably not. (580) 
 
But in the marginalia on the pages following what Yoeme terms her ‘Day of Deliverance,’ 
some sense of the method of the story, and by implication the novel, is made clear: 
Yoeme had believed power resides within certain stories; this power ensures the 
story to be retold, and with each retelling a slight but permanent shift took place. 
Yoeme’s story of her deliverance changed forever the odds against all captives; 
each time a revolutionist escaped death in one century, two revolutionists escaped 
certain death in the following century even if they had never heard such an escape 
story. Where such miraculous escape stories are greatly prized and rapidly 
circulated, miraculous escapes from death gradually increase. (581) 
 
If Yoeme’s story works, with the others in the ‘Almanac of the Dead,’ to narrate ways of 
disentangling the colonised from Eurocentric certainty, tipping the odds out of its favour, 
and decolonising a space for narratives of insurgency, the same, I believe, can be said of 
Silko’s Almanac of the Dead. As noted, the novel’s broad focus on Indigenous insurgency and 
the forthcoming revolution in itself makes clear that its idea of the Americas is one in which 
the totalising Eurocentrism bequeathed by conquest encyclopaedism is unravelling. But I 
would argue that the constituent narratives of Almanac are more than the sum of their parts: 
between them, they imagine a world in which the categories on which the Eurocentric 
‘mosaic of memory and imagination’ that shapes its totality depend have been made strange, 
and are no longer required for thinking and knowing. 
A provocative example, in relation to my discussion of totalising certainty, comes in the 
novel’s subtle bilingualism. Silko’s oscillation between English and Spanish names for 
Menardo’s company—Universal Insurance, or Seguridad Universal, his tool for giving the 
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elite certainty that ‘the new world could belong to them just as the old one had’ (261)—is 
deeply suggestive: ‘Insurance’ and ‘Seguridad’ are presented as ostensibly interchangeable 
nouns. Yet, to adapt Maria Lauret’s method in her study of language migration in the U.S., 
the space between these two words—the dialogue they implicitly create with each other—
can be seized on for close reading;238 and in this, the way in which Almanac works as an 
aesthetic beyond Eurocentric categories comes into view. 
On Menardo’s very first trip to procure supplies for Universal Insurance/Seguridad 
Universal in Tucson, soon after his introduction into the novel, strong hints are dropped 
about the kinds of violence that his policies will presuppose: visiting gun shops, he thinks 
that he wants ‘an elite security force, one that the wealthy and the powerful will rent for 
special occasions—elections or funerals and even weddings’ (264). When Menardo meets 
Greenlee, the violence implicit in the English term ‘insurance’ is hinted at by the term’s 
hermeneutic overlap with the term ‘security’ as Menardo struggles with his English:  
Menardo sits back in the taxi and ignores the English words of the driver. The 
taxi stops at the army surplus store near the railroad tracks. […] Menardo admires 
the parachute in halting English. He might find use for those in his company. 
The man pulls nervously at the driving gloves and asks what the company sells. 
‘Insurance and security,’ Menardo answers, not sure he has used the correct 
English word for insurance. (264-5) 
 
The reason for Menardo’s uncertainty is significant: the Spanish, ‘seguridad’ refers to both 
‘insurance’ and ‘security.’239 Universal Insurance’s Spanish name thus covers conspicuously 
more ground than its English one: with an eye on its Spanish name, the aforementioned 
transformation of Universal Insurance’s English name, after the ‘Africa’ section, into 
‘Universal Insurance and Security’ is far from surprising.  
Universal Insurance’s iteration as Seguridad Universal draws the bilingual reader’s 
attention to the fact that the ‘Universal’ to which it refers is defined from a Eurocentric locus 
of enunciation, and thus blind to that which is unrecognisable or incommensurable—its 
universality is, like the certainty it provides, a violent performance of hegemony, as ‘universal’ 
as Venice, Arizona. Since the categories by which Universal Insurance/Seguridad Universal 
																																																						
238 Maria Lauret, Wanderwords: Language Migration in American Literature (New York, NY: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014), p. 2. 
239 Looking at the definitions given by the Real Academia Española, we can see this is the case: the first two 
definitions for ‘seguridad’ are ‘a secure or certain quality’ [‘una cualidad de seguro’], and ‘a service responsible 
for the security of a person’ [‘un servicio encargado de la seguridad de una persona’]. The word 
‘seguro/segura’ gives us similar results: as an adjective, ‘free and exempt from risk, certain and undoubted’ 
[‘libre y exento de riesgo; cierto, indubitable’]; and as a noun ‘security, certainty, trust’ [‘seguridad, certeza, 
confianza’], ‘a situation free of all danger’’ [‘lugar o sitio libre de todo peligro’]. Real Academia Española and 
Asociación de Academias de la Lengua Española, ‘Seguridad,’ Diccionario de la lengua española (Real Academia 
Española) <http://dle.rae.es/?id=XTrIaQd> [accessed 11 August 2016]. 
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operate generate the same blindness to difference on which an articulation of universality 
depends, that totalised vision of the world as that universe against which it can be insured 
and secured is as doomed to failure as Menardo himself. In the connective tissue Almanac 
draws between Universal Insurance and Seguridad Universal, a model for imagining a world 
without Eurocentrism emerges in the dissolution of Anglophone and Hispanophone 
monolingualisms. This is the heart of Almanac’s vision of a variety of definitions or 
descriptions of reality: the imagination of a world becomes less like a single totality 
performing its hegemony, and more like an openness to plurality—a totality as decentred 
potentialities, which is as much as to say a totality that does not totalise. 
This idea is summed up neatly in the figure of Zeta’s and Lecha’s European father, a 
failed mining engineer in West Texas from whom they were estranged as children. When 
they are eventually reunited with him at a hotel in El Paso, they find him disinterested and 
sleepless: 
He never smiled or spoke, merely nodding in the direction of the hotel restaurant. 
His forehead was continually trying to solve a mathematical formula even while 
he sat with them. (122) 
 
Increasingly frustrated by his inscrutability, Lecha decides to burst into his hotel bedroom: 
Zeta saw he did not recognize them immediately. Lecha was looking past him in 
the room and did not see this. Zeta felt her heart fall in her chest. The bed had 
not been slept in. The pillows and spread had not been touched since the hotel 
maid. The black wire hangers in the closet nook were empty. He had been sitting 
at the small desk. The desk top was bare, although for an instant Zeta had 
mistaken cigarette scars along the edges for a pattern of decoration. ‘Where is 
everything?’ Lecha said, walking around and around the small room impatiently. 
Their father had turned as if he suffered from stiffness in the neck and shoulders. 
He had begun to hunch under long, unkempt white hair. They had always spoken 
English with him since he had never been able to learn Spanish. But Lecha had 
had to repeat the question twice before he could answer. ‘Everything?’ he had 
said in a steady voice. ‘I am trying to think about it,’ he had answered. (122) 
 
In this moment, the failure of Eurocentrism to articulate its idea of the world is made clear. 
In the same way that Yoeme’s entry in the Almanac of the Dead tilts the odds in the favour 
of captives everywhere, Silko’s Almanac models the eventual disappearance of totalised 
Eurocentrism in Zeta’s and Lecha’s father’s death, ‘dry and shriveled as a cactus blown down 
in a drought’ while trying, in lonely isolation, to think about ‘Everything’ (122-3). ‘Everything’ 
cannot be totalised and to do so is toxic; and in the sisters’ ability to accommodate their 
helpless father’s monolingualism, the moment gestures at bi- and multilingualism as a means 
of decentring European epistemological dominance. For Silko, conquest encyclopaedism’s 
inheritance of totalising Eurocentrism is an idea of the world the only certainty of which is 
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its expiration—and in direct opposition to the father’s assumption that ‘Everything’ can be 
articulated from a central space, Almanac counters that inheritance by imagining a fictional 
encyclopaedism in which the conditions for revolution become possible as insurgent realities 
decentre and pluralise the world’s ‘mosaic of memory and imagination.’ 
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4. Roberto Bolaño’s ‘Idea of the World’ 
 
There are highly suggestive parallels between Leslie Marmon Silko’s Almanac of the Dead 
and Roberto Bolaño’s 2666, which to date have been only scantly explored.240 Among the 
most significant of these similarities is their concern, like Joyce’s novels, with imagining 
totality. There is, however, a slight difference: while Almanac sees Zeta’s and Lecha’s father 
literally shrivel up ‘trying to think about’ everything—that is, trying to figure totality using a 
method implicated in toxifying colonialism—in 2666, a minor epiphany is afforded to Nazi 
soldier Hans Reiter on his realisation of a rather less self-destructive technique for visualising 
‘everything.’ In the notebooks of Boris Abramovich Ansky, a Jewish Bolshevik from the 
fictional Russian village his Division is occupying, Reiter notes the following reflection on 
Giuseppe Arcimboldo: 
The Milanese painter’s technique struck him as happiness personified. The end 
of semblance. Arcadia before the coming of man. […] the paintings of the four 
seasons were pure bliss. Everything in everything, writes Ansky. As if Arcimboldo 
had learned a single lesson, but one of vital importance.241 
 
This key moment, in 2666’s fifth and final part, pulls together the novel’s extended discussion 
of the relationship between metaphor and totality—providing us a lens through which to 
conceive 2666’s relationship with encyclopaedism. In what follows, I will unpick the terms 
Bolaño uses in his invocation of Arcimboldo so as to clarify exactly the novel’s conception 
of totality, and use the light it shines across 2666’s parts to elucidate as such its own vision, 
and critique, of millennial totality. 
As Reiter notes, Ansky does not equivocate in his praise for Arcimboldo’s Four Seasons 
(Fig. 4): he praises the paintings for manifesting ‘the end of semblance,’ which is a blissful 
vision of ‘everything in everything’—or totality. ‘Semblance’ [‘las apariencias’] is a key term 
in 2666, and is given its fullest definition by Ansky himself, moments earlier in the notebooks 
as ‘things that only seem and never are, things all surface and no depth, pure gesture,’ which 
are often the refuge of ‘the fearful’ (722).242 Ansky dwells on the connection between fear 
and semblance: for him, unchecked fear leads people to create semblances in order to sooth 
																																																						
240 Hermann Herlinghaus has drawn an explicit comparison between Almanac and ‘The Part about the 
Crimes,’ offering Almanac as an example of a ‘critical spirit’ that Bolaño ‘[takes] up into the twenty-first 
century.’ Although Herlinghaus does not explore the comparison in particular depth, he makes a useful 
gesture toward the possibilities for comparative analysis of the two texts. Hermann Herlinghaus, Narcoepics: A 
Global Aesthetics of Sobriety (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 203–231. 
241 Roberto Bolaño, 2666, trans. by Natasha Wimmer (London: Picador, 2009), p. 734; all further references 
to this text in this chapter are from this translation and edition and are given parenthetically, unless otherwise 
specified. 
242 Roberto Bolaño, 2666 (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 2004), p. 903. 
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themselves, as they give form to reality in order to make it palatable and knowable, but can 
easily become a space for facile fantasy. His specific example for this theory are his fellow 
Russian writers, many of whom fear ‘above all…being no good…of forever dwelling in the 
hell of bad writers’ (722). These ‘bad writers,’ Ansky suggests, create semblances to quell their 
fear of inadequacy; yet the creation of semblances, which after all ‘only seem and never are,’ 
enables these ‘bad writers’ to valorise semblance as an ends rather than a means—that is, to 
believe in the thing that seems rather than that which is (722; emphasis in original). As Ansky 
puts it, for such ‘bad writers’ it is ‘as if the paradise of good writers…were inhabited by 
semblances,’ and that ‘the worth (or excellence) of a work were based on semblances’ (722). 
This, for Ansky, is the crux of the problem with ‘semblances’: while they may vary ‘from one 
era and country to another,’ they ‘always remained just that, semblances’: fictions that, when 
seen as a goal rather than a method, enable disingenuous and insincere thought and 
knowledge about reality (722). 
Implicit in this critique is a theory of the ‘worth (or excellence) of a work’ as an ethical 
quality that resides beyond mere figuration—in what artistic works are rather than what they 
seem, or in fiction that is a method to reality rather than a didactic sketch of its goal. A cryptic 
digression on Tolstoy gives a sense of exactly the implications of this; for Ansky, Tolstoy’s 
works are: 
[gestures] muddled by an effort of will, the hair and eyes and lips of Tolstoy and 
the versts traveled on horseback by Tolstoy and the women deflowered by 
Tolstoy in a tapestry burned by the fire of seeming. (722-3) 
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This oddly agglutinated sentence suggests that Ansky reads Tolstoy’s works and theory of 
art, which Tolstoy made decisively clear in What is Art?,243 as so invested in semblances of 
pastoral masculinity that they negate, or burn, themselves: for Ansky, semblances of ‘versts’ 
and ‘women deflowered’ put the reader in an unethically disingenuous and insincere relation 
with a reality that seems but never is. Using the example of Tolstoy, Ansky’s critique of 
semblance could be seen as addressing the way totalising fictions are constructed to provide 
blithe reassurance to a status quo—what Professor Albert Kessler, in ‘The Part about Fate,’ 
describes as ‘the art of avoidance, not of revelation’ (267). So if Tolstoy is an example of 
‘bad’ semblance, what does it mean that Ansky sees Arcimboldo’s Four Seasons as the ‘end of 
semblance,’ ‘pure bliss,’ and ‘everything in everything’? How do these phrases relate to one 
another? And what does it 
have to do with the 
encyclopaedic imagination? 
If Ansky’s implication is 
that Tolstoy’s semblances ‘only 
seem and never are,’ and thus 
valorise semblance as goal for 
reality rather than method for 
interpreting and apprehending 
it, then it would follow that he 
reads Arcimboldo’s Four 
Seasons as doing the opposite: 
using semblances as a method 
that enables viewers to proceed 
to a reality that really is. In this, 
Ansky’s description of the Four 
Seasons as ‘Everything in 
everything’ [‘todo dentro de 
todo’] is highly suggestive.244 
Bolaño’s Spanish offers a more 
specific inference than 
Wimmer’s translation: besides 
																																																						
243 Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art?, trans. by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1995). 
244 Bolaño, 2666, p. 917. 
 
Clockwise: Spring (1563), Summer (1572), Autumn (1573), Winter, 
(1573). 
 
Fig. 4. Giuseppe Arcimboldo, Four Seasons (1563-73). Oil on canvas. 
Musée du Louvre: Paris. ‘Giuseppe Arcimboldo,’ Wikipedia: The Free 
Encyclopedia (Wikimedia Foundation, 2 October 2016. Web. 11 
October 2016).  
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meaning ‘in,’ ‘dentro de’ specifically connotes ‘inside’ or ‘within’;245 with this in mind, Ansky 
can be understood as reading Arcimboldo’s Four Seasons as a semblance of totality—a totality 
in which human potentiality is commensurable with a natural order of things, which vision 
of total coherence and organic possibility is ‘pure bliss.’ For Ansky, Arcimboldo’s ‘end of 
semblance’ is the use of semblance—that which seems—to return the viewer to a world of 
absolute possibility that really is (or at least could be): semblance as means to an ethical end. 
In this, that mysterious single lesson Arcimboldo had learned starts to look like a method for 
articulating a semblance of totality that does not remain merely semblance; and ‘The end of 
semblance’ [‘El fin de las apariencias’] comes to be less the termination of semblance than 
the ultimate goal or aim or culmination of semblance.246 What makes the Four Seasons 
‘happiness personified,’ then, is the optimistic connection it draws between totality and 
human possibility—as if the act of imagining ‘everything’ need not always be tyrannically 
Procrustean. In this, Ansky reads cause for revolutionary optimism: 
When I’m sad or in low spirits…I close my eyes and think of Arcimboldo’s 
paintings and the sadness and gloom evaporates, as if a strong wind, a mentholated 
wind, were suddenly blowing along the streets of Moscow. (735; emphasis in 
original) 
 
It is significant, however, that Ansky does not find the same optimism across the whole 
of Arcimboldo’s oeuvre: 
																																																						
245 Diccionario de la lengua Española (DLE): ‘2. prepositional phrase. In the interior of a real or imaginary space. 
Inside/within/in a drawer, a city, the heart, the soul.’ [‘2. loc prepos. En el interior de un espacio real o imaginario. 
Dentro de un cajón, de una ciudad, del corazón, del alma.’] Real Academia Española and Asociación de Academias de 
la Lengua Española, ‘Dentro de,’ Diccionario de la lengua española (Real Academia Española) 
<http://dle.rae.es/?id=CDuZpeI> [accessed 11 August 2016]. Sergio Marras spells this out in his study of 
Bolaño’s use of Arcimboldo: ‘According to Ansky, Arcimboldo means that although everything is located in 
everything, ultimately everything is found in the part. And vision of the whole and the part is always 
provisional….’ [‘Según Ansky, Arcimboldo quiere decir que si bien el todo está en el todo, este se encuentra 
fundamentalmente en la parte. Y la visión del todo y la parte es siempre provisoria….’]. Sergio Marras, El 
héroe improbable (cómo Arturo Belano siempre quiso ser Benno von Archimboldi) (Santiago de Chile: RiL Editores, 
2011), p. 22; my translation. 
246 Bolaño, 2666, p. 917. This interpretation of the word ‘end’ works in Bolaño’s original Spanish as well as 
Wimmer’s English translation. As the definition of ‘el fin’ in DLE makes this clear, ‘el fin’ and ‘the end’ share 
implications of resolution or culmination as well as termination: ‘3. noun. Objective or motive with which 
something is carried out.’ [‘3. m. Objeto o motivo con que se ejecuta algo.’] Real Academia Española and 
Asociación de Academias de la Lengua Española, ‘Fin,’ Diccionario de la lengua española (Real Academia 
Española) <http://dle.rae.es/?id=HxFMc9Z> [accessed 11 August 2016]. 
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The Roast [Fig. 5], for example, 
was like a horror painting, a 
reversible canvas that, hung one 
way, looked like a big metal 
platter of roast meats, including 
a suckling pig and a rabbit, with 
a pair of hands, probably a 
woman’s or an adolescent’s, 
trying to cover the meat so it 
won’t get cold, and, hung the 
other way, showed the bust of a 
soldier, in helmet and armor, 
with a bold, satisfied smile 
missing some teeth, the terrible 
smile of an old mercenary who 
looks at you, writes Ansky, and 
his gaze is even more terrible 
than his smile, as if he knew 
things about you that you never 
even suspected. (734) 
 
Those ‘things about you that you never 
even suspected’ that Ansky sees in the 
gaze of Arcimboldo’s mercenary 
suggest a hidden knowledge about or joke at the expense of the viewer which directly recalls 
Amalfitano’s discourse on eyes in ‘The Part about Fate,’ when Charly Cruz describes the 
magic disk he used to own. As Charly Cruz explains, the magic disk had a ‘little old drunk’ 
on one side and ‘a picture of a prison cell, or the bars of a cell’ on the other: ‘When you spun 
the disk the laughing drunk looked like he was behind bars’ (334). Amalfitano leaps on the 
fact that the little old drunk is laughing, and offers two possible explanations for the little old 
drunk’s amusement at what ‘isn’t really a laughing matter’: 
‘The little old drunk is laughing because he thinks he’s free, but he’s really in prison,’ 
said Óscar Amalfitano, ‘that’s what makes it funny, but in fact the prison is drawn 
on the other side of the disk, which means one could also say that the little old 
drunk is laughing because we think he’s in prison, not realizing that the prison is 
on one side and the little old drunk is on the other, and that’s reality, no matter 
how much we spin the disk and it looks to us as if the little old drunk is behind 
bars. In fact, we could even guess what the little old drunk is laughing about: he’s 
laughing at our credulity, you might even say at our eyes.’ (334, 335; emphasis in 
original) 
 
If the little old drunk is laughing at our credulity, it is because our eyes render us unable to 
identify the component parts of ‘apparent movement’ (333), which would enable us to 
distinguish the ‘everything’ of totality rather than a single, persistent image. In a very similar 
way, Arcimboldo’s mercenary smirks knowingly at his viewer’s inability to know 
 
 
Fig. 5. Giuseppe Arcimboldo, The Roast (c. 1570). 
Oil on panel. Nationalmuseum: Stockholm. Giuseppe-
Arcimboldo.org (Web. 11 October 2016). 
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simultaneously his image and that of his constituent elements: his terrible gaze and toothless 
smile mock the determinism of our vision and the ways we must adjust ourselves to enable 
our eyes to piece together not just his image but its implication of the ‘horror’—the hidden 
violence—that underpins quotidian life. In this, we should note that the ‘single lesson’ 
Arcimboldo has learnt allows him to create contrasting semblances of totality: if the Four 
Seasons is optimistic about human possibility and The Roast pessimistic, they are nevertheless 
both semblances of ‘Everything in everything’ that return the viewer to visions of reality that 
are, contingent on either a revolutionary or a deterministic perspective of human possibility. 
The tragedy in this, of course, is that it implies that the blissful optimism of the Four 
Seasons depends on an Arcadian humanity that is not fully self-aware, while the horrific 
pessimism of The Roast envisions a modern humanity that is grappling with the determined 
limits of its vision. As such, while for youthful Ansky in revolutionary Russia the Four Seasons 
is like a ‘mentholated wind,’ for jaded Amalfitano on the neoliberal frontera, the wind: 
[hurls] itself against the slope of the mountains to the east, raising dust and a litter 
of newspaper and cardboard on its way through Santa Teresa, moving the clothes 
that Rosa had hung in the backyard, as if the wind, young and energetic in its 
brief life, were trying on Amalfitano’s shirts and pants and slipping into his 
daughter’s underpants and reading a few pages of the Testamento geometrico to see 
whether there was anything in it that might be of use, anything that might explain 
the strange landscape of streets and houses through which it was galloping, or 
that would explain it to itself as wind. (202-3; emphasis added) 
 
While the Arcadian potentiality of the Four Seasons is like a refreshing wind that reinvigorates 
Ansky’s optimism, the wind blowing along Amalfitano’s streets is, like the Chilean professor 
himself, frustrated by the limits of possible knowledge and his consciousness of those limits. 
It is as if, for 2666 as a whole as much as in the divergence between Arcimboldo’s Four Seasons 
and The Roast, there is a certain point of consciousness or self-awareness beyond which 
epistemology becomes exponentially more uncertain, diminishing the returns of human 
possibility. The question yielded by this point is whether these divergent poles—the 
optimism of the Four Seasons and Ansky’s mentholated wind and the pessimism of The Roast 
and the ontologically dumbstruck wind engulfing Amalfitano—are merely incompatible 
images of totality, or whether they can be used dialectically, to generate ideas of the world 
that do not negate either pole. Is it possible to provide a reader the optimistic bliss of 
‘Everything in everything’ without obfuscating the determined limits of possible human 
knowledge—to envision the world as a whole while acknowledging the credulity of our eyes, 
but without taking advantage of that credulity to assert malevolent power or create facile 
semblance? Can visions of totality return us to a world that does not seem but really is? 
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These questions are articulated in Protean form earlier in ‘The Part about Archimboldi,’ 
by General Entrescu: 
Did Jesus Christ, he asked, suspect that someday his church would spread to the 
farthest corners of Earth? Did Jesus Christ, he asked, ever have what we, today, 
call an idea of the world? Did Jesus Christ, who apparently knew everything, 
know that the world was round and to the east lived the Chinese (this sentence 
he spat out, as if it cost him great effort to utter it) and to the west the primitive 
peoples of America? And he answered himself, no, although of course in a way 
having an idea of the world is easy, everybody has one, generally an idea restricted 
to one’s village, bound to the land, to the tangible and mediocre things before 
one’s eyes, and this idea of the world, petty, limited, crusted with the grime of the 
familiar, tends to persist and acquire authority and eloquence with the passage of 
time.  
And then, taking an unexpected detour, Gentral Entrescu began to talk about 
Flavius Josephus, that intelligent, cowardly, cautious man, a flatterer and odds-on 
gambler, whose idea of the world was much more complex and subtle than 
Christ’s…(686) 
 
In Entrescu’s speech, Bolaño implicitly sets the ambitious parameters for 2666’s ‘idea of the 
world’ [‘idea del mundo’]: one that is beyond the limits imposed by ‘our village’ and ‘the 
grime of the familiar.’247 Shortly afterwards, in Ansky’s reading of Arcimboldo, Bolaño 
elaborates these parameters by suggesting that that move beyond ‘our village’ and ‘the grime 
of the familiar’ necessitates a form of totalising thought—a way of conceiving the world—
that incorporates the failures implicit in the actual inability of humans to conceive totality 
objectively. Indeed, if Entrescu suggests that everyone’s ‘idea of the world’ is, by default, a 
totalised idea rooted in that which has always been the case, which does not even necessarily 
have to account for the roundness of the globe, Ansky’s reading of Arcimboldo’s Four Seasons 
and The Roast seems to suggest that the most useful or ethical ‘idea of the world’ would be a 
semblance of totality that at once allows for its own failure through multiplicity, 
inconsistency, and uncertainty. Little surprise, then, that Reiter unconsciously echoes 
Entrescu’s fascination with Flavius Josephus’ ‘idea of the world’ when he recalls his discovery 
of Arcimboldo: 
It’s in Ansky’s notebook, long before he sees a painting by the man, that Reiter 
first reads about the Italian painter Arcimboldo, Giuseppe or Joseph or Josepho 
or Josephus Arcimboldo or Arcimboldi or Arcimboldus (1527-1593). (729; emphasis 
added) 
 
2666, I propose, constructs an ‘idea of the world’ that repositions our ethical relationship 
with reality by valorising thought which can imaginatively construct a semblance of totality 
while incorporating the implicit failure of any such semblance of totality to be actually 
																																																						
247 Bolaño, 2666, p. 857. 
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totalising—that is, which thinks dialectically with both the optimism of the Four Seasons and 
the pessimism of The Roast. Implicit in this is a critique of ideas of the world that depend, like 
much encyclopaedic practice, on a positivism that prioritises the validity of that which is 
knowable through observation. Just like us, General Entrescu, Boris Ansky, and Hans Reiter 
tend to depend on the knowability of that which is beyond the eyes in order to conceive of 
the world; Bolaño’s gambit is that if we embrace the unknowability of that which is beyond 
our eyes and work with our dependence on fictions that make the unknown knowable, 
instead of simply trusting in ‘the grime of the familiar,’ we can generate ideas of the world 
that enable us to take bolder ethical steps—steps that may keep alive the possibility of 
disrupting the genocidal patterns of history. Just as Stephen Dedalus encourages Leopold 
Bloom to move ‘from the known to the unknown,’248 Amalfitano likes to hold on to his 
‘rather idiosyncratic ideas’ about the knowability of that which is not immediately visible: 
He believed (or liked to think he believed) that when a person was in Barcelona, 
the people living and present in Buenos Aires and Mexico City didn’t exist. The 
time difference only masked their nonexistence. And so if you suddenly traveled 
to cities that, according to this theory, didn’t exist or hadn’t yet had time to put 
themselves together, the result was the phenomenon known as jet lag, which 
arose not from your exhaustion but from the exhaustion of the people who would 
still have been asleep if you hadn’t traveled. (188, 189) 
 
For Amalfitano, believing, or liking to think you believe, in ‘Make-believe ideas’ that 
presuppose the fundamental unreality of that which is beyond personal vision is not 
solipsism. Rather, such ideas: 
turned the pain of others into memories of one’s own. They turned pain, which 
is natural, enduring, and eternally triumphant, into personal memory, which is 
human, brief, and eternally elusive. They turned a brutal story of injustice and 
abuse, an incoherent howl with no beginning or end, into a neatly structured story 
in which suicide was always held out as a possibility. They turned flight into 
freedom, even if freedom meant no more than the perpetuation of flight. They 
turned chaos into order, even if it was at the cost of what is commonly known as 
sanity. (189) 
 
The only way we can ‘blaze paths into the unknown’ (227), Bolaño seems to suggest, is if we 
acknowledge the unknown as in some sense unknowable or knowable only according to the 
failures of our eyes. In this, we can begin to imagine and figure ideas of the world that 
reconceive our ethical connection to the world and its history—or, to adapt the terms of the 
novel’s epigraph, to be revitalised by the horror hidden by the apparent boredom of 
millennial modernity. 
 
																																																						
248 Joyce, Ulysses, 17.1013. 
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4.1 Infinito Vertigo 
 
To date, the majority of critical work on 2666 has focused on the ethics of Bolaño’s 
portrayals of femicide in Ciudad Juárez and the Holocaust. In this, a productive consensus is 
emerging, in which 2666 is read as twinning femicide and the Holocaust in order to identify 
and critique the historical trajectory of the contemporary, from Twentieth Century capitalism 
to millennial neoliberalism and necropolitics.249 A generalised perspective on the novel’s 
scope has tended to go implied in this approach; to approximate, 2666 is a new epic form, 
fit to succeed Gabriel García Márquez, Carlos Fuentes, Mario Vargas Llosa, and the other 
boomistas, and to capture and critique the realities of contemporary globalisation.250 While this 
																																																						
249 Significant contributions to this predominant current include: Laura Barberán Reinares, ‘Globalized 
Philomels: State Patriarchy, Transnational Capital, and the Femicides on the US-Mexican Border in Roberto 
Bolaño’s 2666,’ South Atlantic Review, 75.4 (2010), 51–72; Cecilia López Badano, ‘2666: el narcotráfico como 
anamorfosis muralista,’ in Roberto Bolaño: Ruptura y violencia en la literatura finisecular, ed. by Felipe A. Ríos Baeza 
(México D.F.: Ediciones Eón, 2010); Daniella Blejer, ‘Pensar/clasificar/denunciar: Las resignificaciones del 
archivo en 2666,’ in Roberto Bolaño: Ruptura y violencia en la literatura finisecular, ed. by Felipe A. Ríos Baeza 
(México D.F.: Ediciones Eón, 2010); Carlos Burgos Jara, ‘Los crímenes de Santa Teresa: Estado, 
globalización y mafia en 2666,’ in Roberto Bolaño: Ruptura y violencia en la literatura finisecular, ed. by Felipe A. Ríos 
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Felipe A. Ríos Baeza (México D.F.: Ediciones Eón, 2010); Grant Farred, ‘The Impossible Closing: Death, 
Neoliberalism, and the Postcolonial in Bolaño’s 2666,’ Modern Fiction Studies, 56.4 (2010), 689–708; Gabriela 
Muniz, ‘El discurso de la crueldad: 2666 de Roberto Bolaño,’ Revista Hispánica Moderna, 63.1 (2010), 35–49; 
Jean Franco, Cruel Modernity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Patrick Dove, ‘Literature and the 
Secret of the World: 2666, Globalization, and Global War,’ CR: The New Centennial Review, 14.3 (2014), 139–
61; Margaret Boe Birns, ‘666 Twinned and Told Twice: Roberto Bolaño’s Double Time Frame in 2666,’ in 
Roberto Bolaño, A Less Distant Star, ed. by Ignacio López-Calvo (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2015); Martín 
Camps, ‘“Con La Cabeza En El Abismo”: Roberto Bolaño’s The Savage Detectives and 2666, Literary Guerrilla, 
and the Maquiladora of Death,’ in Roberto Bolaño, A Less Distant Star, ed. by Ignacio López-Calvo (New York, 
NY: Palgrave, 2015); Martin Paul Eve, ‘Keep Writing: The Critique of the University in Roberto Bolaño’s 
2666,’ Textual Practice, 30.5 (2015), 949–64; Eli Jelly-Schapiro, ‘“This Is Our Threnody”: Roberto Bolaño and 
the History of the Present,’ Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 56.1 (2015), 77–93; Shaj Mathew, ‘Ciudad 
Juárez in Roberto Bolaño’s 2666: Mexico’s Violent Cradle of Modernity,’ Critique: Studies in Contemporary 
Fiction, 57.4 (2016), 402–16; Nicholas Birns, ‘Black Dawn: Roberto Bolaño as (North) American Writer,’ in 
Roberto Bolaño as World Literature, ed. by Nicholas Birns and Juan E. De Castro (New York, NY: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2017); Juan E. De Castro, ‘Politics and Ethics in Latin America: On Roberto Bolaño,’ in Roberto 
Bolaño as World Literature, ed. by Nicholas Birns and Juan E. De Castro (New York, NY: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2017); Federico Finchelstein, ‘On Fascism, History, and Evil in Roberto Bolaño,’ in Roberto Bolaño 
as World Literature, ed. by Nicholas Birns and Juan E. De Castro (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2017). 
250 This is particularly the case with Anglophone Bolaño criticism, which is still catching up, as Héctor Hoyos 
has noted, with Hispanophone criticism. This is primarily because Bolaño was well-known and highly 
regarded in the Hispanophone world at least a decade before he became popular in the Anglophone world, 
but is also down to the relatively niche nature of Anglophone scholarship on Latin American writing and the 
anomalous nature of his Anglophone popularity. While the trickle of Anglophone Bolaño scholarship has 
started to gather pace, Hispanophone scholarship in general remains substantially more advanced. In this 
study, I will be drawing from both fields. For discussion of the contrasts between Bolaño’s Hispanophone 
and Anglophone receptions, see: Wilfrido H. Corral, Bolaño traducido: nueva literatura mundial (Madrid, Spain: 
Ediciones Escalera, 2011); Héctor Hoyos, Beyond Bolaño: The Global Latin American Novel (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2015); Will H. Corral, ‘Bolaño, Ethics, and the Experts,’ in Roberto Bolaño as World 
Literature, ed. by Nicholas Birns and Juan E. De Castro (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017). For 
discussion of 2666’s relationship with ‘world literature,’ see: Sergio Villalobos-Ruminott, ‘A Kind of Hell: 
Roberto Bolaño and The Return of World Literature,’ Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, 18.2-3 (2009), 
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is a useful shortcut into the novel, and one clearly shaped by its more or less explicit ambition 
to be not just within the tradition of the Latin American novela total, but one of the ‘great, 
imperfect torrential works’ of the ‘great masters,’ it does not quite get to the stakes 
presupposed by that immense scale (227).251 By taking as starting points Entrescu’s and 
Ansky’s articulated fascination with representations of totality—‘an idea of the world’ and 
‘Everything in everything’—the ways in which 2666 can be productively read in the context 
of the history of encyclopaedic thought becomes clear. In this, my approach is in ostensible 
contrast with Sharae Deckard’s assertion, in her important study of 2666’s ‘peripheral 
realism,’ that the novel is ‘not an encyclopedic fiction.’252 Although Deckard refuses the term, 
there is, I believe, overlap between our respective readings which the term addresses, and 
that can be used to clarify the nature of Bolaño’s concomitant valorisation and critique of 
the totalising imagination. 
Deckard explores the ways in which ‘Bolaño reformulates realism to interrogate the 
ideological nature of art and the limits of realism while encoding the conditions of millennial 
capitalism in the semi-periphery,’ and in so doing proposes that 2666 ‘be called a “world-
system novel,”’ as it ‘[maps] the incommensurable geographies of global capital from Europe 
																																																						
193–205; Sharae Deckard, ‘Peripheral Realism, Millennial Capitalism, and Roberto Bolaño’s 2666,’ Modern 
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Directions Books, 2007), pp. 69–70; Mark D. Anderson, ‘Dissonant Worlds: Mario Vargas Llosa and the 
Aesthetics of the Total Novel,’ in Critical Insights: Mario Vargas Llosa, ed. by Juan E. De Castro (Ipswich, MA: 
Salem Press, 2014), pp. 201–18. For more on the novela total, see: Carlos Fuentes, La nueva novela 
hispanoamericana (México D.F.: Joaquín Mortiz, 1969); Mario Vargas Llosa, García Márquez: Historia de un deicidio 
(Barcelona: Barral, 1971); Sainz; Robin Fiddian, ‘James Joyce and the Spanish American Novel: A Preliminary 
Study,’ The Crane Bag, 6.2 (1982), 84–88; Roberto Gonzalez Echevarría, Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin 
American Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Wilfrido H. Corral, ‘Novelistas sin timon: 
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Reappraisal of the “Total” Novel’; Ryan F. Long, Fictions of Totality: The Mexican Novel, 1968, and the National-
Popular State (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008). 
252 Deckard, p. 369. Martin Paul Eve also depends on the term ‘encyclopedic’ in his latest work on 2666, 
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to the Americas.’253 Oswaldo Zavala rightly criticises Deckard’s argument’s dependence on a 
periphery-metropole binary, describing it as the result of ‘[invocating] theoretical models that 
generalise recent discussions of the “post-national” from the U.S. and European academy’ 
to the rest of the world: 
In this way, Deckard adopts the same epistemological platform that judges the 
Latin American space as a priori an unstable periphery and which reduces the 
region to the transition from utopian caudillos…to the arrival of forms of 
economic and labour exploitation belonging to neoliberalism.254 
 
While Zavala goes on to intimate quite a deal of scorn for Deckard’s argument, as well as 
that of Sergio Villalobos, it is not inaccurate to say that, despite its obvious perspicacity, her 
model of 2666 as a ‘world-system novel’ encodes Latin America as the periphery of a 
European centre—and the consequence of this is that Deckard’s reading of 2666 ends up 
implicating the novel in a form of Eurocentrism that it is difficult to identify in its ‘idea of 
the world.’  
Deckard’s reading is built on understanding it as the ‘welding of multiple genres and 
modes of realism with irrealist imagery and language’ in order to capture the ‘radical mixtures 
of residual and modern temporalities, cultural formations, and social relations in the 
peripheries of millennial capitalism.’255 As such, Deckard proposes that: 
2666’s multiple genres are embedded in a new realist narrative that represents the 
conjunctions of millennial capital across a range of peripheries and former 
colonies and metropoles: this compendium of realist genres might be said to 
register anachronistic temporalities within a singular modernity.256 
 
In this, 2666 forges an aesthetic that restores throughout the modern ‘world-system’ what 
Johannes Fabian would term ‘coevalness,’257 and which Bolaño combines with ‘a totalizing 
historical impulse’ that enables the novel to ‘represent totality’ through its structure, which, 
‘moving among classes, geographies, and genres, re-creates the fractured social relations of 
life in the semiperiphery.’258 For Deckard, 2666 makes out of its parts a whole that captures 
																																																						
253 Deckard, pp. 351–2, 369. 
254 ‘…los análisis invocan modelos teóricos que generalizan discusiones recientes de lo que se denomina como 
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255 Deckard, p. 356. 
256 Ibid, p. 368. 
257 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). 
258 Deckard, pp. 368–9. 
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and offers a ‘negative critique’ of ‘the totality of millennial capitalist modernity.’259 Yet this 
‘negative critique,’ which Deckard perceives in Bolaño’s ‘critical irreal[ism],’ does not quite 
get to the novel’s diagnosis of ‘one’s eyes’ (686), and as such overlooks its very positive 
critique of generating, and reading, totalised images as such.260 Accordingly, while Deckard 
identifies in 2666 an image of ‘the totality of millennial capitalist modernity,’ she does not 
substantially account for the novel’s in-built critique of its imaginative creation of that very 
‘idea of the world.’ In this, as Zavala’s criticisms suggest, that ‘singular modernity’ within 
which 2666 registers the world’s temporalities begins to look, like its ‘world-system,’ rather 
Eurocentric: 
…[Deckard’s and Villalobos’ analyses] reify cultural logics organic to late 
capitalism: the notion of the centre and the periphery, the reduction of Latin 
America to a general history of failed caudillista utopias and geopolitical 
subjection, the total removal of its politics from the global context, the supremacy 
of the aforementioned global currents of domination that transform literary 
objects into mechanisms of global meaning, etc..261 
 
The ‘world-system’ provides Deckard a way of understanding 2666’s totalising scale, but does 
not afford a means for reflecting on the limitations of that representation of totality. This is 
my key divergence from Deckard, and it is in this context that I propose that the term 
‘encyclopedic’ does productive critical work for the novel. 
For Deckard, 2666 is not encyclopaedic because it ‘refuses the jouissance of paradigmatic 
overspill and heteroglossia,’ and as such ‘does not strive to take the whole world into itself, 
enfolding whole fields of knowledge.’262 Yet, as we have already seen with Joyce and Silko, 
such aesthetic tropes and impossible volumes of content are not prerequisites for 
engagement with encyclopaedic thought. It is not possible for novels to enfold whole fields 
of knowledge; what they can do, however, is mine the operations of thought on which our 
sense of totality depends—to find, like Ansky, everything within everything, or to generate, 
like Barry Seaman, an ‘idea of the world’ from ‘The Abridged French Encyclopedia’ (244). As 
Deckard notes, Bolaño’s conception of a fictional totality diverges from that of the boomistas, 
and from Vargas Llosa in particular, by demonstrating no ‘interest in creating an illusion of 
coherence and autonomy that supplants the infinito vertigo of reality.’263 It is this ‘infinito vertigo’ 
																																																						
259 Ibid, p. 367. 
260 Ibid, pp. 366–7. 
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that is the salient point of the novel: it is the ‘unknown’ to which the paradigm of a ‘world-
system’ addresses itself with inappropriate confidence, but against which, as we have seen 
with Ulysses and Almanac of the Dead, the history and practice of encyclopaedic thought has a 
lot to say. 
 
4.2 Gestalt Encyclopaedism 
 
Bolaño’s interest in encyclopaedism is conspicuous from the publication of Nazi 
Literature in the Americas (1996), which Chris Andrews has described as inaugurating his ‘later 
fiction.’264 Nazi Literature in the Americas,  a catalogue of fictional right wing writers from across 
the Americas does indeed provide a useful starting point in identifying and characterising 
2666’s own approach to encyclopaedic thought. Although it is not entirely accurate to 
describe Nazi Literature in the Americas as a fictional encyclopaedia in itself, since it purports 
to be a catalogue of specific writers rather than a totalised system for all knowledge, 
encyclopaedism is evidently one of its guiding concerns.265 Yet rather than focusing on a 
specific, historical encyclopaedism, like Joyce and Silko do with the Britannica and Las Casas, 
Nazi Literature in the Americas is guided by an encyclopaedism that has not yet arrived: its 
assortment of writers and their ‘profoundly mediocre, forgotten, ignored and, of course, non-
existent literary corpus’266 mark discrete dots whose connection would create a unified, 
totalising semblance that could occupy or colonise reality—that is, a Nazi encyclopaedism. 
In Bolaño’s critique of encyclopaedic thought, the concern is less with an inherited 
encyclopaedism than with the potentially inherited one, immanent to, yet deferred by, the 
contemporary. 
This is not to say, however, that Bolaño’s interest in encyclopaedism is merely 
speculative—rather that, in his reading, the possibility of a Nazi encyclopaedism manifests 
itself as consistent with the trajectory of history. Indeed, as Rory O’Bryen writes, Nazi 
Literature in the Americas ‘significantly postpones the dialectical synthesis of [its] stories to a 
moment that lurks ominously as a not too distant possibility but one that remains postponed, 
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deferred, yet to come.’267 In the dots Nazi Literature in the Americas provides, Bolaño enables 
the reader to piece together the outline of an encyclopaedism that lies within the culture of 
the Americas—a totalising whole that is more than its collection of displaced Nazis. The 
question the text explores is the extent of that immanence, and the action that would be 
required to transform its scattered parts into a whole. In this, the entry on Willy Schürholz is 
instructive. Schürholz is born and raised in a secretive community called ‘Colonia Renacer’: 
At first glance it seems to be a large estate like many others in the region. A closer 
look, however, reveals a number of significant differences. To begin with, 
Colonia Renacer has its own school, medical clinic, and auto repair shop. It has 
established a self-sufficient economic system that allows the colony to turn its 
back on what Chileans, perhaps over-optimistically, like to call ‘Chilean reality,’ 
or simply ‘reality.’ […] A final differentiating trait, perhaps the most trivial but 
also the first to strike those who have caught a glimpse of the colony’s interior 
and the few who have crossed its perimeter, is the ethnic origin of its inhabitants: 
they are all, without exception, German. […] Every so often the national 
newspapers report their activities, or describe the mystery in which they are 
enveloped. There has been talk of pagan orgies, sex slaves and secret executions. 
[…] It has also been said that Eichman, Bormann and Mengele were hidden there. 
[…] After the coup in 1973, Colonia Renacer disappeared from the news.268 
 
In this introductory description of ‘Colonia Renacer,’ Bolaño locates Schürholz in a very 
loosely fictionalised version of the infamous Colonia Dignidad, a small colony founded in an 
isolated part of central Chile by Paul Schäfer, a former Nazi and fugitive from child sex abuse 
charges, that Pinochet’s regime used for detention and torture. This fictionalising move—
arguably an early proto-type for 2666’s fictionalising of Ciudad Juárez as ‘Santa Teresa’—
enables Bolaño to locate Colonia Dignidad and its history as simultaneously within the remit 
of historical fact and beyond the historical imagination of ‘Chilean reality.’ Just like the 
‘rebirth’ indicated by its name, ‘Colonia Renacer’ re-imagines the possibility of an evil that 
‘Chilean reality’ hubristically distinguishes from itself. Historical consciousness, Bolaño 
suggests, may want to separate itself from ‘evil,’ but in doing so risks making itself blind to 
the rebirth of that very same evil. It is in this context that Schürholz’s ‘withdrawn, stubborn 
and strangely self-confident’269 poetry makes itself understood at once as an artefact of 
totalising Nazism and a miserable cry for help. 
Schürholz’s first poetry ‘combined disconnected sentences and topographic maps of 
Colonia Renacer,’ and leads to a ‘series of poetic experiments’ in the literature department at 
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the Catholic University, comprised of huge maps ‘which took some time to decipher, on 
which verses giving further instructions for their placement and use had been written in a 
careful, adolescent hand.’270 When his colleagues realise that the maps are of Nazi 
concentration camps, Schürholz’s poems are discreetly removed in case of scandal—yet he 
goes on to publish several books in the same style: ‘maps of concentration camps 
superimposed on a map of Colonia Renacer, or a particular city (Stutthof or Valparaíso, 
Maidanek or Concepción), or situated in an empty, rural space.’271 Towards the end of his 
career as a poet, Schürholz finds himself ‘catapulted to the very summit of notoriety by a 
group of local and North American impresarios,’ who provide him a team with which to dig 
‘the map of an ideal concentration camp into the Atacama desert,’ and again ‘in the Arizona 
desert and a wheat field in Colorado.’272 
In the support that he receives from both ‘the avant-garde poetry scene, who were 
generally opposed to the military regime’ and the military historians at the fictional ‘Review of 
Thought and History,’ Bolaño emphasises the flexibility of Schürholz’s work to numerous, even 
contradictory, interpretations.273 Indeed, as Andrews astutely notes, this is a move typical of 
Bolaño’s ‘fiction-making system’:  
The point that Bolaño is making is that even if there is a statistical correlation 
between avant-garde aesthetic practice and progressive politics…the two are not 
causally related. Artistic experimenters, like Schürholz and Ramírez Hoffman, 
may be advocates or agents of conservative revolutions.274 
 
That said, Schürholz’s life-size maps are also, I propose, an explicit reference to Jorge Luis 
Borges’ ‘On Exactitude in Science’—and a significant one for discerning the encyclopaedic 
possibility Bolaño uses the story to figure. Just like Schürholz’s later maps, in Borges’ 
fragment an empire’s cartographers are described as having ‘struck a Map of the Empire 
whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it.’275 It is 
significant, that the ‘Tattered Ruins’ of Borges’ cartographers’ map, which is discarded by 
succeeding generations as ‘Useless,’ shares an imagined space with Schürholz’s maps: ‘the 
Deserts of the West.’ 276 Moreover, their shared fictional space can be used to discern a 
temporal trajectory: for if Borges’ fragment, ‘purportedly from…1658,’ attests to a time in 
the distant past when an empire’s cartography totalised and occupied reality, Bolaño’s 
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Schürholz draws plans for the cartography of a Nazi empire were it to expand west, as if that 
possibility persists for the distant future. Indeed, Bolaño gives Schürholz’s date of death as 
‘2029,’ indicating that the text is narrated from the future, and as such secretes greater 
knowledge about that currently-deferred possibility. Invoking Borges in Schürholz’s 
narrative, Bolaño enables us to perceive the immanence, temporal distance notwithstanding, 
of a potential Nazi encyclopaedism that lies waiting to seize reality. 
Bolaño’s ethical strategy, as Celina Manzoni observes, is something like an ultimatum: ‘If 
history cannot formulate suitable questions or is incapable of finding answers in the silence 
of the disappeared, poetry can become its ally.’277 In the fictionalised oblivion of a character 
like Schürholz, Bolaño works to articulate something about history and its potential that 
history itself seems unable to grasp fully—perhaps because Schürholz’s history is emblematic 
of that which makes itself easily overlooked and hard to discern, truth and reconciliation 
notwithstanding. As Bolaño notes, of Schürholz’s unexpectedly popular foray into children’s 
writing, he ‘idealize[s] a childhood that was suspiciously aphasic, amnesic, obedient and 
silent,’ the aim of which seems to be ‘Invisibility,’ as if for Schürholz his survival has 
depended on society’s blindness to him.278 Nazi Literature in the Americas does the opposite of 
Schürholz’s children’s book, working to make visible that to which history is blind. 
The widely-noted structural debt of Nazi Literature in the Americas to Borges’ A Universal 
History of Iniquity is instructive in this regard:279 indeed, if Borges works to ‘restore such evil 
to Enlightenment discourses of “universal history” that construe history, as Hegel does, in 
terms of the emancipatory, truth-disclosing dialectic of rational consciousness,’280 then 
Bolaño makes the restored evil, immanent to those discourses, visible to his readers. This is 
particularly clear in Nazi Literature in the Americas’ ‘Forerunners and Figures of the Anti-
Enlightenment,’ one of whom makes a conspicuously ham-fisted intervention in the history 
of encyclopaedic thought:  
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In 1925…[Luis] Fontaine da Souza published A Refutation of Diderot (530 pages), 
followed two years later by A Refutation of D’Alembert (590 pages), thus 
establishing himself as the country’s leading Catholic philosopher.281 
 
Fontaine da Souza’s refutations do not merely state his position against the famously liberal 
founders of l’Encyclopédie, but tacitly suggest that the humanistic elements of the 
Enlightenment can be rejected while the framework and categories it developed to perceive 
reality ‘objectively’ can be retained. Indeed, in his subsequent pamphlet on ‘The Jewish Question 
in Europe Followed by a Memorandum on the Brazilian Question,’ which ‘explained the threats that 
widespread miscegenation would pose to Brazilian society (disorder, promiscuity, 
criminality),’ da Souza universalises as objective an idea of the world that is contingent on 
the Enlightenment’s racial categories.282 Moreover, da Souza’s classification as either a 
forerunner or figure of the ‘Anti-Enlightenment’ inscribes him, just like Schürholz, from a 
distant vantage point, at which something called the ‘Anti-Enlightenment’ may have achieved 
a form of synthesis—as if from a point at which a Nazi encyclopaedism built on refuting 
Diderot and D’Alembert has been articulated. While Borges’ A Universal History of Infamy 
affirms and elaborates on the ‘infamy’ of figures unincorporated from encyclopaedic sources 
like the Britannica, Nazi Literature in the Americas imagines the capacity of that same infamy, 
incorporated or not, to figure its own encyclopaedism. 
It is important to note, however, that Bolaño’s American Nazism is not merely a local 
coda to Borges’ universal infamy; as Manzoni notes: 
If A Universal History of Infamy seems an immediate part of Bolaño’s lineage, both 
texts also recognise a zone of interchange, of chiasmus, or inversion, in, on the 
one hand, the journey from ‘history’ to ‘literature,’ and, on the other, location, 
where the universality of the Borgesian text looks limited, in Bolaño, to America. 
Ultimately, and in a different sense, not of opposition but of similarity, ‘infamy’ 
and ‘Nazi’ can be read as a corresponding pair: where it says ‘Nazi,’ read ‘infamy’ 
(or vice versa); another method for presenting the figure of the double that, with 
diverse but always worrying variations, is unfolded in this and other texts by 
Bolaño.283 
 
The dialogue between the two texts does not create the opposition or difference of a local-
global binary, but correspondence and doubling: Nazism is not just a particular manifestation 
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of universal infamy, but also a universal outfit for the progress of infamy—after all, as Hoyos 
notes, Nazism in itself is unarguably of European origin and has become, in Nazi Literature 
in the Americas, ‘a displaced figure of globalization.’284 As such, Bolaño’s American Nazis are 
agents of infamy, and their deferred encyclopaedic possibility their tool for achieving 
universality. What is important about the synthesis of that possibility into an actual Nazi 
encyclopaedism, however, is the emphasis it places on the reader and their agency—as the 
entry on Harry Sibelius makes manifestly clear. 
Sibelius’ epic The True Son of Job transforms, uproariously, the lessons of ‘universal history’ 
into a chronicle of Hitler’s conquest of the Americas: 
The structure of the book is modeled on [Arnold J. Toynbee’s Hitler’s 
Europe].…Sibelius, of course, is animated by intentions of an entirely different 
nature. In the final analysis, the British professor’s aim is to testify against crime 
and ignominy, lest we forget. The Virginian novelist seems to believe that 
‘somewhere in time and space’ the crime in question has definitively triumphed, 
so he proceeds to catalogue it.285 
 
The suggestion is, in Sibelius’ reading and subsequent use of Toynbee, that the moral 
compass of any document, and therefore of any period of time, can be oriented towards 
infamy, or Nazism, given the right context. Just as Pierre Menard’s reading of Don Quixote 
animates ‘the plurality of virtual interpretations lying unactualized within any text,’ as well as 
‘the power to lay bare the excess of virtual interpretations over the present moment of any 
concrete enunciation,’ so does The True Son of Job abuse the interpretative openness of writing 
as such in order to figure universal Nazism.286 In this, Bolaño dispenses definitively with the 
assumption that any cultural output could be opposed to evil in and of itself; and in so doing 
responsibility for the dialectical synthesis of his text’s Nazi encyclopaedism is placed with a 
reader active and motivated enough to enable it. That is to say, if The True Son of Job can 
appropriate Toynbee as an outfit for the dialectical synthesis of Nazi encyclopaedism, then 
as a text it is in search of an audience of collaborators or accomplices sufficiently monstrous 
and cunning to collaborate in the intellectual work of joining American Nazism’s dots into 
its idea of the world. And in this Nazi Literature in the Americas leads us straight to 2666: for 
not only is the number 2,666 the page count of The True Son of Job doubled, but its 
bibliographic addenda, ‘Epilogue for Monsters’ [‘Epílogo para monstruos’], implicitly 
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suggests that all that is required is a monstrous readerly genius to join the dots of Nazi 
literature into its totalising semblance for reality.287 
The importance of such readerly genius is not lost on Óscar Amalfitano, who, wrestling 
with his own sanity, finds himself remembering a book by ‘a certain Lonko Kilapán, 
published in Santiago de Chile in 1978,’ sent to him by ‘a wiseass of long standing’ (216): 
This Kilapán presented himself with the following credentials: Historian of the 
Race, President of the Indigenous Confederation of Chile, and Secretary of the 
Academy of the Araucanian Language. The book was called O’Higgins is 
Araucanian, and it was subtitled 17 Proofs, Taken from the Secret History of Araucania. 
Between the title and the subtitle was the following phrase: Text approved by the 
Araucanian History Council. (216) 
 
Amalfitano notes that there are plenty of curious and suspicious things about the book, such 
as its date of publication, ‘1978, in other words during the military dictatorship’ (223). From 
this Amalfitano imagines how one could ‘deduce the atmosphere of triumph, loneliness, and 
fear in which it was published,’ and perhaps even picture the cringeworthy scene in which 
Kilapán, an obsequious ‘gentleman of Indian appearance, half out of his head but hiding it 
well’ (223), persuades Editorial Universitaria to publish his tract at a discount. But he 
immediately notes that by way of a particular approach to reading, ‘it was possible to imagine’ 
other, less patronising scenarios: 
…the active reader—the reader as envisioned by Cortázar—could begin his 
reading with a kick to the author’s testicles, viewing him from the start as a straw 
man, a factotum in the service of some colonel in the intelligence services, or 
maybe of some general who fancied himself an intellectual, which wouldn’t be so 
strange either, this being Chile, in fact the reverse would be stranger […] And if 
Kilapán hadn’t written the book, it might be that Kilapán didn’t exist, in other 
words that there was no President of the Indigenous Confederation of Chile, 
among other reasons because perhaps the Indigenous Confederation didn’t exist, 
nor was there any Secretary of the Academy of the Araucanian Language, among 
other reasons because perhaps said Academy of the Araucanian Language never 
existed. All fake. All non-existent. Kilapán, from that perspective, thought 
Amalfitano…might easily be a nom de plume for Pinochet, representing 
Pinochet’s long sleepless nights or his productive mornings…But there was no 
reason to get too excited. Kilapán’s prose could be Pinochet’s, certainly. But it 
could also be Aylwins’s or Lagos’s. Kilapán’s prose could be Frei’s (which was 
saying something) or the prose of any right-wing neo-Fascist. Not only did Lonko 
Kilapán’s prose encapsulate all of Chile’s styles, it also represented all of its 
political factions, from the conservatives to the Communists, from the new 
liberals to the old survivors of the MIR. (224-5) 
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While Nazi Literature in the Americas imagines that the activation of immanent Nazi potential 
is dependent on certain monstrous active readers, 2666 suggests that active reading can be 
used inversely too, to deduce the traces of evil where it makes itself least visible. As such, just 
as The True Son of Job is an active reading of Hitler’s Europe, in search of an audience of readers 
active enough to collaborate in its construction of a Nazi totality, active reading of O’Higgins 
is Araucanian reveals its commensurability with a totalising fascism. In this, the importance 
of Bolaño’s intellectual debt to Julio Cortázar, who Amalfitano mentions specifically, is 
conspicuous; indeed, Cortázar’s concept of the ‘active reader’ [‘letor activo’], which he also 
refers to as the ‘reader-accomplice’ [‘lector cómplice’], is, I propose, essential to 
understanding the vital agency of the reader in Bolaño’s conception of encyclopaedism.288 
Cortázar’s theory of the ‘active reader,’ which is in many ways an exploration of what has 
since become known as ‘reader-response’ theory,289 is posited in the ‘Expendable Chapters’ 
of Hopscotch (1963), as part of a series of notes belonging to an experimental writer named 
Morelli. Morelli, in much-criticised terms that make explicit the unquestioning misogyny on 
which Hopscotch is premised, defines the ‘active reader’ through its distinction with the 
‘female-reader’ [‘lector hembra’].290 As E. Joseph Sharkey glosses: 
the lector-hembra reads a book passively, a mere witness to the creative production 
of the author; the lector activo, by contrast, consciously participates in the creation 
of the novel he reads.291 
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For Morelli, and by extension Cortázar, the distinction is vital for a theory of a novel that 
can go beyond the subjective limits of the author and represent something like the ‘imago 
mundi’ or ‘mandala’ over which Morelli and Hopscotch’s protagonist, Horacio Oliveira, 
obsess.292 It is worth unpicking exactly how Cortázar figures the relationship between active 
reading and the envisioning of a world picture: 
An exceedingly pedantic note by Morelli: ‘To attempt the roman comique in the 
sense in which a text manages to hint at other values and thus collaborates in that 
anthropophany that we still consider possible. It would seem that the usual novel 
misses its mark because it limits the reader to its own ambit; the better defined it 
is, the better the novelist is thought to be. An unavoidable detention in the 
varying degrees of the dramatic, the psychological, the tragic, the satirical, or the 
political. To attempt on the other hand a text that would not clutch the reader 
but which would oblige him to become an accomplice as it whispers to him 
underneath the conventional exposition other more esoteric directions. Demotic 
writing for the female-reader (who otherwise will not get beyond the first few 
pages, rudely lost and scandalized, cursing at what he paid for the book), with a 
vague reverse side of hieratic writing.’293 
 
For Morelli, traditional novels, like the roman comiques with which he specifically associates 
Ulysses, are ultimately invested in the possibility of holistic, objective representations of 
reality—anthropology [antropología] with the clarity and momentousness of an epiphany 
[epifanía], as he indicates in his portmanteau ‘anthropophany’ [antropofanía].294 Yet just as 
Morelli’s ‘anthropophany’ recalls anthropophagy [antropofagía], or cannibalism, such 
traditional novels limit themselves to themselves—that is, they are built primarily on the 
authority of the author, and as such rely on the idea of narrative as ‘a pretext for the 
transmission of a “message.”’295 For Morelli, ‘there is no message, only messengers, and that 
is the message,’296 which means that the ‘anthropophany’ which traditional novelists ‘still 
consider possible’ is ultimately self-indulgent illusion; as he proclaims, in ‘Another apparently 
complementary note’:  
‘In general every novelist hopes his reader will understand him, by participating 
in his own experience, or that he will pick up a determined message and 
incorporate it. The romantic novelist wants to be understood for his own sake or 
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that of his heroes; the classical novelist wants to teach, leave his trace on the path 
of history.’297 
 
For Morelli, this is facile, gratifying only to the passive ‘female-reader’: 
‘As for the female-reader, he will remain with the façade and we already know 
that there are very pretty ones among them, very much trompe l’oeil, and that in 
front of them one can keep putting on in a satisfactory way the comedies and the 
tragedies of the honnête homme. With which everything turns out happily, and as 
for those who protest, they can go soak their heads.’298 
 
For Morelli, then, the traditional novel is merely ‘content in a closed order’ and, serious 
authors should oppose this, and search instead ‘for an opening,’ which he finds in the appeal 
to ‘active readers.’299 Indeed, in a different note Morelli confesses that the only character that 
interests him is ‘the reader, to the degree in which something of what I write ought to 
contribute to his mutation, displacement, alienation, transportation.’300 This, of course, 
necessitates that traditional narration be jettisoned, ‘[cutting] the roots of all systematic 
construction of characters and situations,’301 and Morelli’s description of a demotic text with 
a ‘vague reverse side of hieratic writing’ is a provocative image of what such a text might look 
like. But to what end all this literary radicalism? What mark exactly does Morelli see the 
traditional novel’s ‘anthropophany’ missing, such that the demotic counter-written by the 
hieratic is the antidote? Towards the end of the ‘exceedingly pedantic note,’ Morelli is explicit 
about why traditional novels written for ‘female-readers’ miss their anthropophanical mark: 
‘The strange self-creation of the author through his work. For out of that magma 
that is a day, the submersion in existence, we wish to raise the power of values 
that announce anthropophany as their end, what can be done then with pure 
understanding, with haughty reasoning? From the time of the Eleatics until today 
dialectical thought has had more than enough time to give us its fruits. We are 
eating them, they are delicious, they are seething with radioactivity. And when the 
feast is over, why are we so sad, brothers of nineteen hundred and fifty 
something?’302 
 
Ultimately, ‘the author’ alone will always be locked in a pattern that re-states the history of 
reasoning, providing a blithe illusion of anthropophany—self-defeating cannibalism derived 
from the refusal to open up to other subjectivities. The cultivation of active readers is nothing 
less, then, than an attempt to move beyond the limits of subjectivity and explore reality in 
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the absolute objectivity inconceivable on an individual basis; as Morelli explains in a different 
note: 
I still thirst for the absolute as much as when I was twenty years old, but the 
delicate twitching, the avid and biting delight of the creative act or of the simple 
contemplation of beauty, no longer seem to me to be a prize, an access to absolute 
and satisfactory reality. There is only one beauty which can still give me that 
access: the one that is an end and not a means, and which is so because its creator 
has identified in himself his sense of the human condition with his sense of the 
artist’s condition. On the other hand, the merely aesthetic plane seems just that 
to me: merely. That is the best way I can explain it.303 
 
To move beyond the merely aesthetic plane, then, it is necessary to ‘[make] an accomplice 
of the reader’: 
‘Simultaneanize [the reader], provided that the reading will abolish reader’s time 
and substitute author’s time. Thus the reader would be able to become a 
coparticipant and cosufferer of the experience through which the novelist is 
passing, at the same moment and in the same form.’304 
 
It is in the co-participation and co-sufferance of author and reader, available only to an author 
willing to write a text ‘that is out of line, untied, incongruous, minutely antinovelistic 
(although not antinovelish)’ 305 and an active reader, that the possibility of envisioning the 
absolute emerges. The connection between a Morellian author and an active reader is the 
space in which a novel would do more than create illusion. Indeed, Morelli asserts that such 
a novel would: 
‘not deceive the reader, not mount him astride any emotion or intention at all, 
but give him rather something like meaningful clay, the beginning of a prototype, with 
traces of something that may be collective perhaps, human and not individual. Better yet, give 
[the reader] something like a façade, with doors and windows behind which there 
operates a mystery which the reader-accomplice will have to look for (therefore 
the complicity) and perhaps will not find (therefore the cosuffering). What the 
author of this novel might have succeeded in for himself, will be repeated 
(becoming gigantic, perhaps, and that would be marvelous) in the reader-
accomplice.’306 
 
Between the Morellian author and the active reader emerge the conditions for ‘becoming 
gigantic,’ articulating the absolute totality of humanity. Little wonder, then, that Wong 
describes the first book he reads by Morelli as seeming like ‘the Great Tortoise turned on its 
back.’307 
																																																						
303 Ibid, p. 475. 
304 Ibid, p. 397; emphasis in original. 
305 Ibid, p. 396. 
306 Ibid, p. 398; emphasis added. 
307 Ibid, p. 440. 
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Morelli’s/Cortázar’s theory of the active reader is, as such, constructed out of both the 
desire to envision the world in its objective, absolute totality, and the belief that such a goal 
is achievable through collaboration. Just as Morelli thirsts to dispense with the mere aesthetic 
and perceive the absolute with the help of his reader-accomplices, Harry Sibelius’ The True 
Son of Job consists of hundreds of disconnected stories ‘that intersect willy-nilly’ narrated 
without ‘any principle’ but ‘produced by the sovereign power of chance unleashed, operating 
outside time and space, at the dawn of a new age, as it were, in which spatio-temporal 
perception is undergoing transformation and even becoming obsolete,’ and so calls out for 
active readers to collaborate in its construction of a Nazi absolutism whose semblance of 
totality could conquer the world.308 Indeed, for Cortázar as for Bolaño, it is only the active 
reader who can use a semblance to develop an idea of the world as ‘everything in everything.’ 
Morelli’s final image for what such a novel could look like is essential for understanding 
how Bolaño uses Cortázar’s ‘active reader’ theory to develop 2666’s critique of encyclopaedic 
thought. In Morelli’s own writing, Cortázar’s narrator explains, the reader is presented with 
‘narrative incoherencies,’ with Morelli maintaining in his notes that ‘the life of others, such 
as it comes to us in so-called reality, is not a movie but still photography.’309 Moreover, Morelli 
insists: 
there was nothing strange about his speaking of characters in the most spasmodic 
way possible; giving coherence to the series of pictures so they could become a 
movie (which would have been so very pleasing to the reader he called the female-
reader) meant filling in with literature, presumptions, hypotheses, and inventions 
the gaps between one and another photograph. […] Morelli thought that the 
existence of those pictures, which tried to present all that with the most acuity 
possible, must have placed the reader in conditions ripe for taking a chance, for 
participating, almost, in the destiny of the characters.310 
 
For Morelli, the suggestion is that the active reader could reassemble anything into an image 
of totality—just like the monsters for whom Bolaño provides the epilogue of Nazi Literature 
in the Americas, or like Amalfitano as he perceives Pinochet’s totalising imagination in 
O’Higgins in Araucanian. Morelli goes on to provide an idealised image for what the 
relationship between the Morellian author and the active reader would look like: such a book, 
he reflects, would have to be ‘something like those sketches proposed by Gestalt 
psychologists, and therefore certain lines would induce the observer to trace imaginatively 
the ones that would complete the figure.’311 Just like looking at a Gestalt drawing, Morelli’s 
																																																						
308 Bolan ̃o, Nazi Literature in the Americas, p. 133. 
309 Corta ́zar, Hopscotch, p. 468. 
310 Ibid, p. 468. 
311 Ibid, p. 469. 
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active readers will join the discrete dots of his text into a world picture—in exactly the same 
way in which a reader of an encyclopaedia could use its discrete entries to reassemble its 
image of the world. 
Of course, although it was easy to get the impression ‘that Morelli had hoped that the 
accumulation of fragments would quickly crystallize into a total reality,’312 it is unsurprising 
to find that he is resistant to the idea of a typical Gestalt image, of the type that coheres into 
something recognisable. For Morelli: 
coherence meant basically assimilation into space and time, an ordering to the 
taste of the female-reader. Morelli would not have agreed to that; rather, it seems, 
he would have sought a crystallization which, without altering the disorder in 
which the bodies of his little planetary system circulated, would permit a 
ubiquitous and total comprehension of all of its reasons for being, whether they 
were disorder itself, inanity, or gratuity.313 
 
As such, in Morelli’s idealised vision, the Gestalt image would manifest itself as: 
A crystallization in which nothing would remain subsumed, but here a lucid eye 
might peep into the kaleidoscope and understand the great polychromatic rose, 
understand it as a figure, an imago mundi that outside the kaleidoscope would be 
dissolved into a provincial living room, or a concert of aunts having tea and 
Bagley biscuits.314 
 
For Morelli, the active reader ought to be able to envision the absolute idea of the world 
from a Gestalt image at least as complex as the inside of a kaleidoscope. 
																																																						
312 Ibid, p. 469. 
313 Ibid, p. 469. 
314 Ibid, p. 469. 
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This image necessitates two major 
conclusions when read in relation to 
2666.315 Firstly, that Amalfitano’s 
ability to read O’Higgins is an Araucanian 
actively, and deduce the fascist imago 
mundi on which it is premised, indicates 
that a key element of creating a 
totalised idea of the world is the 
construction of blind-spots—known-
unknowns to which such an idea of the 
world can refuse to acknowledge. If 
O’Higgins is Araucanian truly is 
commensurable with the Pinochet 
regime, as Amalfitano suspects, then it 
is only so by virtue of its concealing 
and obscuring that same regime—that 
is, by insisting on blindness to those 
features Amalfitano detects in 
Kilapán’s ‘cadences’: 
the butchery of Patricio Lynch, the endless shipwrecks of the Esmeralda, the 
Atacama desert and cattle grazing, the Guggenheim Fellowships, the Socialist 
politicians praising the economic policy of the junta, the corners where pumpkin 
fritters were sold, the mote con huesillos, the ghost of the Berlin Wall rippling on 
motionless red flags, the domestic abuse, the good-hearted whores, the cheap 
housing, what in Chile they called grudge holding and Amalfitano called madness. 
(225) 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, Morelli’s image suggests that, although the encyclopaedia is in its 
nature Gestalt, requiring an active reader to join its dots together, its insistence on coherence 
makes it suitable only for Morelli’s passive and facile ‘female-reader.’ Such coherence 
depends, as Amalfitano’s revelation reading Kilapán indicates, on a blindness directed by the 
power doing the cohering. In this, the significance of active reading, for Bolaño, comes to be 
in its ability to reveal those blindnesses on which ideas of the world depend. 
Amalfitano’s drawings earlier in his section anticipate this revelation, and speak 
suggestively to it as a critique of the encyclopaedic imagination. After Amalfitano hangs 
																																																						
315 Although, of course, Cortázar’s invocation of Gestalt drawings also speaks suggestively to Juan García 
Madero’s drawings at the end of The Savage Detectives. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Amalfitano’s drawings 1-3. (192) 
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Rafael Dieste’s Testamento geométrico on 
the clothesline in his garden, he 
develops the unconscious habit of 
drawing simple geometric shapes and 
writing the names of various thinkers at 
each vertex (Figs. 6, 7). Among the 
numerous ways of reading these images, 
I would add, in light of the text’s 
engagement with Hopscotch, that they can 
be interpreted as filled-in Gestalt 
drawings. In the same way that one 
mentally joins the discrete elements of a 
Gestalt drawing to piece together its 
totality, Amalfitano’s unconscious tries 
to piece together the vertices of each 
shape according to the intellectual 
tradition he knows, as if to try to make that very tradition cohere. Yet the drawings are, as 
Amalfitano notes, ‘something like a joke’: ‘There had to be something funny about it, but 
whatever it might be he couldn’t put his finger on it, no matter how hard he tried’ (194). 
While Bolaño certainly gets a metafictional laugh out of the conspicuous ‘B’ in drawings 
2 and 3, which Amalfitano reckons ‘could be God or the existence of God as derived from 
his essence’ (193), it is also important to note that the drawings’ selection of thinkers is 
ostentatiously androcentric, including not a single woman. Conspicuously, Amalfitano draws 
4-6 while talking to Silvia Pérez about the way the police ‘were carrying out the investigation’ 
of the crimes against women and girls in the city, as if Amalfitano’s unconscious is trying to 
make the world cohere to an androcentric, phallogocentric tradition, without acknowledging 
his intellectual blindness to women. Little surprise, then, that Amalfitano’s final drawing (Fig. 
8) is simply a wall of men’s names, obscuring any kind of guiding shape or pattern, making 
one blind to its ignorance by swamping the entire field of representation. It is as if 
Amalfitano’s unconscious has absorbed one of the drafts Cortázar gives for the ending of 
Morelli’s novel: 
The page contains a single sentence: ‘Underneath it all he knew that one cannot 
go beyond because there isn’t any.’ The sentence is repeated over and over for 
the whole length of the page, giving the impression of a wall, of an impediment. 
There are no periods or commas or margins. A wall, in fact, of words that 
illustrate the meaning of the sentence, the collision with a wall behind which there 
 
 
Fig. 7. Amalfitano’s drawings 4-6. (193-4) 
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is nothing. But towards the bottom and on the right, in one of the sentences the 
word any is missing. A sensitive eye can discover the hole among the bricks, the 
light that shows through.316 
 
Morelli and Cortázar allow for Hopscotch to require an eye sensitive to merely anomaly; for 
Bolaño, however, this is no longer enough. In Amalfitano’s list of names, the missing element 
required to join the dots is that which has been rendered invisible, whose presence has been, 
like the face Amalfitano has just drawn and erased, ‘obliterated’ (207). In this, Bolaño 
presents simultaneously his critique of encyclopaedic thought and his challenge to his ‘active 
readers’: to develop an idea of the world, a blissful and radical vision of everything in 
everything, with an eye sensitive to that to which it is blind. 
It is in this light that Barry Seaman’s aforementioned ownership of The Abridged French 
Encyclopedia, which sticks in the mind of Oscar Fate, though ‘he’d never heard of, in college 
or ever’ (244), ought to be read. Taking up the challenge to see through one’s blindness, 
Seaman’s encyclopaedia, as laughable as it seems in and of itself, becomes a fundamentally 
liberating idea: a total encyclopédie, complete with missing parts (and a conspicuous 
counterpoint to the 
totalising refutations of 
Luis Fontaine da Souza). 
As Seaman explains in 
his sermon, ‘You have 
to know how to look 
even if you don’t know 
what you’re looking for’ 
(251). 
 
4.3 Florita Almada beyond the Labyrinth of Solitude 
 
The importance that Bolaño’s critique of encyclopaedic thought attributes to that which 
goes unseen returns us to his theory of semblance: for if a gestalt, or abridged, 
encyclopaedism is necessarily a semblance of totality that can be used to piece together an 
idea of the world, then it follows that its gaps, or blind spots, or unknowns (both known- 
and unknown-), which constitute the bulk of its vision, take on tremendous significance. The 
gaps between the dots are the negative space that give shape to ideas of the world, which 
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Fig. 8. Amalfitano’s list of names (207) 
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makes looking for them—even though it is difficult to know what they are—so important 
for Barry Seaman. Indeed, the reason that the Americas’ Nazi literature requires readers 
ingenious and monstrous is because the spaces between the dots it provides are so vast. Yet 
while Nazi Literature in the Americas has its fun with those ‘monstruos’ and their non-existent 
corpus, 2666’s theory of semblance, as espoused by Ansky and interpreted by Reiter, makes 
the importance of those gaps between its own idea of the world’s various dots its most salient 
element. 
Reiter’s reflections, immediately after the war, on Nazism as semblance provide a critique 
of that ingenious and monstrous Nazi imagination, which clarify the salience of the gaps or 
blind-spots or unknowns in reality: 
He began to think about semblance, as Ansky had discussed it in his notebook, 
and he began to think about himself. He felt free, as he never had in his life, and 
although malnourished and weak, he also felt the strength to prolong as far as 
possible this impulse toward freedom, toward sovereignty. And yet the possibility 
that it was all nothing but semblance troubled him. Semblance was an occupying 
force of reality, he said to himself, even the most extreme, borderline reality. It 
lived in people’s souls and their actions, in willpower and in pain, in the way 
memories and priorities were ordered. Semblance proliferated in the salons of the 
industrialists and in the underworld. It set the rules, it rebelled against its own 
rules (in uprisings that could be bloody, but didn’t therefore cease to be 
semblance), it set new rules. 
National Socialism was the ultimate realm of semblance. (741) 
 
For Reiter, Ansky’s theory of semblance enables him to formulate the broad ideological 
operations of Nazism as the totalising of reality. In this, that which is unknown or 
unrecognisable or invisible to Nazism is either homogenised in line with its core ideas, like 
the ‘[rebellions] against its own rules’ incorporated as support, or rendered non-existent, 
placed genocidally at the bottom of its order of ‘memories and priorities.’ As Reiter realises, 
it is as if for Nazism the incommensurable and the unknown are at best aberrations in reality 
and at worst ontological impossibilities. The Nazi semblance of totality shapes everything 
into its self-referring ‘realm’ by colonising and homogenising agency and reality, ‘willpower 
and pain,’ and as such makes blindness central to its operation: it indoctrinates its subjects 
with an idea of the world premised on a semblance that is unable to see anything that is not 
already comprehensible to its parameters, whether it is ideologically incompatible or simply 
unknown—as if the coherence of Nazism’s world picture, afforded by blithe certainty in its 
values, were more than merely an epistemology premised on willed ignorance, a semblance 
that exists as an ends in itself rather than a means to reality. 
The only thing, for Reiter, that is outside of Nazism’s semblance is Ansky: ‘Only Ansky’s 
wandering isn’t semblance, he thought, only Ansky at fourteen isn’t semblance’ (741). This 
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is significant because Ansky is, as a Communist and a Jew, exactly the category of human 
whose reality Nazism’s semblance of totality negates: the notebooks of Ansky, in their 
author’s identity as much as in the theories they espouse, teach Reiter that reality can only be 
perceived by way of that to which the dominant power insists its subjects must be blind. By 
approaching Nazi reality through Ansky, one of Nazi reality’s enforced blind spots, Reiter is 
able to identify Nazism’s operation as semblance, and disentangle himself from it: 
He also remembered that in those days he had ceaselessly read and reread Ansky’s 
notebook, memorizing each word, and feeling something very strange that 
sometimes seemed like happiness and other times like a guilt as vast as the sky. 
And he accepted the guilt and happiness and some nights he even weighed them 
against each other and the net result of his unorthodox reckoning was happiness, 
but a different kind of happiness, a heartrending happiness that for Reiter wasn’t 
happiness but simply Reiter. (742) 
 
By seeing reality both through the blindness Ansky represents and with the blindness he 
theorises as semblance, Reiter is able to return not to that which seems like Reiter but that 
which simply is Reiter. The implications of this for 2666 are major: for, if the suggestion 
implicit in Ansky’s theory of semblance is that 2666’s idea of the world ought to be built 
dialectically on Arcimboldo’s optimism in the Four Seasons and his pessimism in The Roast—
that is, that it should create a semblance of totality that returns us to a world that really is 
while simultaneously acknowledging both the predetermined limits of our eyes and their 
susceptibility to ethical blind spots—then the exact way in which our eyes’ credulity is handled 
becomes key. For Bolaño as for Reiter, the only method for picturing the world with a bolder 
ethics, beyond the limits of ‘one’s eyes’ and the ‘grime of the familiar,’ is to try to see by way 
of our blindness—both through and with it—in order to identify that which we cannot see and 
to read it as such (686). Indeed, as El Cerdo describes Reiter/Archimboldi to Norton as 
having: 
‘the eyes of a blind man. I don’t mean he couldn’t see, but his eyes were just like 
the eyes of the blind, though I could be wrong about that.’ (127) 
 
For 2666, by transforming our blindness into sight we can reconceive our idea of the world 
in relation to that which we are, for whatever reason, currently unable to see. 
Developing an idea of the world both through and with our blindness is the central 
challenge of ‘The Part about the Crimes,’ which is given its structure by Santa Teresa’s 
unfolding femicide—an open secret to which all involved, including most of those 
responsible for investigating it, seem committed to making themselves blind. Using the 
herbalist Florita ‘La Santa’ Almada, who ‘had been granted the gift of sight’ (427) in her old 
age, Bolaño explores how the culture’s willed blindness to femicide must be seen both through 
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and with—and in this ‘blind-seeing,’ he suggests, our idea of the world can be reconceived 
beyond an epistemology of strategic ignorance that normalises misogyny and sexual violence 
by making it invisible. Florita is introduced to the novel as having achieved a small but 
significant following among Santa Teresa’s residents, due to her appearances on An Hour with 
Reinaldo, a Sonoran TV chat show, and her rumoured ability to see the crimes in her mind. 
Yet even before her dramatic first appearance on the show, Bolaño introduces her in 
conspicuous terms. Florita, we learn, is ‘experienced in the care of the sightless,’ having been 
born to a blind mother and married to a livestock dealer who, ‘by the miraculous laws of 
symmetry,’ also eventually went blind (431). Although Florita is capable of taking up her 
husband’s work, she finds that ‘a certain sensibility was required’ for buying and selling 
livestock that she ‘in no way possessed’: ‘a certain propensity to blindness’ (431). Indeed, 
what makes Florita a seer, she says, is simply being ‘someone who sees’—a talent she 
demonstrates when she first goes beyond her village ‘to see the world’: ‘Every hundred feet 
the world changes, said Florita Almada. The idea that some places are the same as others is 
a lie’ (427, 430). Florita’s ability to see and discern the differences in amidst the complexity 
of reality enables her to teach herself, since, as she comments, ‘When you know something, 
you know it, and when you don’t, you’d better learn’ (429). Indeed, in a significant metaphor, 
which reaches into the section’s 110 scenes of disinterment,317 Florita likens her ability to 
learn something from each book that she reads to finding ‘a doll lost and found in a heap of 
somebody else’s trash’ (431): if 2666 seeks to reimagine the world according to that to which 
we are made blind, Florita’s metaphor insists that such a vision must incorporate the disposed 
girls and women of Santa Teresa. As Florita eventually explains to Sergio González, when 
asked about her ability to ‘see the deaths that had taken place in Santa Teresa,’ in terms that 
foreshadow those of Entrescu: 
Sometimes, like anybody, she saw things, and the things she saw weren’t 
necessarily visions but things she imagined, like anybody, things that sprang into 
her head, which was supposedly the price you paid to live in modern society, 
although she believed that anybody, no matter where they lived at certain 
moments saw or pictured things, and all she could picture recently, as it happened, 
were the killings of women. (571; emphasis in original) 
 
																																																						
317 The traces of many of the fictionalised facts in ‘The Part about the Crimes,’ and the sources for each of 
the murdered girls and women, can be found in the journalist Sergio González Rodríguez’s as-yet 
untranslated account of the femicide in Ciudad Juárez, Huesos en el desierto [Bones in the Desert]. See: Roberto 
Bolaño, Between Parentheses: Essays, Articles and Speeches, 1998-2003, trans. by Natasha Wimmer (London: 
Picador, 2004), pp. 231–2; Sergio González Rodríguez, Huesos en el desierto, 3rd edn (Barcelona: Editorial 
Anagrama, 2010). For a breakdown of the victims of the crimes in 2666 in relation to their sources in Huesos 
en el desierto, see: Andrews, pp. 205–29. 
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Florita’s dramatic first appearance on the show establishes a series of connections with 
other moments in the novel which are key for apprehending the productive power that blind-
seeing undertakes in 2666. Reinaldo, a loyal client of and devotee to Florita, finds a spot for 
her when she reaches out to him with a ‘message she’d like to make public’ (434). Following 
Reinaldo’s interview with a ventriloquist, Florita begins her segment by speaking about the 
visions she has been having of ‘dead women and dead girls’ (435), clearly alluding to Santa 
Teresa’s femicide. As Florita tries to explain herself ‘as exactly as possible,’ she realises that 
she is going to go into a trance: 
She was afraid to speak, because sometimes the first thing to be seized was her 
tongue. And even though she wanted to, because it would have been a great relief, 
she was afraid to close her eyes, since it was precisely when they were closed that 
she saw what the spirit possessing her saw, so Florita kept her eyes open and her 
mouth shut (though curved in a pleasant and enigmatic smile). (435, 436) 
 
In an unintuitive twist, which clarifies Bolaño’s commitment to harnessing rather than simply 
trying to dispel blindness, Florita’s visions beyond subjectivity come when she closes her 
eyes, not when she opens them. By seeing without the limits imposed by her physical eyes, 
Florita enables herself to be possessed by a spirit that can show her that which she cannot 
see—she looks through her blindness by looking with her blindness. As such, Florita reaches: 
the moment of revelation, unsolicited and afterward uncomprehended, the kind 
of revelation that flashes past and leaves us with only the certainty of a void, a 
void that very quickly escapes even the word that contains it. […] Poor things, 
she thought, they must be feeling so sorry for me. And then she couldn’t help it 
and she went into a trance. She closed her eyes. She opened her mouth. Her tongue 
began to work. She repeated what she had already said: a big desert, a big city, in 
the north of the state, girls killed, women killed. What city is it? […] It’s Santa 
Teresa! It’s Santa Teresa! I see it clearly now. (436; emphasis added) 
 
In this, Florita’s trance manifests something like an allegory for reading: with a text in front 
of the eyes, readers shut themselves off from the physical world only to open themselves to 
possession by spirits from beyond their village and the grime of the familiar, just like Florita. 
Yet, though this allegory is evident and noteworthy, Florita’s blind-seeing does more than 
model the novel’s ideal reader. Indeed such blind-seeing yields, for both Florita and the 
reader, ‘revelation’—a term that carries particular weight in a novel whose inscrutable title 
showcases the infamous ‘number of the beast’ from the Book of Revelation.318 In this 
reference to ‘revelation,’ Florita’s trance is connected directly to the discussion Oscar Fate 
overhears between criminologist Albert Kessler and his Mexican chaperone at a restaurant 
																																																						
318 For a helpful discussion of the use of the number 666, see: Boe Birns, pp. 67–8. 
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on the highway from Tucson to Santa Teresa. Indeed, just as Florita achieves her visions by 
gazing through closed eyes, Kessler is praised by his chaperone for his ‘power to hold a gaze’: 
Then he removed his hands from his face and with shining eyes he said: I don’t 
mean a natural gaze, a gaze from the natural realm, I mean a gaze in the abstract. 
(265) 
 
Kessler’s assent to this compliment, and the idea of a ‘gaze in the abstract,’ is appended by a 
discourse on how such a gaze must see beyond words: 
In the nineteenth century…society tended to filter death through the fabric of 
words. Reading news stories from back then you might get the idea that there 
was hardly any crime, or that a single murder could throw a whole country into 
tumult. We didn’t want death in the home, or in our dreams and fantasies, and 
yet it was a fact that terrible crimes were committed, mutilations, all kinds of rape, 
even serial killings. […] Everything was passed through the filter of words, 
everything trimmed to fit our fear. What does a child do when he’s afraid? He 
closes his eyes. What does a child do when he’s about to be raped and murdered? 
He closes his eyes. And he screams, too, but first he closes his eyes. Words served 
that purpose. (266) 
 
For Kessler, this is an effect of modernity’s relationship with human nature, which has 
produced ‘archetypes of crime’ (266) in line with the hierarchies of the dominant classes of 
society. In this, Kessler notes that ‘crime’ is implicitly defined as an affliction solely of those 
within ‘polite society,’ whereas similar wrongs inflicted on those in ‘the outer fringes of 
society’ would simply not count: 
In the seventeenth century, for example, at least twenty percent of the 
merchandise on every slave ship died. By that I mean the dark-skinned people 
who were being transported for sale, to Virginia, say. And that didn’t get anyone 
upset or make headlines in the Virginia papers or make anyone go out and call 
for the ship captain to be hanged. But if a plantation owner went crazy and killed 
his neighbor and then went galloping back home, dismounted, and promptly 
killed his wife, two deaths in total, Virginia society spent the next six months in 
fear, and the legend of the murderer on horseback might linger for generations. 
Or look at the French. During the Paris Commune of 1871, thousands of people 
were killed and no one batted an eye. Around the same time a knife sharpener 
killed his wife and his elderly mother and then he was shot and killed by the 
police. The story didn’t just make all the French newspapers, it was written up in 
papers across Europe, and even got a mention in the New York Examiner. How 
come? The ones killed in the Commune weren’t part of society, the dark-skinned 
people who died on the ship weren’t part of society, whereas the woman killed 
in a French provincial capital and the murderer on horseback in Virginia were. 
(266-7) 
 
To count means to be recognisable and observable within society; unlike the thousands killed 
during the commune or the millions in the transatlantic slave trade, culture ‘batted an eye’ at 
the provincial French woman and the Virginian murderer on horseback. To not count, then, 
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means that culture’s un-batted eye will see right through you, un-seeing any shared humanity 
and vulnerability. For Kessler, this reveals something vital about how ‘polite society’ polices 
its boundaries with its ‘outer fringes’: 
What happened to [the provincial French woman and the Virginian murderer on 
horseback] could be written, you might say, it was legible. That said, words back 
then were mostly used in the art of avoidance, not of revelation. (267; emphasis added) 
 
If the ‘polite society’ of those who count is able to determine whose lives are legible, then it 
follows that the language it uses to narrate those legible lives ultimately reinforces that 
legibility at the expense of those who are not ‘part of society.’ That is to say, the legibility of 
‘polite society’ becomes a realm of semblance: the ends of society’s imagination, or how it 
wants reality to seem, rather than its means to imagining the world as it really is—of avoiding 
the world rather than revealing it. 
For Kessler, who in ‘The Part about Fate’ is speaking about five years after his state-
sponsored trip in ‘the Crimes,’ this is precisely what is happening in Santa Teresa: ‘everyone 
living in that city is outside of society, and everyone, I mean everyone, is like the ancient 
Christians in the Roman circus’ (267). Santa Teresa and its femicide are, according to 
Kessler’s abstract gaze, a willed blind spot of international capitalism—and that enforced 
invisibility is manifestly obvious throughout the ‘Crimes.’ The narrative constructed around 
Klaus Haas, Santa Teresa’s alleged serial killer,319 provides a succinct example of how this 
willed blindness works at the same discursive level highlighted by Kessler. Following the 
arrest of Los Bisontes, a gang accused of being in league with Haas, a short passage describing 
the response in mass public discourse is given: 
The best Christmas present, read the headline of the story in La Voz de Sonora 
describing the capture of the five pachucos. True, there were deaths. A longtime 
thief whose stage of operations was the city center was stabbed to death, two 
men with ties to the drug trade died, a dog breeder died, but no one found any 
women who had been raped and tortured and then killed. […] There were the 
usual deaths, yes, those to be expected, people who started off celebrating and 
ended up killing each other, uncinematic deaths, deaths from the realm of 
folklore, not modernity: deaths that didn’t scare anybody. The serial killer was 
officially behind bars. His imitators or followers or hirelings were, too. The city 
could breathe easy. (540) 
 
Bolaño’s free indirect discourse makes ironic the pretensions of La Voz de Sonora [‘Sonora’s 
Voice’] to give voice to ‘the city.’ Just like the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century organs 
Kessler cites, La Voz de Sonora imagines its readership and the community of Santa Teresa as 
coterminous, with those outside of the society it has pre-determined not just left out but 
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consigned to the ‘realm of folklore,’ as if their existence takes place in a timeless space with 
no bearing on Sonoran ‘modernity.’ Just as Kessler suggests, language becomes for Santa 
Teresa’s ‘polite society’ a tool for avoidance rather than revelation of reality—with the 
discovery, in the following weeks, of multiple bodies in advanced stages of decomposition 
soon after both quashing any suggestion that ‘The city could breathe easy’ (545-9). La Voz 
de Sonora seems, when read alongside Kessler’s theory of language, to be enforcing blindness 
to the crimes, darkly foreshadowing Leo Sammer’s instruction to the men he tasks with 
digging a mass grave for Greek Jews: ‘Remember the idea isn’t to find things, it’s to not find 
them’ (764; emphasis in original). And of course, as Yolanda Palacio, at Santa Teresa’s 
Department of Sex Crimes, explains to Sergio González, such discursive blindness has 
consequences:  
Do you know how many women are the victims of sex crimes in this city? More 
than two thousand a year. And almost half of them are underage. And probably 
at least that many don’t report being attacked, which means we’re talking about 
four thousand rapes a year. In other words, every day more than ten women are 
raped here, she said, gesturing as if the women were being assaulted in the 
corridor. […] Sergio didn’t know what to say. Do you know how many people 
work here in the Department of Sex Crimes? Just me. (563) 
 
For the Deparment of Sex Crimes, working with the unreported, or invisible, is essential. Yet 
in the realm of polite society’s discursive blindness, it is preferable to let provision for such 
work remain equally invisible. 
If Kessler’s theory of language used by ‘polite society’ as ‘the art of avoidance, not of 
revelation’ [‘más en el arte de esconder que en el arte de develar’] provides the framework 
for understanding blindness to the crimes, Florita’s talk-show revelation [‘revelación’] traces 
a route to perceiving those outside of society and their human vulnerability.320 As such, 
Florita’s revelation is one that eludes language as such, leaving ‘only the certainty of a void, 
a void that very quickly escapes even the word that contains it’ (436)—as if the only possible 
articulable language that a revelation that connects ‘polite society’ with its ‘outer fringes’ 
could take would be one that gazed into the void or abyss of death, the only destiny shared 
by the entirety of humanity.321 Significantly, in this Joyce-like vision of the world ‘upon the 
																																																						
320 While the connection between these two passages is more conspicuous in Wimmer’s decision to translate 
both ‘develar’ and ‘revelación’ as ‘revelation,’ the original Spanish words share as their etymological root the 
verb ‘velar,’ linking each moment through connotations of unveiling. Bolaño, 2666, pp. 339, 546. 
321 As Farred has convincingly argued, 2666 tasks itself with revealing ‘the necropolitics of desubjectivation,’ 
which he defines as ‘the politics of life as, in and (only) death.’ While Farred’s focus on Bolaño’s necropolitics 
is an essential component in understanding 2666’s ethical spine, my argument here engages with death’s 
universal inevitability, rather than its politico-economic use to create what Melissa Wright memorably 
describes as ‘disposable women.’ Farred, p. 698; Melissa W. Wright, Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global 
Capitalism (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006). 
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incertitude of the void,’322 Florita is specifically recalling her vision of Benito Juárez, whose 
wanderings as a shepherd boy inspired her own wanderings throughout Sonora as a herbal 
healer. Florita, by way of a poem she half-remembers, figures Benito Juárez’s thoughts as an 
imagined dialogue with the moon: 
What does this enormous solitude portend? And what am I? And also: This is 
what I know and feel: that from the eternal motions, from my fragile being, others 
may derive some good or happiness. And also: But life for me is wrong. And also: 
Old, white haired, weak, barefoot, bearing an enormous burden, up mountain 
and down valley, over sharp rocks, across deep sands and bracken, through wind 
and storm, when it’s hot and later when it freezes, running on, running faster, 
crossing rivers, swamps, falling and rising and hurrying faster, no rest or relief, 
battered and bloody, at last coming to where the way and all effort has led: 
terrible, immense abyss into which, upon falling, all is forgotten. And also: This, 
O virgin moon, is human life. (432) 
 
Just as Florita imagines a solitary Benito Juárez figuring death as an abyss [‘abismo’], the 
‘unsolicited’ void [‘vacío’] that is fleetingly revealed to her as she envisions Santa Teresa’s 
‘dead women and dead girls’ incorporates a fleeting vision of the mass death beyond the 
reach of everyday language; indeed, it is as if Florita’s blind-seeing enables her to achieve 
Amalfitano’s ‘make-believe ideas’ about jet lag, through which one can ‘[turn] the pain of 
others into memories of one’s own,’ transforming our enormous, portentous solitude into 
communion (435-6, 188-9).323 
Florita’s blind-seeing takes her beyond the limits of subjectivity and the language of 
‘polite society,’ and towards a vision of reality as defined in relation to humanity’s shared 
destiny, against which her, and our, idea of the world can be reconceived. In this focus on 
‘the absolute’ beyond the visible, Florita begins to seem a little like a latter-day version of 
Cortázar’s Morelli. Yet, if Morelli is content with a gestalt image of the inside of a 
kaleidoscope, free from ‘female’ coherence, Florita is aware that coherence is a political 
strategy, and that the absence of coherence from the narrative of Santa Teresa’s femicide in 
itself speaks volumes about the extent of the misogyny by which it is underpinned. Florita 
offers instead, on her second appearance on An Hour with Reinaldo, a way of seeing the crimes 
through and with our blindness to them, in an image in implicit contradistinction to Morelli’s 
gestalt kaleidoscope: 
I’m talking about visions that would take away the breath of the bravest of brave 
men. In dreams I see the crimes and it’s as if a television set had exploded and I 
keep seeing, in the little shards of screen scattered around my bedroom, horrible 
scenes, endless tears. (459) 
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The challenge Florita poses, then, is for ‘lucid eye[s]’324 to make the political choice to see 
through and with their blindness—to reconceive the world in relation to the ‘endless tears’ of 
those outside of society by joining the dots provided by those ‘little shards of screen.’ Indeed, 
Florita asks her audience what it might mean if Sonora’s civic leaders are not working to do 
exactly this: 
Why do they cover their eyes, I ask? Have they been up all night studying how to 
help the country advance, how to promise workers greater job security or pay 
raises, how to fight crime? Maybe so. It’s not for me to say otherwise. Maybe 
that’s why they have circles under their eyes. But what would happen if I went up 
to one of them and took off his glasses and saw that he didn’t have circles under 
his eyes? It frightens me to imagine. It makes me angry. (458; emphasis in original) 
 
Bolaño provides more than a few examples of those circle-free eyes across 2666, not least 
the Negrete twins, who twin the university and the police—but the most pertinent to my 
argument here is General Humberto Paredes, a ‘former police chief of Mexico City’ who 
meets Sergio González and his colleague Macario López Santos at his ‘walled castle in 
Colonia del Valle’ to discuss the snuff industry in Santa Teresa (536). General Paredes’ very 
name, which translates literally as ‘walls’—as if to suggest that he is both in name and nature 
sealed off from the unknown, a solitary police chief of the infinite space in his own ‘walled 
castle’—sets him up as an object lesson in willed blindness. When Macario López asks 
General Paredes for his thoughts on the snuff films, he insists that their existence is unlikely, 
and made even less likely by the fact that he ‘never saw one, when [he] saw and was informed 
of everything’ (536). This, of course, could not be possible, and his insistence that evidence 
does not exist because he has not seen it is outrageously arrogant. Bolaño makes this critique 
legible in the way General Paredes uses his eyes when interacting with Macario López and 
Sergio González—as, for example, when he makes an indulgent joke about his age while 
‘eyeing the reporters’ (536) for laughter. For General Paredes, only that which is determined 
by his desires is visible to him. The ramifications of the General’s propensity to blindness are 
at their fullest when the journalists push him on the snuff industry, suggesting that perhaps 
the industry only reached its current horrors after the General retired: 
The general begged to differ: according to him, pornography had reached its 
fullest flowering slightly before the French Revolution. Everything you might see 
today in a film from the Netherlands or a collection of photographs or a dirty 
book had already been set before the year 1789, and for the most part was a 
repetition, a filip on an already-gazing gaze. (536; emphasis in original) 
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In this, General Paredes’ tacit argument is that nothing could exceed either that which 
occurred before the Enlightenment or that which he has already seen—and as such, he 
wilfully blinds himself to the unknown, denying its possibility or potentiality in the 
contemporary and future. Indeed, before the journalists leave, he insists once again to 
Macario López that he ‘saw everything’ (537) as if such a thing were possible. 
In a wry and backhanded compliment, Macario López tells General Paredes at one point 
that he talks ‘just like Octavio Paz,’ and asks him whether he is currently reading him. The 
General replies that ‘the only thing he’d read by Paz, and this was many years ago, was The 
Labyrinth of Solitude, and he hadn’t understood a single word’ (536). In this curious reference 
to Paz’s famous essay on Mexican identity, Bolaño builds around his walled General yet 
another series of walls: Paz’s metaphorical labyrinth. To simplify Paz’s argument crudely, the 
Mexican’s residence in a ‘labyrinth of solitude’ is an effect of having been ‘expelled from the 
center of the world’ by the violence of conquest, which has estranged Mexicans from both 
their Spanish and Indigenous heritages.325 In this, Mexicans ‘are condemned to search for 
[the center of the world] through jungles and deserts or in the underground mazes of the 
labyrinth,’ but are each alone in the solitude that accompanies ‘a break with one world and 
an attempt to create another.’326 Bolaño suggests that the General is blithely alone in a 
labyrinth, restating his walled solitude—solitude that Macario López observes extends to an 
unusual absence of bodyguards in his ‘walled castle.’ For Paz, the Mexican’s solitude is 
ultimately neither final nor absolute, and is open to different uses; nevertheless, he concludes 
his analysis with a stark warning against what he perceives as modernity’s hubristic and self-
defeating rationalisations for solitude: 
Modern man likes to pretend that his thinking is wide-awake. But this wide-awake 
thinking has led us into the mazes of a nightmare in which the torture chambers 
are endlessly repeated in the mirrors of reason. When we emerge, perhaps we will 
realize that we have been dreaming with our eyes open, and that the dreams of 
reason are intolerable. And then, perhaps, we will begin to dream once more with 
our eyes closed.327 
 
For Paz as for Florita, communion can only be achieved with closed eyes that gaze through 
solitude and beyond the ‘mirrors of reason,’ or semblances, that only reify solitude. For 
General Paredes, conversely, solitude is an opportunity to proclaim oneself exceptional, even 
in the face of the death that makes equals of us all; indeed, as he insists to Macario López, 
even though: 
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if you lose you die and if you win sometimes you die too, which makes it hard to 
keep up a sporting attitude…some of us try to fight the good fight. (537; emphasis 
added) 
 
General Paredes, alone in his walled realm of semblance, demonstrates at once the 
overlap between Paz’s vision of solitary Mexicans and their ‘wide-awake thinking’ and the 
strategically blind that Florita imagines with eyes free of circles. Just as for Paz modern 
Mexicans can move beyond the solitude of semblances of ‘reason’ by learning to dream with 
their eyes closed, Florita insists that we move beyond our solitude by learning to look beyond 
the limits of the visual. Once again, Benito Juárez is pivotal in Florita’s thinking here—for if 
General Paredes uses his solitude to think himself exceptional, Benito Juárez is only able to 
achieve that glimpse into the abyss of death by working with his solitude, ‘facing boredom 
head-on,’ and bearing witness to those ‘terrible things’ on the other side of boredom (433). 
And indeed, while General Paredes uses his solitude to cultivate circle-free eyes with which 
to dismiss contemporary reality as simply ‘a filip’ on a centuries-old gaze, Benito Juárez’s gaze 
leads him, and Florita, to two conclusions: ‘First, not to cheat people, and, second, to treat 
them properly. Beyond that, there was room for discussion’ (536, 433). For Florita, seeing 
both through and with our blindness in order to reimagine the world means confronting the 
death which transforms life’s solitude into communion—and for her, to come away from 
such a confrontation with anything other than an ethics that builds on the fundamental 
equality of all humanity before death would be as worrying as being a politician without 
circles around their eyes. 
Florita’s blind-seeing becomes a means to reconceiving the world in relation to a 
fundamental ethics beyond the semblances, or labyrinths of solitude, that occupy it. Indeed, 
in her final words in the novel, which she says while ‘fix[ing]’ Sergio González ‘with her gaze,’ 
Florita clarifies that her visions of femicide are not about who is ‘beyond the law’: rather her 
vision, she insists, ‘has nothing to do with the law’ [‘aquí no tiene nada que ver la impunidad’] 
(572).328 For Florita, the law is just another totalising semblance occupying reality that, if used 
exclusively to perceive it, blinds one to that which really is. 
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4.4 An Oasis of Horror upon the Void 
 
In spite of everything, Florita is ‘at peace with the world,’ even though ‘Everything in this 
world…no matter how big, was the tiniest spec compared to the universe’ (456). As she 
explains to her TV audience, dreaming can help you to re-situate yourself in the world:  
Well, that was the way it was in dreams. There were dreams in which everything 
fit together and other dreams in which nothing fit and the world was like a creaky 
coffin. (457) 
 
Foreshadowing the differences Ansky attributes to Arcimboldo’s Four Seasons and The Roast, 
Florita observes that the world can seem just as comprehensible, commensurable, and 
blissful as it can inexplicable, incommensurable, and terrifying.329 If 2666 asks whether the 
optimism of ‘Everything in everything’ as visualised in the Four Seasons and the pessimism of 
The Roast’s vision of bloodthirsty horror are anything more than incompatible images of 
totality—whether they can be used dialectically to generate ideas of the world that allow us 
to see what really is with as much optimism as pessimism—then for Florita, the answer seems 
to be that it can. Between her images of the world ‘in which everything fit’ and ‘in which 
nothing fit’ exists for Florita the possibility to see through and with our blindness in order to 
act ethically and responsibly—a feeling she associates with a ‘small and shining inner peace’ 
(457). 
Central to this dialectic is peace with incompletion and inconsistency—as if the only way 
to move beyond the extremes of optimism and pessimism is by acknowledging the implicit 
failures in the respective visions of each. For 2666, this is summed up by the line from Charles 
Baudelaire’s ‘The Voyage’ that Bolaño uses as its epigraph: ‘An oasis of horror in a desert of 
boredom.’ If the Four Seasons is an oasis and The Roast is horror, it is only with both that we 
can see through our millennial boredom—to be able to perceive the desert in which we find 
ourselves, and the death by which we are surrounded. Only in this way can a new idea of the 
world, conceived by bolder ethical steps, be generated. Indeed, as Bolaño provocatively 
suggests in his reading of ‘The Voyage’ in his essay ‘Literature + Illness = Illness’: 
An oasis is always an oasis, especially if you come to it from a desert of boredom. 
In an oasis you can drink, eat, tend to your wounds, and rest, but if it’s an oasis 
of horror, if that’s the only sort there is, the traveler will be able to confirm, and 
this time irrefutably, that the flesh is sad, that the day comes when all the books 
have indeed been read, and that travel is the pursuit of a mirage. All the 
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indications are that every oasis in existence has either attained or is drifting toward 
the condition of horror.330 
 
The critics Norton, Pelletier, and Espinoza approach the world without this dialectic, 
allowing their Eurocentric semblance to register that which is real as simply unreal or non-
existent—and the example they set is worth unpicking, to get a sense of precisely the extent 
to which Bolaño’s idea of the world aims to reshape epistemology fundamentally. On 
reaching Santa Teresa, ‘an environment whose language they refused to recognize,’ the critics’ 
inability to think without Eurocentrism is laid bare: 
At the hotel they found a note from Augusto Guerra, the dean of the Faculty of 
Arts and Letters. The note was addressed to his ‘colleagues’ Espinoza, Pelletier, 
and Norton. Dear Colleagues, he had written without a hint of irony. This made 
them laugh even more, although then they were immediately sad, since the 
ridiculousness of ‘colleague’ somehow erected bridges of reinforced concrete 
between Europe and this drifters’ retreat. It’s like hearing a child cry, said Norton. 
(112) 
 
In a vision of Eurocentrism that is, like so much of the critics’ behaviour, crude but not 
unfamiliar, the possibility of Europe’s commensurability or even co-existence with as abject 
and infantile a place as Santa Teresa is both laughable and depressing—a binary that looks a 
lot like optimism and pessimism filtered through a Eurocentric semblance of the world. That 
their patronising and arrogant behaviour is premised on their ability to picture the world is 
made explicit in the invocation of Heidegger when describing their initial response to 
Amalfitano: 
The first impression…was mostly negative, perfectly in keeping with the 
mediocrity of the place, except that the place, the sprawling city in the desert, 
could be seen as something authentic, something full of local color, more 
evidence of the often terrible richness of the human landscape, whereas 
Amalfitano could only be considered a castaway, a carelessly dressed man, a 
nonexistent professor at a nonexistent university, the unknown soldier in a 
doomed battle against barbarism, or, less melodramatically, as what he ultimately 
was, a melancholy literature professor put out to pasture in his own field, on the 
back of a capricious and childish beast that would have swallowed Heidegger in 
a single gulp if Heidegger had had the bad luck to be born on the Mexican-U.S. 
border. (114) 
 
It is not simply that the critics are Eurocentric, though they are evidently continuing in the 
tradition of Bartolomé de Las Casas by categorising the Americas as essentially barbaric. 
Rather, as the image of Amalfitano achieving what Heidegger would allegedly be incapable 
of—survival where he ought to be eaten for breakfast—Bolaño suggests that the critics’ 
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European theories for envisioning the world as a whole—specifically, Heidegger’s ‘world 
picture’—take on a new life in the Americas, gaining a new consciousness with their new 
context that makes them toxic for those applying them blindly.331 Indeed, it is as if in the 
Americas European epistemology becomes exponentially more uncertain, and the agents of 
their blind application become devoured by an analysis of reality with diminishing returns. 
As such, for Espinoza and Pelletier, content to dwell within their blindness, Amalfitano is ‘a 
failed man, failed above all because he had lived and taught in Europe’ (114). Conversely, for 
Norton, whose nascent awareness of the ‘unreal or at least logically ungraspable’ foreshadows 
her decision to abandon the critics’ futile quest and join Morini, Amalfitano is simply a ‘sad 
man whose life was ebbing swiftly away’ (113, 114). 
Morini is the obvious exception among the critics, more in his last-minute refusal to join 
the others on their quest for Archimboldi than in his physical disabilities—though, in light 
of the text’s investment in blind-seeing his ‘mild attack’ (35) of blindness near the beginning 
of the novel is auspicious. Inspired by the ‘revelation’ of Marcel Schwob—that our heroes 
live inside us and there is not usually any need to invade their privacy—Morini finds himself, 
after pulling out of the trip to Santa Teresa, unconsciously embarking on a different kind of 
voyage: 
a voyage that would end not at the grave of a brave man but in a kind of 
resignation, what might be called a new experience, since this wasn’t resignation 
in any ordinary sense of the word, or even patience or conformity, but rather a 
state of meekness, a refined and incomprehensible humility that made him cry 
for no reason and in which his own image, what Morini saw as Morini, gradually 
and helplessly dissolved, like a river that stops being a river or a tree that burns 
on the horizon, not knowing that it’s burning. (106, 107) 
 
Just like in Baudelaire’s voyage, Morini finds himself, albeit unconsciously, on a quest to 
apprehend or understand modernity—and for Morini, the ‘new experience’ that the voyage 
reveals to him is that of being humble, meekly resigned to both his solitary subjectivity and 
eventual communion in death. This moment is fundamental for understanding how 2666 
functions as an ‘oasis of horror’: for it is not just that Morini’s ‘revelation’ is bluntly restated 
to Amalfitano, Kessler, and Archimboldi as the advice that they ‘[get] used to it’ (211, 578, 
890), but that the image of the burning tree ‘not knowing’ that it is on fire—but presumably 
knowing other things—comes to stand for the wilfully blind Eurocentric epistemology, or 
tree of knowledge, in which Morini is trained and situated. Just as Heidegger and his ‘world 
picture’ would be devoured by the frontera, Morini comes to realise that, like a tree of 
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knowledge that could not diagnose its own conflagration, Eurocentric eyes could not even 
reveal the end of the world as it happened. Indeed, in a significant parallel, Bolaño historicises 
this tendency: during his division’s campaign in Ukraine, Reiter observes ‘woods that 
suddenly burst into flames as if by means of a mysterious process of combustion, woods like 
dark islands in the middle of endless wheat fields’ (700). As Anksy or Reiter might put it, 
Eurocentric epistemology is a realm of semblance; and for 2666, the challenge is to make 
that epistemology self-aware, open to its inconsistency and incoherence—as if only through 
consciousness of failure can any epistemology seek to be more than a facile refuge for ‘the 
fearful’ (722). 
If, as Fate recalls being told, ‘the secret of the world’ (348) is hidden in the femicide of 
Santa Teresa, it is the kind of open secret inarticulable as such by those involved in the 
secret—not legible, only avoidable. Just like the tree of knowledge unaware that it is on fire, 
the only way, Bolaño suggests, to articulate that secret, and to reimagine the world in line 
with its horror, is by thinking without semblance, allowing for multiple and competing ideas 
of the world to illuminate our blind spots, even if they render the dots that we join to trace 
our subjective ideas of the world incomplete or incoherent. Only in so doing, Bolaño 
suggests, can the dialectic through which we could take a bolder ethical stance to the world 
be enacted, and can the horror be felt as an oasis. 
 159 
5. Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Literary Totality 
 
Bend down the tree of knowledge and you’ll unroost a strange bird. 
Djuna Barnes, Nightwood (1936)332 
 
 
When reviewing the critical scholarship on fictional encyclopaedism, I proposed that the 
field’s origins in the work of Edward Mendelson had led to a tendency to overemphasise and 
conflate authorial ‘mastery’ with ethnonational ‘greatness,’ while at the same time 
encouraging an ahistorical conception of encyclopaedic thought and practice.333 While it is 
certainly possible to argue that Ulysses, Almanac of the Dead, and 2666 are ‘great Irish/Native 
American/Latin American novels,’ it is clear that to do so is to miss the point of their scope. 
These are not texts that aim simply to encapsulate their ‘national culture,’ as Mendelson might 
suggest, or even to negate and overwrite the ‘real world’ with their authors’ own mastery, as 
might Leo Bersani.334 Rather, these are texts that make specific critical interventions in the 
history and practice of encyclopaedic thought—and in doing so insist on the radical potential 
of fiction to reconceive our sense of the world. Indeed, to develop Ronald T. Swigger’s 
argument, focusing on how encyclopaedism in fiction opens up the way ‘a field which speaks 
for and sums up the possibilities of knowledge open to humans’335 can be re-purposed 
through a literary approach to the totalising imagination—an approach that enables one to 
imagine at a totalising level without seeking to create a totality as such. Indeed, while Joyce 
casts his Odysseus in a relationship of cruel optimism with the Imperial status quo by way of 
his desire for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in doing so he relativises the Imperial status quo’s 
totalising imagination by subjecting it to both Stephen’s critique of totality and Molly’s 
gynocentric last word. Ulysses becomes a totality that invites readers to move between 
different totalities—to find in its ‘mocking mirrors’ the world’s obscure soul.336 Very 
similarly, Silko sees the totalising imagination of pan-American settler colonialism 
proscribing and negating those deemed ‘different’—and in this, Almanac of the Dead sets itself 
up as a de-totalising space, that can conceive the reality ‘variously.’337 For Bolaño, although 
the synthesis of a totalising imagination can feel like it is yet to occur, our blindness to the 
horror on which our lives are built necessitates a form of literary thinking that makes us see 
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through and with our ‘propensity to blindness’—and 2666 itself becomes a totality built from 
those things to which totalising imaginations cannot see.338 
Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño all exhibit totalising imaginations—but between Ulysses, Almanac 
of the Dead, and 2666, completion, consistency, coherence, singularity, and certainty do not 
emerge as the contingent features of their imagined encyclopaedisms. Rather, what their 
engagement with the history and practice of encyclopaedic thought demonstrates is that they 
share a sense that thinking through fiction reveals something about encyclopaedism that is 
otherwise contextually inaccessible: that the way whole epistemologies are built requires 
imaginative leaps of faith that leave us both blind to reality and vulnerable to being placed in 
totalised realities that oppress us. For Joyce, Silko and Bolaño, fictional encyclopaedism is the 
manifestation of a peculiarly literary approach to the totality: if encyclopaedism aims towards 
totality, or Mortimer Adler’s complete, consistent, coherent, singular, and certain ‘universe 
of discourse,’339 then fictional encyclopaedism creates a different kind of totality, that makes 
incompletion, inconsistency, incoherence, multiplicity, and uncertainty an integral part of its 
argument. As discussed in the introduction to this study,340 this manifests a sort of ‘totality-
without-totality,’ not dissimilar from Jacques Derrida’s ‘messianism-without-messianicity’—
but, as fiction is the route, we could perhaps begin to talk of literary totality. 
In the context of the scholarship of fictional encyclopaedism, Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño 
tell us least two things. Firstly, they demonstrate the yield of comparative and historicising 
approaches to encyclopaedism in fiction, vindicating Swigger over Mendelson. Secondly, and 
more generally, their examples jointly suggest that fictional encyclopaedism is about creating 
a space within which our sense of the world can be evaluated, without at once normalising 
that totality. Indeed, if, to recall the study of Lindsay Fullerton and James Ettema, the editing 
of Wikipedia is a process both ‘cognitive and normative,’341 a fictional encyclopaedia makes 
the space for the type of epistemic evaluation that can reconceive both how we think and 
how we know what is normal—our senses and our worlds. When Djuna Barnes’ Dr Matthew 
O’Connor says that by ‘Bend[ing] down the tree of knowledge…you’ll unroost a strange 
bird,’342 he encapsulates the spirit of this idea: fictional encyclopaedism contorts the 
epistemology of the status quo and examines the work it is doing to support the strangeness 
of the world we live in. 
 
																																																						
338 Bolaño, 2666, p. 431. 
339 Adler, p. 5. 
340 See: ‘1.1 Imagined Encyclopaedisms,’ pp. 13-6. 
341 Fullerton and Ettema, p. 198; emphasis in original. 
342 Barnes, p. 138. 
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5.1 The Path to Bowling Green 
 
What makes fictional encyclopaedism important, then, is its capacity to construct a 
totality without the elements that make totality pyrrhic, or toxic, or mere semblance. A short 
journey along one of Wikipedia’s lately-forked paths provides an instructive example of how 
and why this remains vital. On 29 January 2017, Kellyanne Conway, U.S. Counselor to the 
President, cited in interviews with Cosmopolitan, TMZ, and Hardball with Chris Matthews ‘the 
Bowling Green massacre’ as justification for the Trump administration’s hastily implemented 
Muslim ban: 
I bet it’s brand new information to people that President Obama had a 6 month ban 
on the Iraqi refugee program after two Iraqis came here, to this country, were 
radicalized, and then were the masterminds behind the Bowling Green massacre. I 
mean, most people don’t know that because it didn’t get covered.343 
 
Conway’s two ‘brand new’ facts—that there had been a massacre in a place called Bowling 
Green and an executive order temporarily banning the Iraqi refugee programme in 
response—were gross distortions of two facts old and uninteresting enough to have been 
scarcely reported: that in 2011 two Iraqi citizens living in Bowling Green, Kentucky were 
prosecuted for attempting to send weapons to insurgents in Iraq, and that the Iraqi refugee 
programme’s background checks were thereafter made more extensive, slowing it down. 
Conway’s promulgation of the type of lie that she had previously described as ‘alternative 
facts’ was widely descried, and led to her perfunctory claim that it was an ‘honest mistake.’344 
But what Conway’s statement reminds us is that the relationship between fact and fiction is 
not straightforwardly binary: ‘brand new information’ that is fictional can assume all the 
effects of information that is factual if it is performed as real. Indeed, Jorge Luis Borges’ Dr 
Yu Tsun, in ‘The Garden of Forking Paths,’ prophesies as much: 
I foresee that mankind will resign itself more and more fully every day to more and 
more horrendous undertakings; soon there will be nothing but warriors and brigands. 
I give them this piece of advice: He who is to perform a horrendous act should imagine to 
himself that it is already done, should impose upon himself a future as irrevocable as the past.345 
 
Tsun and Conway both know that it is not truth at stake in ‘alternative facts,’ but power. It 
matters less whether ‘the Bowling Green massacre’ happened than the assumption that it 
																																																						
343 ‘Kellyanne Conway Cites “Bowling Green Massacre” To Defend Refugee Ban,’ Hardball with Chris Matthews 
(U.S.A.: MSNBC, 2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-w16cyQ8wQ> [accessed 9 April 2017]. 
344 Joe Coscarelli, ‘Kellyanne Conway Admits “Bowling Green Massacre” Error,’ The New York Times, 3 
February 2017 <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/us/politics/bowling-green-massacre-kellyanne-
conway.html> [accessed 9 April 2017]. 
345 Borges, ‘The Garden of Forking Paths,’ Collected Fictions, p. 121; emphasis in original. 
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might have—just as Tsun murders Dr Stephen Albert to communicate the name ‘Albert’ to 
his superiors via the newspaper headlines, Conway promulgates an imagined massacre to 
communicate to her potential allies her anti-Islam white supremacy. 
If you search for information on ‘the Bowling Green massacre’ on Google, the first hit 
is the event’s Wikipedia entry: ‘The Bowling Green massacre is a fictitious incident.’346 As 
discussed in the introduction to this study,347 the encyclopaedia does not mediate the 
boundary between fact and fiction: it reifies legitimate and normative reality. For Wikipedia, 
this is formalised through its ‘General Notability Guideline’: ‘If a topic has received significant 
coverage in reliable sources that are independent of the subject, it is presumed to be suitable for a 
standalone article or list.’348 It is clear how ‘the Bowling green massacre’ presents ethical 
problems for an encyclopaedia compiled according to notability: the topic has indeed 
‘received significant coverage’ but only because it is untrue. Is one of the effects of devoting 
a page to Conway’s ‘fictitious event’ not to deliver her goal of imagining the ‘horrendous 
act…already done’? Does the fictitious event’s ‘notability’ not normalise Conway’s willed 
ignorance of and bad faith against Islam? 
These issues are 
not lost on the 
editors, whose 
discussion is logged 
on the article’s ‘talk’ 
page (Fig. 9). In the 
context of this 
project’s argument, 
one particular disagreement is conspicuous: the historical antecedent presented by the 
massacre in 1643 of refugee Lenape and Wappinger Algonquians, at what is now Jersey City, 
New Jersey, by Dutch colonists, who were based at what is now Bowling Green, New York. 
The massacre, which brought about Kieft’s War (1643-5), is typically referred to as either the 
‘Pavonia Massacre’ or ‘the Slaughter of Innocents.’349 Nevertheless, Wikipedia’s editors find 
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Fig. 9. ‘Talk:Bowling Green Massacre.’ Wikipedia. 2017. (Web. 9 April 2017). 
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themselves in an awkward position when they are obliged to prioritise the ‘fictitious event’ 
over the historical antecedent, as the exchange between Nobs01 and 7&6=thirteen makes 
clear: 
So the actual event is a footnote, and the fake news an artcle [sic]. Is this what 
Wikipedia has become? Nobs01  
 […] 
The actual event is a separate article which is connected with a footnote. The 
fake news is a separate article because it is itself notable. And yes, that is what 
Wikipedia is supposed to be. 7&6=thirteen350 
 
‘Fake news’ overwrites ‘actual event,’ reifying the reality of Conway’s ‘alternative fact’—
implicitly presenting the fiction as more notable, and therefore more real, than the fact. Just 
as the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s ‘Great American Indian Leaders’ exhibition resourced an 
encyclopaedic idea of the world defined from the standpoint of compulsory tribal absence, 
Wikipedia provides little room for optimism about the possibility of decolonial justice and 
study of history within an encyclopaedic framework. 
This is less a criticism of Wikipedia than a critique of encyclopaedic form—and a negative 
demonstration of what it is that makes fictional encyclopaedism so radical, and of such 
enduring significance. In the works of Joyce, Silko, and Bolaño, it is not necessary to make 
the type of judgement required by a ‘General Notability Guideline’: the history of 
encyclopaedic thought and practice reveals the contingency of ‘notability’ on structures of 
power, and a literary totality enables understanding from more than one standpoint. Far from 
accepting the ‘irrevocable future’ with which ‘notability’ threatens to totalise the 
contemporary, fictional encyclopaedism understands that the discipline of encyclopaedism is 
not transcendent—neither divine nor unquestionable—but ultimately the discipline of 
humans.
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